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Abstract 
This thesis explores the origins of the pirate in international legal thought. It takes as 
its starting point the recent wave of piracy off the coast of Somalia, mapping the image 
of the pirate constructed by contemporary legal commentators. The figure of the pirate 
that takes shape is the archetype of illegitimacy and epitome of enmity in international 
law: hostis humani generis. Where and when did this figure first emerge in 
international legal thought? My argument is twofold. First, against dominant 
transhistorical accounts which project the pirate backwards in an unbroken arc from 
the present to antiquity, I show that its juridical identity has been marked by 
fundamental discontinuities and transformations. Second, I locate the construction of 
a distinctly modern figure of the pirate in the emergence of a capitalist world economy 
in the long 16th century. The pirate’s universal enmity, I suggest, was initially 
religious in nature, an ideology rooted in inter-imperial rivalries confronting Habsburg 
Spain with Ottoman, in the Mediterranean, and Protestant, in the Atlantic, threats to a 
universalising Christendom. With the development of an early capitalist economy and 
the growing coincidence of imperial interests with trade, the image of the pirate began 
to change. In the work of Grotius, I argue, its enmity was transformed, the pirate 
rendered not as religious foe, but as enemy of a universal right to commerce. It is this 
new secular figure of enmity, the thesis concludes, that is produced and reproduced in 
modern legal thought. 
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Introduction 
In the wake of the events of 11 September, 2001 and the US’s advertisement of a ‘war 
on terror’, lawyers grappled with competing legal paradigms under which terrorists 
might be treated. How should this figure, neither ordinary criminal nor recognised 
state actor, be understood? How might the war on terror, with its seemingly unlimited 
licence for imperial violence, be justified? International lawyers quickly found a 
homology with another figure of enmity, the pirate. Writing in the New York Times, 
two months after the events of 9/11, Anne-Marie Slaughter declared ‘Al Qaeda 
members are international outlaws, like pirates’.1 Others went further, declaring the 
two figures one and the same: ‘200 years ago, everyone called terrorists by another 
name: pirates’;2 ‘[t]wo centuries ago the fledgling United States prosecuted a similar 
war against terrorism. Only, we didn’t call it “terrorism”, but piracy’.3  
The pirate loomed large, too, in President George W. Bush’s 2002 National 
Security Strategy of the United States.4 The document set out the US’s security 
strategy for the ‘war on terror’, one premised on a policy of pre-emptive strikes against 
an expanding universe of enemies.5 But the strategy also advocated waging ‘a war of 
ideas’ in which terrorism would be assimilated with other forms of illegitimate 
violence: ‘terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide’.6 
Like its doppelgängers, terrorism was a ubiquitous threat to be universally condemned. 
In the National Security Strategy, the invocation of piracy, like slavery and 
genocide, served as a rhetorical shorthand for illegitimacy and censure. But it also 
implied a license for unrestrained violence against those labelled terrorists—for their 
extirpation at will. As one legal scholar put it in the immediate wake of 9/11: ‘On the 
high seas if you saw a pirate, you sank the bastard. You assault pirates, you don't arrest 
                                                        
1 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World’, New York Times, 17 November 
2001, A23. 
2 Richard Leiby, ‘Terrorists by Another Name: The Barbary Pirates’, Washington Post, 15 October 
2001, C01. 
3 Chris Mooney, ‘The Barbary Analogy’, American Prospect, 19 December 2001. 
4 National Security Strategy of the United States (White House, 2002) (NSSUS). 
5 ‘We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or 
use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends’: NSSUS 14.  
6 Ibid. 
 8 
[them].’7 The pirate, and by extension the terrorist, was hostis humani generis, the 
enemy of humankind: a figure who, by his exceptional violence, places himself outside 
of humanity and the protection of legal and moral limits. 
The analogy to piracy served, one critic observes, to legitimise ‘a more brutal 
and unconventional anti-terrorist policy’.8 It was to the figure of the pirate that John 
Yoo, the influential architect of US torture policies, appealed in defending the 
construct of the ‘illegal enemy combatant’, a figure who forfeits all rights of both 
combatant and civilian. ‘Why is it so hard for people to understand that there is a 
category of behavior not covered by the legal system’, he asked in a 2005 interview. 
‘What were pirates? . . . Historically, there were people so bad that they were not given 
protection of the laws. There were no specific provisions for their trial, or 
imprisonment.’ Pirates and illegal combatants: neither ‘deserve the protection of the 
laws of war.’9 
Yoo was not alone in invoking the pirate as model. Terrorists, former NATO 
commander Wesley K. Clark has argued, are ‘like modern-day pirates’ and should be 
treated as such.10 Legal historian Douglas Burgess Jr similarly suggests terrorism 
should be defined ‘as a species of piracy’.11 His recent book is unequivocal, its subtitle 
reading simply: ‘Piracy is Terrorism, Terrorism is Piracy’.12 A plethora of work 
repeats the equation. 
As the ‘war on terror’ continues, invocation of the ‘piracy precedent’ still 
provides the basis for justifications for exceptional treatment of suspected terrorists 
                                                        
7 Dave McIntyre quoted in Leiby (2001) C01. 
8 Mikkel Thorup, An Intellectual History of Terror: War, Violence and the State (Routledge, 2010) 156. 
For a similar warning, see Alan Clarke, ‘Creating a Torture Culture’ 32 Suffolk Transnational Law 
Review (2008) 1, 18. 
9 Jane Mayer, ‘Outsourcing Torture’, The New Yorker, 14 February 2005, 106, 114. Yoo has repeated 
this argument on various occasions. See ‘Interview with John Yoo’, Frontline, 18 October 2005, 
transcript available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html (last visited 30 
March 2018); John Yoo, ‘Obama Made a Rash Decision on Gitmo’, Wall Street Journal, 29 January 
2009, A15. 
10 Wesley K. Clark & Kal Raustiala, ‘Why Terrorists Aren’t Soldiers’, New York Times, 8 August 2007, 
A19. 
11 Douglas R. Burgess Jr, ‘The Dread Pirate Bin Laden’, Legal Affairs, July/August 2005, available at 
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2005/feature_burgess_julaug05.msp (last visited 30 March 
2018). 
12 Douglas R. Burgess Jr, The World for Ransom: Piracy is Terrorism, Terrorism is Piracy (Prometheus 
Books, 2010). See also Douglas R. Burgess Jr, ‘Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New 
International Law’, University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review 13 (2005) 293. 
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such as the practice of ‘targeted killing’, torture, and extraordinary rendition.13 Ingrid 
Detter argues that terrorists are, ‘ipso facto, excluded from the protection of the law 
of war. . . . Like pirates, [they] place themselves outside the family of nations and 
make themselves enemies of mankind.’14 Both, Anthony Colangelo concurs, ‘have 
opted out of the “law of society”’. 15 Pirate and terrorist alike, Louis René Beres insists, 
are to be understood as hostes humani generis, with all nations enjoying a right to 
exterminate them: ‘the only lawful alternative to extraordinary means of remediation, 
including assassination or extrajudicial execution, may sometimes be craven surrender 
to barbarism’.16  
A FIGURE OF ENMITY 
The association of terrorism with piracy may seem an odd connection to make. Pirates 
have long held a prominent place in the popular imagination, from Gay’s Polly to 
Gilbert and Sullivan’s The Pirates of Penzance, Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure 
Island to Barrie’s Peter Pan, Errol Flynn’s swashbuckling Captain Blood to Johnny 
Depp’s dashing Captain Jack Sparrow. Popular cultural representations suggest a 
figure at once heroic and morally ambiguous: daring and cunning, yet sometimes also 
ruthless and violent. Pirates have been celebrated for their oppositional culture, as 
rebellious outcasts seeking to pose a radical democratic challenge to an imperial and 
exploitative social order,17 an inspiration for modern radical groups—the Paris 
                                                        
13 See, e.g., Mark V. Vlasic, ‘Assassination & Targeted Killing-A Historical and Post-Bin Laden Legal 
Analysis’ 43 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2011) 259; Frank A. Biggio, ‘Neutralizing the 
Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in the Emerging War on Terrorism’ 34 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law (2002) 1. The Bush Administration’s original justification for the 
lawfulness of targeted killing relied on a 1989 advisory memorandum issued by the then Special 
Assistant for Law of War Matters, W. Hays Parks. Amongst the historical examples cited by Parks was 
an early 19th-century Marine expedition to kill ‘Barbary pirates’ in Libya: W. Hays Parks, 
Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, reprinted in The Army Lawyer, 
December 1989, 4 available at www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/12- 1989.pdf (last visited 31 
March 2018). On the history of targeted killing, see Markus Gunneflo, Targeted Killing: A Legal and 
Political History (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
14 Ingrid Detter, ‘The Law of War and Illegal Combatants’ 75 The George Washington Law Review 
(2007) 1049, 1096-97. 
15 Anthony J. Colangelo, ‘Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the 
Intersection of National and International Law’ 48 Harvard International Law Journal (2007) 121, 145. 
16 Louis René Beres, ‘After Osama Bin Laden: assassination, terrorism, war, and international law’ 44 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2011) 93, 135. 
17 See Marcus Rediker, Villains of all Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Verso, 2004) 176; 
Peter Linebaugh & Marcus Rediker, The Many Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the 
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Beacon Press, 2000); Gabriel Kuhn, Life Under the Jolly 
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Commune, its daily paper bearing the title Le Pirate; the Edelweißpiraten, a prominent 
resistance movement in Nazi Germany; today’s various political Pirate Parties, with 
their calls for civil rights and direct democracy; anti-capitalist protestors hoisting 
pirate emblems.18 Professional sports teams and fan groups bear their name or 
image—Orlando Pirates in Johannesburg; FC St Pauli in Hamburg—and children 
cavort in pirate dress, with eyepatch and sabre in hand.  
This is all a far cry from terrorists—or génocidaires and slavers, in the 
continuum suggested by the National Security Strategy. Indeed, the invocation of the 
pirate as a figure of vituperation in anti-terrorism discourse is all the more striking for 
its contrast with today’s popular cultural representations. Striking, but not surprising. 
For international lawyers, there is little novel in the image of pirate-cum-terrorist. The 
appeal to the pirate as analogy in the context of terrorism was made possible precisely 
because of his longstanding place in the legal imaginary as a figure of extreme enmity. 
Already in 1769, William Blackstone had opined that piracy is ‘an offence against the 
universal law of society’. The pirate, in renouncing ‘all the benefits of society’, is 
reduced ‘to the savage state of nature’ and ‘all mankind must declare war against 
him’.19 Beltway planners and their legal propagandists did not have to look far for a 
model justifying unfettered repression. 
It is this figure of the pirate—an international scourge deserving universal 
reprobation—with which the present study is concerned. The last decade has brought 
its distinctive role in international legal thought once more into sharp relief. Much of 
the recent interest emerged in reaction to the dramatic rise—an ‘epidemic’ if some 
commentators are to be believed20—of maritime violence around the Horn of Africa 
and, in particular, off the coast of Somalia. Peaking in activity between 2008 and 2012, 
these new pirates, commentators warned, were ‘a plague’ that demanded ‘immediate 
                                                        
Roger: Reflections on Golden Age Piracy (PM Press, 2010); Christopher Hill, ‘Radical Pirates?’, in 
Collected Essays, vol. 3 (Harvester Press, 1986) 161; Christopher Hill, Liberty Against the Law: Some 
Seventeenth-Century Controversies (Allen Lane, 1996); Anon, ‘Pirate Utopias: Under the Banner of 
King Death’, 8 Do or Die (1999) 63. 
18 Radical authors also invoke the opposition spirit of the pirate: see, e.g., Tariq Ali, Pirates of the 
Caribbean (Verso, 2006). 
19 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4 (University of Chicago Press, 
1979) [1769] 71. 
20 Eugene Kontorovich, ‘“A Guantánamo on the Sea’: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and 
Terrorists’ 98 California Law Review (2010) 243, 243. 
 11 
and aggressive action’.21 ‘Pirates are not ordinary criminals’, a typical intervention 
held; they are exceptional and ‘can be seized at will by anyone, at any time, anywhere 
they are found’.22 Again, as in the wake of 9/11, the historical identification of the 
pirate as hostis humani generis, enemy of mankind and humanity, was invoked: his is 
an ‘extraordinary, inexplicable villainy’.23  
The image of the pirate that emerges from these international legal 
discourses—from Blackstone to Yoo—is that of a dangerous other: ‘pathogens’ and 
‘parasites’, in the words of some commentators, to be expunged from the body of 
humanity, biological metaphors evoking the exterminationism inherent in their legal 
identity.24 The pirate in modern international legal thought, in short, is the epitome of 
enmity. But not just any enmity: universal enmity. He is a paragon of evil, opposed to 
all and demanding perfunctory annihilation by all. It is this figure of the pirate that has 
become a paradigmatic category in modern international legal thought such that to 
identify the terrorist with the pirate is to legitimise his elimination. 
HISTORICISING THE PIRATE 
The origins of this figure of the pirate and the treatment it evokes is the focus of this 
thesis. The ideological figure of the pirate that emerges from international legal 
thought, as is perhaps already clear from the discussion above, is more than the sum 
total of its modern legal definitions. For example, under the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy is defined as an act of robbery, or other illegal 
act of violence or deprivation, committed for ‘private ends’ on the ‘high seas’ or 
elsewhere outside the jurisdiction of any state.25 (The pirate, by way of contrast, is not 
defined at all.) In a strict definitional sense, then, the assimilation of terrorism to piracy 
makes no sense: the former is said to be inherently political in nature, while the latter 
                                                        
21 Peter Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea (Lawrence Hill, 2010) 1, 4. 
22 Douglas R. Burgess Jr, ‘Thar Be Terrorists!’, New York Times, 5 December 2008, A33. 
23 Shannon Lee Dawdy, ‘Why Pirates Are Back’ 7 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2011) 
361, 374. 
24 William Langeweische, ‘Anarchy at Sea’, Atlantic Monthly, September 2003, 50; Oded Löwenheim, 
‘Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind: British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian 
Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates’, 47 International Studies Quarterly (2003) 23. 
25 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS) arts 100 to 107 and 110. 
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is explicitly defined as apolitical.26 Leaving aside the ideological content of the 
political in this formulation, it is apparent that the pirate performs ideological work in 
international legal thought beyond its strict legal definition—work, for instance, that 
makes it possible to be invoked in the name of fighting and eliminating terrorism. 
Certainly, robbery on land, whether or not for ‘private ends’, has never attracted the 
same opprobrium. Similarly, other forms of maritime violence—the trafficking of 
refugees, say—have a much larger cost in human lives, yet attract nothing like the 
rhetorical or material responses to piracy. What is it about this figure and his 
depredation at sea that calls forth such enmity—that casts the pirate as the mould of 
illegitimacy?  
This thesis argues that the extreme hostility attaching to the pirate lies in the 
threat he poses to capital. The pirate’s depredations—his violence against private 
property—is deemed illegitimate because it imperils international commerce and 
challenges global processes of capital accumulation. Expulsis Piratis, Restituta 
Commercia—pirates expelled, commerce restored—as the official motto of the 
Bahamas had it until recently.27 We can see this in the context of Somali piracy too. 
Its volume—hundreds of attacks on vessels in a period of a few years—was certainly 
dramatic, but the international response it attracted was far more striking. What other 
issue could have united US, EU, NATO, Chinese, Japanese, Iranian and Russian 
navies against a common enemy? Securing commercial circulation over the world’s 
vast ocean spaces requires force: the legitimate violence safeguarding a pelagic plane 
of commercial circulation, the violence of the pirate its illegitimate other. In other 
words, the construction of the pirate as universal enemy in international legal thought 
and the construction of the market as universal norm are two sides of the same coin. 
In this respect, then, the history of piracy and history of capitalism go hand in hand. It 
is onto that history that this thesis seeks to shed light. 
Curiously, that history is almost entirely absent from legal treatments of piracy. 
Contemporary debates around Somali pirates revolve predominantly around the 
adequacy of international law, taking that law as largely given and leaving 
                                                        
26 See discussions around the Achille Lauro affair in, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism, Politics and 
Law: The Achille Lauro Affair (Wiley, 1991); Malvina Halberstam, ‘Terrorism on the High Seas: The 
Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety’ 82 American Journal of 
International Law (1988) 269. 
27 Until independence in 1973: Mark Neocleous, The Universal Adversary: Security, Capital and ‘The 
Enemies of All Mankind’ (Routledge, 2016) 169 note 25. 
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unscrutinised its origins. In this respect, scholarship on piracy in international law 
treads a familiar path: the international law discipline has long borne the stamp of a 
preoccupation with pragmatic, policy- and practice-focused concerns, with an 
attendant poverty in systematic historical inquiry.28 Doctrinal exegesis, ‘foreign 
office’ histories,29 and narratives of progress30 dominate the field. In the case 
specifically of the pirate, it emerges, in effect, as a category seemingly without a 
history, a stable and static legal concept stretching backwards in time. Piracy, one 
lawyer tells us, has existed for over three thousand years.31 Another insists that 
‘[v]irtually all oceans of the world have had a long history of maritime piracy, from 
the early days of seafaring in small, coast-hugging vessels all through the age of oared 
and sailed ships up to the heydays of imperialism.’32 
What is it exactly that international lawyers claim has existed across time? 
‘One great difficulty’, wrote the historian Philip Gosse in 1924, ‘is to decide who was, 
and who was not, a pirate’.33. A certain polysemy is characteristic of the term in its 
everyday usage, at once legal concept, political smear, and cultural signifier. 
Historians frequently apply the term to a range of actions across time involving some 
form of violence against shipping at sea, while presuming an inherent, consistent 
meaning. Is piracy simply the physical act of pillage at sea? It certainly takes that 
character in many popular histories of piracy, a phenomenon existing in these accounts 
so long as humans have travelled by sea.34 As Gosse wrote, ‘piracy, like murder, is 
one of the earliest of recorded human activities.’35  
                                                        
28 See Randall Lesaffer, ‘International Law and Its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love’, in 
Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Maria Vogiatzi (eds), Time, History and International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 27. Martti Koskenniemi’s work has gone some way to reorienting attention 
on the discipline’s history: see, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). See also Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
29 David Bederman, ‘Foreign Office International Legal History’, in Craven et al. (eds) (2006) 43. 
30 On the idea of progress in international law, see Thomas Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in 
International Law Discourse (Asser, 2010). 
31 Robert M. Jarvis, ‘Maritime Piracy in the Modern World’ 6(3) Insights on Law and Society (2006) 
1. 
32 Peter Lehr, ‘Introduction’, in Peter Lehr (ed.), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism 
(Routledge, 2007) vii, vii. 
33 Philip Gosse, The Pirate’s Who’s Who (Floating Press, 2012) [1924] 12. 
34 See, e.g., Angus Konstam, Piracy: The Complete History (Osprey, 2008). 
35 Philip Gosse, The History of Piracy (Dover, 2007) [1932] 1. See also Konstam (2008) 10. 
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But in international legal treatments, if piracy has existed across time, so too 
has it borne a specifically legal impress, the stamp of illegality or, at the very least, 
illegitimacy. Bemoaning the obstacles posed by international human rights law to the 
capture of Somali pirates, for instance, Eugene Kontorovich argues that these ‘make 
it harder for nations to perform the oldest and perhaps most basic law enforcement 
function in international law: preventing piracy’.36 Patricia Birnie’s account is also 
typical in this regard. Pirates, she writes, ‘were robbers who attacked and plundered 
other vessels indiscriminately and violently, roaming the oceans for this nefarious 
purpose’. It is, she insists, ‘an age old offence’ dating to antiquity.37 In her sweeping 
historical gloss, periodic reference to piracy in historical texts is taken as evidence of 
both its timeless existence and its unchanging status as a heinous offense under law. 
Not only is the pirate a timeless figure, but so too, as Kontorovich’s remark 
implies, does his legal identity stretch backwards through time in a smooth arc. ‘More 
than 2,000 years ago’, writes Burgess Jr, ‘Marcus Tullius Cicero defined pirates in 
Roman law as hostis humani generis, “enemies of the human race.” From that day 
until now, pirates have held a unique status in the law as international criminals.’38 
While locating its origins not as distant as antiquity, Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 
suggests that piracy ‘has been recognized as an international crime under customary 
international law since the 1600s, and has continued to be deemed a customary as well 
as a conventional international crime’.39 ‘For centuries there has been universal 
jurisdiction to try pirates’, Michael Akehurst agrees,40 while Kontorovich discerns an 
unchanging consensus on the pirate’s identity as hostis humani generis.41 And Samuel 
Issacharoff, drawing out the concomitant implications of the designation, states simply 
that ‘nothing is more settled than the fact that pirates are hostis humani generis, 
                                                        
36 Kontorovich (2010) 246 (emphasis added). 
37 P.W. Birnie, ‘Piracy: Past, present, future’ 11 Marine Policy (1987) 163. 
38 Burgess Jr, ‘The Dread Pirate Bin Laden’ (2005) (emphass added). As I discuss in Chapter 1, Cicero 
did not in fact use the term hostis humani generis to describe pirates. 
39 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical 
Framework’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Transnational 
Publishers, 1999) 3, 83. 
40 Michael Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ 46 British Year Book of International Law 
(1972-73) 145, 160. 
41 Kontorovich (2010) 251. 
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enemies of all mankind, for whom jurisdiction is universal and punishment 
merciless’.42 
The rhetorical pattern that emerges is striking for its presentism. The pirate’s 
timeless legal disapprobation and transhistorical insidiousness—and the attendant 
license for his extirpation—is invoked as legitimation for his status and treatment 
under international law today. In the very act of invoking history, contemporary 
assumptions about pirates are projected backwards to create a pseudohistory of 
universal enmity. That it is so inherent in the idea of the pirate today makes it hard to 
conceptualise a time where it might have been otherwise. Such presentism is nowhere 
clearer than in Donald Puchala’s suggestion that the English pirate Henry Morgan’s 
1671 attack on Panama ‘must have been for the Spanish colonists . . . what 11 
September 2001 was for the people of New York.’43 
These international legal discourses blur the historical specificity of the pirate, 
producing and reproducing the pirate as a timeless figure abstracted from any concrete 
historical referent. This treatment of the pirate in contemporary international legal 
thought recalls Marx’s criticism of bourgeois political economy. Economists, he wrote 
in The Poverty of Philosophy, ‘express the relations of bourgeois production, the 
division of labour, credit, money, etc., as fixed, immutable, eternal categories’. They 
explain how production takes place in these relations, Marx accepted, but they leave 
unexplained—and unexplored—‘how these relations themselves are produced, that is, 
the historical movement which gave them birth’.44 But as Marx went on to show in 
ample detail, production relations are not static. The mistake of the economists, such 
as Proudhon to whom Marx was responding, was (and is) to ignore the historical 
movement underpinning and throwing up the categories given theoretical expression 
in bourgeois economic theories. History is transformed into a set of static categories—
the market, reified and projected backwards into all human history as ‘exchange’ and 
‘barter’. So too the pirate is reproduced as a transhistorical figure of enmity, the enemy 
of humanity from antiquity to the present. Even those scholars who root the pirate’s 
                                                        
42 Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Pirates Then and Now’, Jotwell, 24 November 2010, available at 
conlaw.jotwell.com/pirates-then-and-now/ (last visited 30 March 2018). 
43 Donald J. Puchala, ‘Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach’ 26(1) 
Contemporary Security Policy (2005) 1, 3. 
44 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (Progress Publishers, 1955) [1847] available at 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy (last visited 2 May 2018) (emphasis 
added). I am grateful to Robert Knox for pointing me to Marx’s discussion of this point. 
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association with illegitimate violence in a concrete juncture—the 1600s, say, as in 
Bassiouin’s brief squib—offer no insight into why it emerged as such. Dominant 
disciplinary discourses abstract from a set of historically specific conditions facing 
international jurists, thus remaining silent on issues to do with the relationship between 
capitalism, interstate competition and international law and expunging from analyses 
questions of political economy. 
How then did the pirate emerge as the archetype of illegitimacy and enmity in 
international legal thought? This thesis takes the pirate in contemporary thought as its 
starting point and seeks to excavate the history behind that category—to identify the 
‘historical movement’, to use Marx’s phrase, which gave it birth. Its focus, then, is not 
simply a prevailing set of ideas about the pirate, but also the material and ideological 
circumstances that generated them, circumstances which the idea of the pirate in turn 
both reflects and distorts. Surprisingly few studies have, until now, sought to do so. In 
the field of law, Alfred Rubin’s The Law of Piracy remains the seminal work.45 Rubin 
traces developments in the legal treatment of piracy across the modern era (with 
particular focus on Britain and the United States), emphasising distinctions between 
natural law and positive law traditions. As a guide to the shifting topography of legal 
argument, doctrine and case law, Rubin’s work remains invaluable. However, Rubin’s 
approach conforms to the standard conventions of legal history, tracing legal doctrine 
and state practice largely abstracted from their material context; international legal 
arguments are presented as free-floating ideas, rather than embedded in changing 
social orders. To the extent that Rubin offers hints as to underlying political-economic 
transformations and specific historical circumstances that make certain legal ideas and 
practices possible and against which they are disseminated and gain purchase, they 
remain just that, hints. 
More recently, in the context of a study of Emer de Vattel’s collective security 
doctrine, Walter Rech offers a lapidary overview of the hostis humani generis concept 
in early modern legal thought, an important supplement to Rubin’s more doctrinal 
account.46 But here too the analysis remains at the level of a history of ideas. In Rech’s 
gloss, we move quickly from Roman enmity towards robbers and other enemies of 
Rome to its marriage with Christian notions of universal enmity associated with the 
                                                        
45 Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (University Press of the Pacific, 2006) [1988]. 
46 Walter Rech, Enemies of Mankind: Vattel’s Theory of Collective Security (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013). 
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devil. Jumping to the 16th century, the now theologically-inflected concept of an 
enemy of humankind is invoked to define the pirate in English admiralty law, as it 
would also be by Locke to define tyrants and anarchists. Rech’s focus is a study of the 
enemy of humankind concept specifically in Vattel’s work, so we can hardly fault him 
for a skeletal preliminary sketch, but like other international legal studies, in vain can 
we search for an explanation for these juridico-intellectual transformations he sets out 
in schematic fashion. Why, on Rech’s account, should the figure of the devil, and the 
religious enmity he represented, come to be associated with the pirate? And why 
specifically at that juncture? 
Beyond the legal field, a number of historical sociological and political studies 
have highlighted the historical specificity of piracy, but paid little attention to its 
ideological role in international legal thought. Janice Thomson’s influential 
Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, for instance, locates the practice of piracy 
within concrete historical processes such as the emergence and consolidation of 
territorial states in Europe. Efforts to combat piracy, on Thomson’s telling, were part 
of a secular process by which various forms of ‘privately’ owned means of violence 
were suppressed as territorial states consolidated their monopoly on legitimate 
violence.47 Yet in this Weberian narrative, the pirate quickly loses any specificity vis-
à-vis other forms of private violence, while the historically-contingent nature of 
distinctions between, say, ‘public’ and ‘private’ or ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are elided, 
these categories, like the pirate in international legal thought, unhelpfully naturalised. 
A quite different approach is suggested by a number of social historians. The 
work of scholars such as Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, as well as the earlier 
work of Christopher Hill, for instance, situate 17th and early 18th century piracy 
within a story about the origins of capitalism and the building of empire.48 On this 
approach, pirates are understood not simply as purveyors of private violence, but 
rather as part of a new proletariat, the outcome of fundamental changes in the 
organisation of a transatlantic political economy. State efforts to suppress piracy, 
including legal penalties, emerged in this story coeval with the reorganisation of 
labour and society around capitalist social relations and the creation of the Atlantic as 
                                                        
47 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns (Princeton University Press, 1994) 3. 
48 Linebaugh & Rediker (2000); Rediker (2004); Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue 
Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1987); Hill (1986). 
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‘a zone for the accumulation of capital’.49 Yet, if they locate piracy within and in 
relation to concrete historical processes—decline of private violence vis-à-vis the 
state’s emerging monopoly on violence; transition in modes of imperialism; 
construction of a capitalist hydrarchy—these literatures have little to say about 
international legal developments. That is, while they accurately direct our attention to 
material processes and concrete historical transitions underlying the changing legal 
landscape as it concerns piracy, they have little to tell us about the legal topography 
itself.  
Finally, two recent books are particularly relevant to this study and it is worth 
distinguishing my own approach. The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations, 
by the literary scholar and translator of Agamben, Daniel Heller-Roazen, attempts a 
wide-ranging history of piracy in international law from antiquity to the present.50 Yet 
it falls short of its ambition, its schematic chapters, no more than vignettes really, 
offering at best fleeting windows onto the intellectual and legal idea of the pirate at 
various historical junctures. Although Heller-Roazen’s study captures elements of a 
changing figure in legal thought, he nonetheless insists on generalising from concrete 
historical instantiations to posit a universal—and once more transhistorical—pirate 
paradigm, one abstract enough to endure over time and capture in its definitional net 
not only maritime plunder but, once more, today’s terrorist. 
A second book, this one from the international relations discipline, is far richer 
in historical detail and theoretical sophistication, but nonetheless falls into a similar 
trap. Nonetheless, it is worth considering in some detail, if only for its influence on 
my own study. How is it, Amedeo Policante asks in The Pirate Myth: Genealogies of 
an Imperial Concept, that the littoral figure of the pirate came to be excoriated as the 
enemy of humanity, to be hunted down and eliminated from the world’s pelagic 
spaces?51 Policante offers an ambitious and erudite genealogy of the concept of piracy 
and its constitutive role in international relations. Yet, like the legal scholars discussed 
above, his focus is on continuity: tracing the arc of enmity from antiquity to the present 
day, he suggests a ‘structural relationship’, across historical epochs, between empire 
and piracy. Empire, according to Policante, has always required the pirate, an 
                                                        
49 Linebaugh & Rediker (2000) 144. 
50 Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (Zone Books, 2009). 
51 Amedeo Policante, The Pirate Myth: Genealogies of an Imperial Concept (Routledge, 2015). I 
discuss this book in more detail in Tor Krever, ‘Hostis humani’ 195 Radical Philosophy (2016) 62. 
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untameable Other against which imperial power is called to action. ‘Over and over 
again in history’, he writes, ‘hegemonic forces have tried to legitimize their claims to 
some form of global Imperial authority by appealing to the existence of pirates’.52 
Yet there is a tension at the heart of The Pirate Myth between the historical 
continuities in piracy’s relationship to empire that Policante wishes to emphasise and 
the fundamental discontinuities in the juridical constructions he describes. At the 
discursive level, certainly, empires have consistently couched their violence in a 
rhetoric of service to humanity. The thread that connects political communities on the 
margins of the ancient Mediterranean, Protestant adventurers challenging Catholic 
hegemony in the New World, a denationalised Atlantic proletariat, and indigenous 
Malay communities subjected to colonial genocide is just that: discursive. However, 
a careful reading of Policante’s own historical examples reveals, as I argue in this 
thesis, that the juridical identity of the pirate and the legal concomitants attaching to 
that identity have been marked by fundamental discontinuities and transformations 
coeval with the political-economic upheavals of the past millennium. As both 
Policante and I argue, the distinctly modern construction of the pirate as enemy of a 
universal right to trade and the attendant license to extirpate them through the 
unfolding of a universal jurisdiction was the juridical concomitant specifically to the 
making of a capitalist world economy. And yet, Policante nonetheless seeks to force 
these new legal developments into the theoretical straightjacket of his empire-pirate 
dyad. So, for example, in describing nineteenth-century British hegemony, Policante 
wants to map classical imperialism onto past forms. Roman efforts to suppress 
Cilicans, we learn, were part of the very same nineteenth-century paradigm of violence 
‘concerned with the perpetual securitization of the world-market’.53 In seeking to 
interpret the imperial Rome of antiquity, the Habsburg empire of the ‘discoveries’, the 
classical imperialism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and American 
hegemony in the advanced capitalist world all in terms of his empire-pirate dyad, 
Policante elides the fundamental differences between imperial formations, their 
contrasting logics dissolving into the background against which a supposedly 
transhistorical paradigm stands in sharp relief. While The Pirate Myth rescues the 
pirate from the marginalia of international relations, throwing a light on his role as a 
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53 Ibid 88.  
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constant lodestar in a fluid seascape of imperial violence, once more historical 
specificity is lost to an under-theorised transhistoricism. 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis seeks to understand the origins of the pirate, an archetypal figure of enmity, 
in international legal thought, offering an account of its emergence and development 
that, in contrast with the ahistoricism of much legal literature, emphasises the 
historical specificity of the concept and its historical rootedness in particular social 
and political-economic conditions. Its methodological focus is not on the minutiae of 
original archival, epigraphic and archaeological records of the past. Nor does it seek 
to rewrite the history of piracy or entertain pretensions to exhaustive totalization. 
Rather, through a synthesis of historical developments and drawing on an array of 
literatures—historical, political, cultural, and legal texts—this study emphasises the 
contingent character of the pirate in international legal thought and locates its origins 
in the concrete context of inter-imperial rivalry and the world historical 
transformations of the long 16th-century.54 
The thesis begins, in Chapter 1, with the modern figure of the pirate in 
international legal thought and fleshes out the brief sketch offered above. Reflecting 
on both popular cultural and legal reactions to the recent wave of Somali piracy, I 
show how these responses reproduce a particular image of the pirate as the epitome of 
enmity. Stepping back from Somali piracy, I trace this figure through international 
legal thought more generally, mapping its defining features and its privileged position 
as a paradigm for approaching various other phenomena—slavery, torture, war crimes, 
etc. 
Where then did this figure emerge in international legal thought? Can it, as 
some international lawyers suggest, already be discerned in the texts of antiquity or 
the tides of the medieval Mediterranean? In Chapters 2 and 3, I show that, contrary to 
the timelessly unequivocal figure of evil depicted in modern international legal 
thought, the pirate was in fact for much of its history a far more ambiguous, liminal 
                                                        
54 For the influence of inter-imperial rivalry on international law more generally, see Robert Knox, 
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figure. While the term has been applied to a whole host of characters, from predatory 
coastal communities of antiquity to the Somali fishermen-turned-raiders of today—by 
way of Vikings, mutineers, nautical adventurers, merchants and even sovereign 
states—it has not always carried the same legal and ideological concomitants. In the 
ancient Greek and Roman words, I show in Chapter 2, a variety of terms were used to 
describe individuals and groups who took to the sea to plunder including various 
cognates of ‘pirate’. Such terms did not necessarily imply criminality let alone 
universal hostility; the most prominent pirates of Classical Rome, the Cilicians, were 
coastal raiding communities, engaged by the Roman navy as legitimate enemies in 
war. Even by the late middle ages, Chapter 3 reveals, distinctions between legitimate 
and illegitimate violence at sea, and the association of sovereign states with the former 
and piracy with the latter, was only slowly beginning to emerge. Piracy might result 
in the award of a right of reprisal to recover material losses, but hardly evoked 
universal hostility or its annihilationist implications. 
If the pirate of modern legal thought, with his extreme enmity, is absent from 
earlier historical epochs, when did he emerge onto his pelagic stage? A great deal of 
literature has privileged the ‘golden age’ of Atlantic piracy in the late 17th and early 
18th centuries, when pirates were systematically hunted by the British navy and 
hanged en masse. Certainly by the 18th century, the pirate was regularly defined as a 
universal enemy, as in Blackstone’s philippic quoted above. The globalisation of the 
norm against piracy and the pirate’s characterisation as hostis humani generis would 
continue over the following centuries, promoted greatly by British naval hegemony 
and the extension of a British legal order to the world’s oceans so as to secure its 
empire of free trade. Yet, while the crystalisation of the pirate as hostis humani generis 
in the legal imagination was a secular process extending forwards from the ‘golden 
age’ of piracy, I trace the origins of this process to an earlier juncture, namely the 
long-16th century. 
Chapters 4 traces the emergence of the pirate as a figure of universal enmity to 
the religious confrontations of 16th century Europe. The enmity attaching to the pirate, 
I suggest, has its origins not in earlier legal treatments of the pirate but in medieval 
theological notions of universal enmity associated with the devil. The universal enmity 
that would come to be associated with the pirate, in short, was in its initial conception 
religious in nature. I show how the pirate came to embody religious enmity specifically 
in the context of Habsburg-Ottoman inter-imperial rivalry The pirates that most 
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captivated the European imagination in this period were the Muslim raiders of the 
Barbary coast in North Africa, viewed by Christian Europeans as both heretical Other 
and vanguard of Ottoman expansion. In the religious ideology thrown up by inter-
imperial rivalry, these individuals came to be closely associated with the religious 
enmity directed towards Islam in general, and the Ottoman empire in particular, as 
satanic forces threatening Christian souls and posing an existential danger to a 
universal Christian commonwealth. 
Chapter 5 shifts focus to the Atlantic where the figure of the pirate as religious 
enemy is detached from its Mediterranean origins and brought to bear on other 
heretical enemies, namely English Protestant interlopers in the New World. Here, 
inter-imperial rivalry is once more the context for political-juridical developments, 
now between an absolutist Habsburg empire and an emerging mercantile English 
empire. While English depredations were cast in the Spanish imagination as the 
heretical attacks of a religious enemy akin to the Muslim pirates of North Africa, in 
London they were viewed as a legitimate response to exclusion from trade with the 
Americas.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I turn to the work of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius at the 
start of the 17th century—or end of the long 16th century, in my periodisation—setting 
his defence of Dutch maritime violence, De iure praedae, in the context of an 
expanding Dutch commercial imperialism and its clash with Portuguese claims to a 
monopoly on trade with the East Indies. Grotius, I argue, secularises the figure of the 
pirate, his enmity not directed at a universal Christian commonwealth but rather at a 
universalising capitalist economy. Here, then, lies the origins of the pirate in modern 
international legal thought: the enemy of capital, to be violently expelled from 
humanity in defence of a universal right to trade. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The pirate in modern international legal 
thought 
‘Boat approaching, three point one miles out, astern.’ The sea was calm and the sun 
high on the morning of 8 April 2009, and the small white skiff cutting through the 
turquoise water was clearly visible from the bridge of the MV Maersk Alabama, some 
240 nautical miles from Somalia. Carrying a crew of 20, the larger vessel was on route 
from Salalah, Oman to Mombasa, Kenya with 17 thousand tons of cargo. Warnings 
about pirate activity in the area had reached the ship’s captain, Richard Phillips, but 
he had elected to maintain a direct course rather than lose time diverting the 
recommended 600 miles from the Somali coastline.1 
As the skiff reached the Maersk Alabama, a long, makeshift ladder was raised 
and four young Somali men scrabbled aboard, seizing control of the bridge and several 
crew including the captain. The remaining crew took shelter in the engine room, 
disabling the bridge controls and overpowering one of the Somalis, Abduwali 
Abdukhadir Muse. An attempted exchange of Muse for the captain saw the interlopers 
leave the ship in one of its lifeboats, but with Phillips as hostage. A tense standoff 
ensued between two US Navy vessels dispatched to the scene—the destroyer USS 
Bainbridge and frigate USS Halyburton—and the small lifeboat. The siege was finally 
ended on 12 April with US Navy SEAL snipers killing three of the Somalis and 
rescuing Phillips. A fourth Somali, Muse, was rendered to a New York courtroom 
where he became subject to the first piracy charges brought in the US in over a 
century.2  
The attack on the Maersk Alabama in early 2009 was in many ways 
unexceptional. It was one of more than 200 attempts on ships in East African waters 
                                                        
1 For Phillips’ account of the attack, see Richard Phillips & Stephan Talty, A Captain’s Duty: Somali 
Piracy, Navy SEALs, and Dangerous Days at Sea (Hyperion, 2010). 
2 Ed Pilkington, ‘Somali teen faces first US piracy charges in over a century’, The Guardian, 22 April 
2009, available at www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/21/somali-pirate-trial-new-york (last visited 
30 April 2018). The Ambrose Light, a brigantine taken by Colombian rebels, was captured in 1885 and 
its crew charged with piracy. Muse later pleaded guilty to charges of hijacking, kidnapping and hostage-
taking—the piracy charges were dropped—and is currently serving a 33 year prison sentence. See 
‘Somali pirate sentenced to 33 years in US prison’, BBC News, 16 February 2011, available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12486129 (last visited 30 April 2018). 
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in 2009, while Richard Phillips was one of some 668 maritime crew taken hostage that 
year.3 At most sporadic in fin de siècle East Africa, piracy around the Horn of Africa 
had by 2006 attracted international attention. Between 2007 and 2009, attacks off the 
coast of Somalia increased 200 per cent; in the first half of 2009 pirates attacked 
almost one ship per day.4 While piracy is a global issue—worldwide, attacks reached 
a peak in 2010, with 445 reported acts of piracy; the following year saw slightly fewer 
at 4395—it is Somali piracy that has garnered the greatest international attention in 
recent years, due in large part to its dramatic impact on global trade. Up to 90 per cent 
of world trade is by sea and the passage from the Gulf of Aden into the Indian Ocean 
is especially prominent in the geography of global production: it is one of the most 
important sea lanes in the world with approximately 30 thousand vessels passing 
around the Horn of Africa each year.6 Whereas the early 1990s saw Somali pirates 
target small fishing and recreational vessels, the new century saw large cargo ships 
and tankers held for ransoms in the millions of dollars—up to US$300 million 
collectively in 2009; a single payment of US$10 million for a South Korean 
supertanker in 2010.7 While even these dramatic figures are small compared to the 
total value of goods shipped daily, the economic cost of maritime piracy is potentially 
much higher—as much as US$25 billion on some analyses8—with Somali insecurity 
creating a potential ‘chokepoint’, the ‘blockage of which would quickly and seriously 
                                                        
3 International Maritime Organization, ‘Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: 
Annual Report—2009’, MSC.4/Circ.152, 29 March 2010, Annex 2. IMO data record 59 acts of piracy 
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4 Shannon Lee Dawdy, ‘Why Pirates are Back’ 7 Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences (2011) 
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the Coast of Somalia, 24 January 2011, UN Doc. S/2011/30; Peter Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside 
Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea (Lawrence Hill, 2010) 55. 
5 In the narrow shipping lanes of Southeast Asia, such as the Strait of Malacca, maritime plunder has 
long been endemic, while the oil-rich waters of the Gulf of Guinea are increasingly subject to maritime 
insecurity and violence. See J.N. Mak, ‘Pirates, renegades, and fishermen: the politics of “sustainable” 
piracy in the Strait of Malacca’, in Peter Lehr (ed.), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global 
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Southeast Asia’, in Guilfoyle (ed.) (2013) 13. 
6 Eichstaedt (2010) 55. 
7 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Money in piracy attracts more Somalis’, New York Times, 10 November 2010, 
A10; Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Somalia: pirates attack fishing boats’. New York Times, 21 April 2010, A9. 
8 Mark T. Nance & Michael J. Struett, ‘Conflicting Constructions: Maritime Piracy and Cooperation 
under Regime Complexes’, in Michael J. Struett, Jon D. Carlson & Mark T. Nance (eds), Maritime 
Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance (Routledge, 2013) 125, 127. 
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endanger global supply chains’.9 In fact, commentators insist, so great was the 
potential disruption to the world’s commercial flows that it presented a fundamental 
threat to the very stability of global capitalism.10  
Such a threat elicited a dramatic response—rapid military action, as in the 
attempted hijacking of the Maersk Alabama, followed by new forms of international 
naval cooperation. NATO had a continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden and in waters 
off Somalia’s eastern coast from October 2008 to December 2016.11 The European 
Union’s Operation Atalanta, launched in December 2008 with the creation of a new 
naval force, EU NAVFOR, continues today. In addition to its NATO operations, the 
US Navy also continues to command Combined Task Force 151, established in 
January 2009 and involving naval vessels from 25 countries. Russia, India, China, and 
South Korea have also deployed their own missions to the cortège of naval ships along 
the Arabian littoral.12 In total, these operations have involved more than 30 countries, 
projecting military power not only along international sea routes but also into Somali 
sovereign maritime and territorial space. In May 2012, for instance, EU attack 
helicopters bombed a village in the Mudug region of Somalia’s central coastline—
‘Disruption of Pirate Logistic Dumps’ in Brussels’ preferred nomenclature13—the 
operation against a ‘notorious pirate den’ striking, the New York Times reported, an 
important blow against ‘the scourge of Somali piracy’.14 
While some see in the exercise of North Atlantic military power the spectre of 
imperialism—recalling, for instance, the 1920 British bombing of Somaliland: 21 days 
of ordinance following two decades of failed ground operations15—it has been largely 
                                                        
9 Michael J. Struett & Mark T. Nance, ‘Constructing Pirates, Piracy, and Governance: An Introduction’, 
in Struett et al. (eds) (2013) 1, 4-5. 
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11 From August 2009, NATO activities went by the name Operation Ocean Shield. See NATO, 
‘Operation OCEAN SHEILD’, available at mc.nato.int/missions/operation-ocean-shield.aspx (last 
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12 Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Piracy off Somalia and counter-piracy efforts’, in Guilfoyle (ed.) (2013) 35, 48. 
For a detailed mapping of counter-piracy operations and various efforts at international cooperation for 
the suppression of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, see various contributions in Guilfoyle (ed.) (2013). 
13 European Union Military Committee, ‘EUMC Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions, Revision 
2017’, European External Action Service Working Document EEAS(2018) 133 REV1, 20 February 
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14 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Toughening Its Stand, European Union Sends Forces to Strike Somali Pirate 
Base’, New York Times, 16 May 2012, A4. 
15 See Deborah Cowen, The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade (University 
of Minnesota Press, 2014) 133. On the Dervish wars in Somaliland, see Said S. Samatar, Oral Poetry 
and Somali Nationalism: The case of Sayyid Maḥammad ‘Abdille Ḥasan (Cambridge University Press, 
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successful in suppressing piracy. Since 2012, Somali pirate attacks have decreased 
dramatically, bringing down global averages with it: from a high of 445 attacks 
worldwide in 2010 to 263 per year between 2012 and 2015 and just under 200 in each 
of the last two years. As of 20 May, there have been 89 attacks so far in 2018.16 This 
represents a significant decline since the phenomenon’s height at the end of the last 
decade, although piracy remains of concern for the maritime industry, academic 
commentators, and international policymakers. In July 2016, NATO warned that 
‘Somalia-based piracy has been suppressed, but not eliminated. Pirates still seek, and 
have the capacity, to mount attacks.’17 Last year saw three vessels hijacked along the 
Somali coast, while a number more were fired upon18 and insurance underwriters are 
reportedly concerned that the maritime industry may be ‘letting its guard down’.19 
At its height, Somali piracy was notable not only for the military response it 
attracted, but also the prodigious literature it generated. In this chapter, I consider some 
of these responses, both popular and academic, tracing the figure of the pirate that 
emerges. Stepping back from the specific instance of Somali maritime violence, I then 
turn to the treatment of the pirate in international legal thought more generally, 
drawing out the defining characteristics of what has become a paradigmatic figure.  
CAPTAIN PHILLIPS AND THE CINEMATIC DEPICTION OF PIRATES 
If events in Somalia thrust piracy once more onto the international agenda, the attack 
on the Maersk Alabama attracted particular attention as the first American-flagged 
ship seized by pirates since the early 19th century. In the wake of the hostage standoff 
and his rescue by US Navy SEALS, Phillips was widely celebrated as a hero who had 
put his own life at risk to save those of his crew. US President Barack Obama publicly 
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commended him, stating ‘I share the country’s admiration for the bravery of Captain 
Phillips and his selfless concern for his crew. His courage is a model for all 
Americans.’20 Many of his crew were less charitable, filing a lawsuit against the ship’s 
owner, Maersk Line Limited, claiming Phillips had acted irresponsibly, ignoring 
warnings about pirates in the area and failing to take reasonable precautions to move 
further from the Somali coast.21 The suit was later settled, but in the wake of his rescue, 
it was not only Phillip’s purported selfless heroism that captured the popular 
imagination. The military operation launched to rescue him and, in particular, the 
Navy SEAL Team Six—the same team that would kill Osama Bin Laden two years 
later—were lavished with praise. ‘How Navy SEALS managed a daring rescue of 
Captain Richard Phillips from gun-toting Somali pirates’, read one headline the 
following day.22 Phillips too joined the chorus: ‘the real heroes are the Navy, the 
SEALs, those who have brought me home’.23 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this story of personal heroism, military triumph and 
piratical evil, also captured the imagination of filmmakers. Released in late 2013 to 
critical acclaim, Captain Phillips is directed by Paul Greengrass and stars Tom Hanks 
as the eponymous protagonist.24 Although the film’s narrative focus is the drama of 
attack and rescue—the screenplay is based closely on Phillips’s own account25—
Greengrass seeks to set the immediate events within a broader geopolitical and 
economic context. As the film’s distributor, Sony Pictures Entertainment, puts it, 
Captain Phillips is ‘simultaneously a pulse-pounding thriller, and a complex portrait 
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of the myriad effects of globalization’.26 Greengrass himself has argued that the film 
goes ‘to the heart of the emerging global economy’.27  
The movie opens in Phillips’ New England home as he prepares to depart for 
the Middle East where he will take command of the Maersk Alabama. He speaks to 
his wife of his fears for a new generation of Americans as an unpredictable global 
economy sees jobs outsourced: ‘50 qualified people fight for the same job, but only 
one will get it’. Cut to Somalia where gaunt, impoverished Somalis squabble for the 
job of hijacking container ships. ‘We want money’, they chant. Cut again, now to the 
Maersk shipyard and the unceasing movement of thousands of containers setting out 
along the sea highways of commerce. The two remote worlds of Phillips and the 
Somali pirates here intersect: both, Greengrass wants to suggest, are driven by, and 
exist at the whim of, global capitalism.  
‘I wanted to show that these were desperate young men with no chance of 
employment’, Greengrass has remarked of the Somali pirates.28 Muse, played in the 
film by Barkhad Abdi, explains at one point that they are merely ‘fishermen whose 
lives have been destroyed by industrial fishing boats’. But why piracy?, Phillips asks 
when Muse hints at the need for money that has driven him, and others like him, to 
plunder; ‘if only there was an other way’, Muse responds. In inviting us to empathise 
with Muse as well as Phillips, Greengrass shows us that the pirates are driven not 
simply by some atavistic savagery. In so doing, the film departs dramatically from 
previous Hollywood depictions of Somalis. One need merely recall Ridley Scott’s 
racist and chauvinist Black Hawk Down in which hordes of inexplicably American-
hating Somalis—‘a pack of snarling dark-skinned beasts’, in the words of one 
reviewer—serve as the ‘depraved and savage foil to the innocence and nobility’ of US 
soldiers.29 In Captain Phillips, by way of contrast, Muse is not so different from his 
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American counterpart: ‘I’ve got bosses’, he remarks at one point, explaining his 
refusal to take the $30,000 in the ship’s safe and need to extract a much larger ransom; 
‘we all got bosses’, Phillips replies. Both are ultimately at the whim of political-
economic forces far larger than themselves and, in Muse’s case, the poverty and 
political instability thrown up by those forces. 
If this is the background against which the attack of the Maersk Alabama is 
set, the film itself quickly devolves into more classic Hollywood fare, the ‘pulse-
pounding’ genre piece that Sony Pictures promises. With the arrival of the US Navy 
on the scene, concerns about the global economy are forgotten altogether as the focus 
shifts, in the now fast-paced action sequences, to the calm efficiency with which the 
Navy SEALS take charge, dispatching the four pirates and rescuing their hostage. The 
situation is resolved by a highly coordinated, technically sophisticated and 
overwhelmingly superior military response. If Phillips is a hero, the film is no less 
about the heroism of the military apparatus that saves him.  
Paul Virilio has written of cinema as the production of ‘war paintings’ whose 
task is ‘to imbue audiences with fresh energy, to wrench them out of apathy in the face 
of danger or distress, to overcome the wide-scale demoralization which was so feared 
by generals and statesmen alike’.30 Drawing on Virilio, Mark Lacy has argued that 
cinema is ‘a space where “commonsense” ideas about global politics and history are 
(re)produced and where stories about what is acceptable behavior from states and 
individuals are naturalized and legitimated.’31 Focusing on war films, he notes that in 
some productions, this involves simply rewriting history such that ‘historical and 
moral ambiguity are [sic] replaced by certainty’.32 Cinema places ‘visual order onto 
chaos’ and offers an ideological technology that distances viewers from the moral 
anxiety that might otherwise accompany an intimate acquaintance with war—while 
also subtly affirming the values and instrumental rationality of capitalist modernity: 
‘speed, efficiency, mobility, domination’. At the same time, Lacy notes, ‘there has 
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always been an alternative cinema that uses the power of images to give the viewer 
moral proximity to lives and situations that they may be distanced from’. Gillo 
Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers is the classic example, offering the viewer an often 
disturbing proximity to colonial violence ‘silenced in hegemonic representations of 
history’.33  
Captain Phillips does not give us moral proximity to distant suffering in 
Somalia, only the discrete situation faced by western mariners and soldiers when 
confronted with the consequences of that suffering. Phillips is the likeable everyman 
confronted with the terror of the pirate who, if not the irrational savage of some 
depictions, bursts no less violently and traumatically into the mariner’s innocent, 
morally certain life. We are offered intimacy only with the terror of American hostages 
and the cool heroics and stealthy efficiency of American soldiers. Moreover, in sharp 
contrast with, say, The Battle of Algiers, there is no historical context offered for the 
events depicted—merely the abstract economic context of ‘globalization’, and at best 
a prefatory hint at that. As one reviewer observes, we are offered ‘a tantalising glimpse 
into the lousy choices available to ordinary people in a wartorn, painfully 
impoverished land’, but a glimpse is all it remains. The film’s fleeting attention to the 
socio-economic environment from which the pirates emerge—one marked by 
impoverishment and the desperation of caterwauling Somali villagers—still elides the 
material political-economic forces which gives rise to that environment. Former 
fishermen are no longer able to fish, warlords force and/or entice them to go to sea as 
pirates, and this is all abstractly connected to ‘globalisation’. One might speculate that 
globalisation has contributed to the immediate Somali context, but all that the film 
makes explicit is that global trade has put Phillips and his crew on a collision course 
with the angry, if understandably so, black men. The filmic strategies that offer 
viewers proximity produce certain events—Phillips’ experience and his rescue—as 
accurate and unmediated, while displacing and excluding others—the production of 
poverty in Somalia, say, or the repeated US and US-sponsored military interventions 
that have contributed to the country’s chronic instability. The abstract indictment of 
‘globalisation’ ultimately risks merely inviting a fatalism about the production of 
Somali piracy and the need—and legitimacy—of a military solution: ‘The tiny flicker 
of understanding for Muse’s predicament that sparked at the beginning sparks no 
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more. But the US navy is awesome.’34 In the final analysis, then, Captain Phillips is 
not so different than its cinematic antecedents, just one more movement in the ‘visual 
score for imperial violence’.35 
SOMALIA’S ‘ENEMIES OF MANKIND’ 
Who are the pirates portrayed in Captain Phillips? At one level, they are individuals 
produced by a concrete set of social relations, forced by the vagaries of global forces 
into a life of violence. And yet, by the time the film concludes, Muse and his fellow 
Somalis have been reduced to mere ciphers, one half of a Manichean dyad. Their 
portrayal outside the cinema largely mirrored this. In his 2010 book on Somali pirates, 
journalist Peter Eichstaedt writes of these men as a ‘menace’, attacking ‘anything of 
value that floats’. They are, in his words, ‘a plague’ that demands ‘immediate and 
aggressive action’.36 Many in Washington had already said as much immediately 
following Phillips’ rescue. Then Bush (and now Trump) administration official John 
Bolton urged air strikes and a ground invasion of Somalia to target pirate strongholds. 
‘Unless we go in and really end this problem once and for all, we will simply see it 
grow over time’, he told one interviewer. The use of force, he insisted, was ‘the 
prudential response’ to piracy.37 Even before the attack on the Maersk Alabama, 
Bolton, along with others in the outgoing Bush administration, was calling for military 
intervention in Somalia. Two hundred years ago, he observed in January 2009, ‘the 
young United States decided to use force to stop attacks on its commerce [by Barbary 
pirates]. America was right then, and it would be right today to use force to destroy 
the Somali pirate bases and ships.’38  
The academic response to Somali piracy largely mirrored Bolton in tone if not 
always policy prescription. Pirates, commentators opined, are hostes humani 
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generis—the ‘enemies of all mankind’—or, as some legal scholars put it, ‘enemies of 
civilization itself’39 and ‘enemies of the human race’.40 Only three years after defining 
terrorism as ‘a species of piracy’, Douglas Burgess Jr now insisted pirates were a 
‘species of terrorist’.41 This was a common theme. Writing of the surge in Somali 
piracy in late 2008, David Rivkin Jr and Lee Casey described piracy as, ‘like terrorism, 
part of a broad challenge to civilization and international order’.42 Eichstaedt, too, was 
eager to link the two evils, insisting that Somali pirates were part of a far-reaching 
terrorist network, ‘the tentacles’ of which ‘extend across the Gulf of Aden into Yemen’ 
and as far as Pakistan and Afghanistan.43 Piracy, as his subtitle implied—Somalia’s 
Terrorism at Sea—was of a piece with international terrorism, merely ‘the edges of 
an underground network determined to make Somalia not only a haven for madness 
but a platform for a global jihad’.44  
Hyperbolic vituperation, in short, was the norm. Writing in 2011, Shannon Lee 
Dawdy already observed that most analysts ‘begin with the presumption that pirates 
are arch criminals, foreclosing historical and social analysis with a flat-footed 
vilification of those committing piratical acts.’45 Yet few Somalis involved in the 
maritime contestations of the last decade referred to themselves as pirates or, in their 
native tongue, burcad badeed (a close translation, literally meaning ‘ocean robber’). 
Rather, they preferred the term badaadinta badah—‘saviours of the sea’—or what the 
Anglophone media, if they reported the attitudes of Somalis at all, translated as ‘coast 
guard’.46 Many claimed that in harassing foreign vessels, they were responding to the 
‘rapacious destruction’ of their waters and traditional livelihoods by western powers: 
overfishing by unlicensed foreign vessels compounded by the offshore dumping of 
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industrial waste.47 Yet, as Dawdy noted, such context is easily forgotten once the 
figure of the pirate is invoked. To name the pirate is already to condemn—as enemy 
of civilization, of mankind, of the human race—with elimination, not nuanced 
understanding, the necessary corollary. The production of poverty, uneven 
development, political instability and Somalia’s desperate economic and social 
conditions; a history of foreign intervention from British territorial partition to the 
US’s actual and proxy wars of the 1990s and 2000s; European states’ overfishing and 
the dumping of industrial waste devastating coastal communities’ livelihoods: all are 
rendered irrelevant to the problem of piracy.48 If the geographical modifier in ‘Somali 
piracy’ is relevant at all, it is simply to invoke the imagery of ‘failed states’, anarchy, 
and atavistic savagery.49 
The association of Somalia with illegitimate violence, piratical or otherwise, 
is a familiar trope in the European imagination, from British colonial writing to the 
cinematic tableaus of Black Hawk Down and Captain Phillips. Writing in the mid-90s, 
the ethnographer of the Somali clan system, IM Lewis, could maintain that little had 
changed in the country’s political geography since the 1800s, but for ‘spears replaced 
by Kalashnikovs and bazookas’.50 Lewis was not alone in seeing in the Somali civil 
war a straightforward dissolution of the Somali state back into anarchic inter-clan 
warfare.51 Patricia Williams has written of western media coverage of the war as 
casting ‘every fragment of institutional Somali power in annihilatingly delegitimizing 
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terms’: a local governor became a ‘guntoting thug’, for instance, and ‘Somalis, all 
Somalis, were described as “undisciplined”, “criminal elements”, whose criminality 
involved “stealing from their own”’.52 It takes no great leap of imagination to 
uncritically accept an image of Somalis as pirates, now stealing not only ‘from their 
own’, but from foreign mariners too, with all the connotations of criminality and 
illegitimacy the epithet carries. 
Yet the invocation of the pirate, as already suggested, does more than simply 
reproduce a narrative of innate Somali violence. It is a figure which licenses as much 
as it condemns. For Dawdy, the pirate, with his ‘extraordinary, inexplicable villainy’, 
serves to produce ‘a sort of international “state of exception”’, grouping these Somali 
fishermen-cum-coast guards with ‘terrorists and other enemies of mankind to justify 
the extrajuridical use of force in nonsovereign spaces’ and extend ‘extralegal 
sovereignty’.53 While much of the academic response to piracy has certainly been 
hyperbolic in its invocation of pirates’ status as ‘arch criminals’, the attendant call to 
arms has arguably been anything but extralegal. Rather, the very villainy of which 
Dawdy writes, and which justifies the antipiracy operations described at the start of 
this chapter, is itself a frame of reference imported from international law with its 
presumption that pirates are ‘enemies of mankind’ requiring intervention and, 
ultimately, elimination.  
While Bolton himself was silent on international law, others arguing for an 
equally dramatic projection of western military power were explicit in their appeal to 
international legal authorisation. Much scholarly commentary focused precisely on the 
legal framework for countering piracy, with analyses quick to seize on international 
law’s sanction of the use of force against those identified as pirates. One volume, 
Modern Piracy, edited by Douglas Guilfoyle and bringing together a number of 
prominent legal scholars and practitioners, was almost entirely concerned with 
surveying international legal instruments with a view to elucidating precisely what 
powers are granted to suppress piracy.54 International law, readers were assured, 
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authorises naval warships to intervene ‘pro-actively against pirates’.55 Roger 
Middleton, noting that within the shipping industry there was ‘a perception that 
international law leaves navies weak and able to do little to combat pirates’, was quick 
to set doubters straight: ‘navies do have sufficient powers under international law to 
combat piracy and they are permitted to use reasonable force against pirates. It is 
important that this fact is well publicized.’56 Others went further still. Writing recently 
in the American Journal of International Law, Tomy Ruys suggests that, taking into 
account both UNCLOS and the UN Charter regime, ‘no breach of Article 2(4) 
normally takes place . . . [even] when a state uses excessive force when arresting a 
vessel genuinely suspected of engaging in piracy’.57 
Even Bolton’s call for a ground invasion, most commentators agreed, was not 
outside the realm of legally permissible responses. Andrew DeMaio, for example, was 
in no doubt that the US ‘may lawfully strike Somali pirates in their safe havens’,58 as 
the EU in fact did in May 2012. The projection of military power into Somali 
sovereign territory was pursued and justified in international legal terms. The UN 
Security Council authorised the use of force within Somalia’s territorial waters and 
even land territory in a series of Resolutions invoking Chapter VII authority to use ‘all 
necessary means’ to repress piracy.59 In fact, some legal commentators argued that the 
US and the EU did not actually require this authorisation for ‘pursuing today’s pirates 
into their lairs, and destroying these outposts of lawlessness’.60 Complaining that 
western militaries were failing to take advantage of the legal solutions already at their 
disposal, Rivkin and Casey argued that naval forces had ‘effectively abandoned the 
historical legal rules’ treating pirates as hostes humani generis. ‘[W]hat is lacking is 
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the willingness to use deadly force, manifested through enormously restricted and 
impractical rules of engagement’.61 Burgess Jr similarly insisted that ‘the law is 
surprisingly clear’ but ‘we just seem to have forgotten about it’.62 International law 
‘cuts through the Gordian knot of individual states’ engagement rules. Pirates are not 
ordinary criminals. They are not enemy combatants. They are a hybrid, recognized as 
such for thousands of years, and can be seized at will by anyone, at any time, anywhere 
they are found.’63 Michael Bahar was equally adamant that since at least the 18th 
century, ‘[a]ny nation had a right and obligation to repress pirates, with their warships, 
wherever on the seas they were found—a rule still in effect today’.64 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THOUGHT 
Who then is this figure about whom the law is ‘surprisingly clear’? Piracy is a specific 
crime under modern international law, as well as the name of variously defined crimes 
under the municipal law of a number of states.65 Its international legal definition is set 
out in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which defines 
piracy as an act of robbery, or other illegal act of violence or deprivation, committed 
for ‘private ends’ on the ‘high seas’ or elsewhere outside the jurisdiction of any state.66  
Although today UNCLOS also includes air piracy in its definition, the pirate 
is generally understood to act on the sea—under international law, specifically on the 
‘high seas’ or elsewhere outside the jurisdiction of any state. He is distinct, then, from 
other thieves or bandits on land or even the brigand who attacks by sea on a coastal 
target. Indeed, under customary international law, pirates’ actions must be directed 
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specifically against another ship—‘against another ship or aircraft, or against persons 
or property on board such ship or aircraft’, in the words of UNCLOS.67 An attack 
against passengers on board the same ship, for example, or seizure of a vessel by its 
own crew or passengers is not understood to be piracy.  
Furthermore, the pirate acts for ‘private ends’.68 Pirates are typically imagined 
as small bands of individuals seeking their own private gain. Piracy is thus distinct 
most obviously from warfare, but also from various other forms of public violence. 
The pirate is thus sharply juxtaposed not only with the soldier, but also the mercenary 
or the privateer who act with the authorisation of the state. Of course, parsing the line 
between private and public ends is often difficult or even artificial, but nonetheless, 
one of the most prominent distinguishing features of the pirate in international legal 
thought is that his actions cannot be attributed to a state.69 Similarly, the pirate does 
not act for political ends (although, as with the distinction between private and public 
ends, the line between political and non-political ends is at best murky). A theft, 
hijacking or other attack on the high seas for political reasons is distinct from the 
privately motivated acts constituting piracy.70 This trait has, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
led to significant debate over whether pirates may commit acts of terrorism—a 
terrorist being understood to act with a political purpose—or whether the pirate and 
terrorist are distinct and mutually exclusive identities.71 
The pirate is a sea-faring, unauthorised plunderer pursuing private gain. And 
yet, taking international legal thought more broadly, the pirate also stands for 
something more than that contained in a formal legal definition. He is no mere 
criminal, but rather is understood to be engaged in ‘an exceptional and seriously 
offensive kind of . . . activity’.72 To invoke the label pirate is to identify an individual 
not merely as illegitimate or criminal, acting in contravention of international law, but 
as the embodiment of enmity itself: hostis humani generis. ‘Pirates are renowned 
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within international law for being . . . enemies of the entire human race’, writes Dino 
Kritsiotis.73 Almost two centuries earlier, the US Supreme Court had said much the 
same: piracy is an ‘offence against the universal law of society’ and the pirate an 
‘enemy of the human race’.74 The pirate stands for universal enmity, the paragon of 
evil and heinousness, opposed to all humanity and civilization.  
An important corollary of this standing is the legal treatment that flows from 
the identification of pirates. As Judge Moore explained in his dissenting opinion in the 
Lotus case, the pirate is ‘treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of mankind . . . whom any 
nation may in the interest of all capture and punish’.75 This leap from outlaw to enemy 
of mankind—regularly reproduced in international legal thought but seldom 
explained—is offered as justification for the pirate’s status as subject to universal 
jurisdiction and the license to seize, try and punish him granted to any and every state. 
In Judge Moore’s words, ‘there has been conceded a universal jurisdiction, under 
which the person charged with the offence [of piracy] may be tried and punished by 
any nation into whose jurisdiction he may come’.76 The consensus around the 
appropriateness of such license is today reflected in article 105 of UNCLOS, which 
provides that on the high seas (or any place outside the jurisdiction of any state) every 
state may seize a pirate ship, or one taken by pirates, and arrest those responsible.77  
The figure that emerges from international legal thought is invested with an 
exceptional status by legal scholars, a paradigmatic example of enmity demanding 
extirpation. Gerry Simpson puts it succinctly: where the pirate is concerned, it is 
simply ‘a case of naming them and eliminating them.’78 The pirate is a figure attracting 
universal opprobrium and uncompromising treatment, invoked as evidence of law’s 
progressive potential to stamp out crime and extend a pacific rule of law across the 
globe. The pirate is heralded as the original international criminal, the first individual 
subjected to criminal responsibility under international law.79 Piracy alone was an 
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exception to the general presumption against individual responsibility.80 The pirate’s 
violence is not only the original international crime. Its prohibition is heralded also as 
one of the very first jus cogens norms of international law, from which none may 
derogate.81 Moreover, as Malcolm Shaw explains in his leading textbook, piracy is 
one of the few such norms on which there is complete agreement. This is in 
juxtaposition to other potential jus cogens norms where ‘no clear agreement has been 
manifested’.82 
The pirate features in yet another origins story as the first figure to attract 
universal jurisdiction.83 In fact, a reference to piracy is almost de rigueur in scholarly 
discussions of the doctrine. It is, Eugene Kontorovich proclaims, ‘the paradigmatic 
crime for which international law authorizes and even requires universal enforcement 
and punishment’.84 As Rebecca Wallace explains, the very idea of a ‘universal crime 
over which all states could exercise jurisdiction, regardless of the alleged offender’s 
nationality’, evolved specifically with piracy and its applicability is a rule of 
customary international law.85 Judge Moore had already said as much in the Lotus 
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case,86 and seven decades later, in the Arrest Warrant Case, concerning a dispute 
between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Belgium, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) again remarked on the exceptionality of piracy. Indeed, 
President Guillaume argued not simply that piracy was the quintessential case of 
universal jurisdiction but that it is the ‘only one true case of universal jurisdiction’.87 
If several of his fellow judges disagreed that piracy was alone in attracting universal 
jurisdiction, they certainly agreed that it was the origin of the doctrine and, ‘in the past 
the only clear example of an agreed exercise of universal jurisdiction.’88 Similar 
statements can also be found in the pronouncements of municipal courts, such as those 
of the United States. Universal jurisdiction, as one judge put it, ‘had its origins in the 
special problems and characteristics of piracy. It is only in recent times that nations 
have begun to extend this type of jurisdiction to other crimes.’89 
The pirate takes on further significance in international legal thought, as we 
saw already in the thesis’s introduction, as the paradigm or model for a whole host of 
further crimes and their treatment under international law. ‘The right of any state to 
try and punish pirates as enemies of humanity’, Gould writes, ‘provides the model for 
modern prosecution and punishment of international criminals’.90 Kontorovich calls 
this the ‘piracy analogy’: the characterisation of the pirate as hostis humani generis 
established a precedent for doing likewise with other criminals, their actions 
analogised with piracy. The slave trade, hijacking, torture, genocide, war crimes: all 
are subject to universal jurisdiction, many jurists argue—despite Guillaume’s 
pronouncement to the contrary—because the perpetrators of these crimes can also be 
understood as enemies of humanity; any state should be able to punish the most serious 
crimes.91  
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One of the first figures to be analogised to the pirate was the slave trader. At 
the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, Lord Castlereagh proposed the trade should 
be considered a crime against the law of nations, ‘raised in the criminal code of all 
civilized nations to the standard of piracy’. By the mid-19th century, a number of 
European powers had declared the slave trader, like the pirate, hostis humani generis.92 
In the post-war era, as a generation came to terms with the horrors of the Second World 
War, it was again to the pirate that many turned as a model for the perpetrators of 
atrocities. Rafael Lemkin would invoke the this figure in 1946 in arguing for a crime 
of genocide in the pages of the New York Times.93 Others saw in Nazi war criminals 
the latest avatars of the pirate.94 Crimes against humanity, Adolf Eichmann’s 
prosecutors told an Israeli district court in 1961, were like piracy: ‘he who commits 
them’, in Hannah Arendt’s paraphrase, ‘has become, like the pirate in traditional 
international law, hostis humani generis’.95 So too the torturer. In the case of Filártiga 
v Peña-Irala, the US Second Circuit ruled that it could exercise jurisdiction over a 
Paraguayan citizen found to have committed torture against another Paraguayan 
citizen. The court observed, at least for the purpose of civil liability, that ‘the torturer 
has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an 
enemy of all mankind’.96 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) would later quote the court’s analogy approvingly in its own 
insistence that the prohibition on torture had acquired ‘a particularly high status in the 
international normative system’.97 More recently, in his concurring opinion in Kiobel 
v Royal Dutch Petroleum, US Supreme Court Justice Breyer insisted that ‘today’s 
pirates include torturers and perpetrators of genocide. And today, like the pirates of 
old, they are “fair game” where they are found. Like those pirates, they are “common 
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enemies of all mankind” and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension 
and punishment.’98 
IN SEARCH OF THE ORIGINS OF ENMITY 
The pirate in modern international legal thought is the epitome of universal 
enmity, a model for those demanding unconditional condemnation and extirpation. 
But if the pirate is an exceptional, paradigmatic figure, how did he come by this status? 
How did he become the model for all figures of enmity, from the slave trader to the 
torturer? From where, in short, does his status as hostis humani generis come?  
For many legal thinks, as noted in the thesis’s introduction, the pirate is a 
timeless figure, his exceptional status extending backwards in time indefinitely, or at 
least long enough that such questions hold no practical value. Others, though, have 
attempted to offer a rationalisation. One answer suggested in the literature is the ‘need 
for order’ in international affairs, to which the pirate posed and continues to pose a 
challenge. Piracy, J.W. Boulton thus observes, was a particularly insidious form of 
disorder: ‘its control was rendered particularly difficult by the peculiar conditions of 
the maritime environment’ and ‘states experienced great difficulty in imposing 
uniform order on the sea, long after they had brought order to the land’.99 This 
‘disruptive threat to the . . . activities of states’ posed by the pirate gave rise to his 
peculiar legal status.100 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, too, points to the ‘interest of 
preserving world order’.101 
Others trace the pirate’s exceptional status to the recognition and acceptance 
by states of ‘fundamental and superior values’—values which the pirate offends, as 
reflected in the prohibition of piracy’s jus cogens status.102 The pirate, on this view, is 
‘regarded as particularly offensive to the international community as a whole’.103 This 
argument often makes reference to the pirate’s alleged heinousness. As P.G. Widd 
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explains, piracy came to be understood as a crime against humanity attracting 
universal jurisdiction because of ‘the particularly savage way in which the attacks are 
carried out against an exposed population. Piracy consists of murder, rape, assault and 
other inhuman acts which have the character of erga omnes, that is valid against all 
the world’.104 Or, as Zou Keyuan puts it, ‘[p]irates commit murder, robbery, plunder, 
rape, and other villainous deeds at sea. Because of its nature, piracy [sic] traditionally 
has been regarded as hostis humani generis and deemed punishable wherever 
encountered’.105 Patricia Birnie, too, argues that pirates came to be regarded as 
‘enemies of the whole human race’ because of their ‘unbridled savagery in the 
attacking of vessels, crews and passengers’.106 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal appear to also have taken such a view in their joint separate opinion in 
the Arrest Warrant case when they stated universal jurisdiction is to be exercised ‘only 
over those crimes regarded as the most heinous by the international community’.107 
What appear at first blush to provide some explanatory power, however, are 
again largely ahistorical generalisations. The need for order, in Boulton’s exposition, 
is a universal imperative—‘a common theme from Antiquity to modernity’.108 The 
‘superior values’ reflected in piracy’s peremptory prohibition appear intrinsic to the 
existence of an ‘international community’, its existence taken for granted. The need 
for order and the existence of universal values, as well as piracy’s antagonism with 
them, are, on these approaches, universal and timeless, no less so than the figure of 
the pirate itself. These theories assume the very things that call for explanation and 
can tell us nothing about the specificity of the pirate in international legal thought. So 
too with the attribution of the pirate’s unique status to the heinousness of his crime. 
Why did acts of robbery, say, on the high seas come to be regarded as especially 
heinous, when the same crime on land attracts none of the same hyperbole? How is it 
                                                        
104 P.G. Widd, ‘The Seafarer, Piracy and the Law: A Human Rights Approach’, PhD diss. (University 
of Greenwich, 2008) 18. 
105 Zou Keyuan, ‘Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea’ 31 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce (2000) 107, 107 (emphasis added). 
106 P.W. Birnie, ‘Piracy: Past, present, future’ 11 Marine Policy (1987) 163, 164. See also Lotus, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Moore. 
107 Arrest Warrant [59]. 
108 Boulton (1983) 2335. Interestingly, for Boulton, if the motivation behind the law of piracy is 
timeless, the content of the law has been marked by disagreement over ‘the character and treatment of 
piracy, [which] has left pirates free to pillage relatively unhindered on the lawless maritime frontiers 
between different systems of states’. Ibid 2338. 
 44 
that the pirate—and not other figures—come to be associated in international legal 
thought with the idea of depravity and extreme offence and enmity towards all of 
humankind? 
To answer these questions, we must look not to theoretical abstractions but to 
concrete historical developments. The figure of the pirate in international legal 
thought, and its association with universal enmity, is not timeless, but nor did it emerge 
suddenly fully formed. Like a palimpsest, earlier meanings and identities lurk beneath 
the new, but all emerged within specific conjunctures and reflect the concrete social 
and political-economic conditions prevailing at those moments. In the next chapter, I 
turn to the world of antiquity and the earliest origins of the pirate. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The pirate of the ancients compared with that 
of the moderns 
In his Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans, the Roman biographer Plutarch recounts 
an incident involving a young Gaius Julius Caesar in 80 BC. Sent to the court of 
Nicomedes in Bithynia to procure a fleet for his commander, Minucius Thermus, 
Caesar was returning through the Aegean when he was accosted by Cilician pirates 
and taken prisoner.1 The pirates demanded a ransom of 20 talents of silver but the 
young aristocrat laughed, insisting sardonically that he was worth at least 50. Caesar 
sent his companions to procure money, while remaining the pirates’ captive for the 
next six weeks. Plutarch writes of a bold prisoner, happily socialising with his captors, 
yet demanding quiet when he wished to sleep and threatening to hang them all upon 
his release. Finally ransomed and free, Caesar immediately set about gathering a small 
fleet in Miletos and put to sea once more, now in search of his former captors. Quickly 
locating their base, Caesar attacked the pirates and took a number prisoner, demanding 
that Junius, the local praetor, punish them. But when Junius failed to act expediently, 
seemingly more interested in the thieves’ loot, Caesar took matters into his own hands 
and ordered the pirates crucified.2 
The story of Caesar and the pirates is a popular anecdote. Although Plutarch’s 
account is brief and offers few details about Caesar’s captors other than that they were 
from Cilicia, the south coastal region of Asia Minor, the events described have been 
seized on by many modern legal scholars as evidence of piracy’s ancient roots and 
even historical precedent for the swift and violent measures to be taken against 
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pirates.3 Modern legal discourse, as noted in the thesis’s introduction, tends to 
represent both piracy and its legal treatment as an unchanging phenomenon spanning 
human history, certainly extending at least to antiquity. Some scholars date piracy’s 
illegality as far back as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (second millennium BC),4 
but a more common point of reference is the ancient world of Greece and Rome. The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law rehearses the familiar 
characteristics of piracy under international law, declaring it ‘the first crime to have 
been recognized as a crime against international law and subject to universal 
jurisdiction’ before quickly stressing that this crime extends ‘back to ancient times.’5  
Reference to the classical roots of piracy and its legal treatment in today’s 
scholarly interventions is almost de rigueur and continues to reproduce an 
understanding of piracy as universally and transhistorically proscribed. Modern jurists 
attribute to classical lawyers, and in particular Marcus Tullius Cicero, the 
characterisation of pirates as hostes humani generis.6 ‘It was the Roman Republic 
which first gave definition to the crime of piracy, and much of its law still holds true 
today’, explains one scholar.7 Another recent commentator argues that ‘[t]he legal 
understanding of piracy nowadays and more than two thousand years ago . . . seems 
to be strikingly similar.’8 Typical also is a straightforward equation of the concept of 
hostis humani generis with universal jurisdiction.9 In declaring pirates enemies of 
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humankind, we can read, ‘Cicero and the Romans introduced the element of universal 
jurisdiction into the law of piracy’.10 And in a similar vein: ‘More than 2,000 years 
ago, Marcus Tullius Cicero defined pirates in Roman law as hostis humani generis . . 
. . From that day until now, pirates have held a unique status in the law as international 
criminals subject to universal jurisdiction’.11 
Citations to Greek and Latin sources have historically enjoyed an important 
place in legal argument. Yet there is a risk in modern writing about piracy of 
attributing distinctly modern legal conclusions to ancient writers. To what extent can 
the modern conception of the pirate be found in the early legal world adumbrated in 
the texts of antiquity? Are the pirates who held Julius Caesar captive and those who 
took Captain Phillips hostage really one and the same? Or have international legal 
scholars today projected backwards in time a contemporary view of pirates and 
piratical activity, reading back into the ancient world something actually quite 
modern? 
This chapter considers to what extent the modern pirate in international legal 
thought in fact maps on to ancient avatars. Analysing both ancient sources and 
secondary literature, from Archaic Greece through to the Roman Empire, it calls some 
of the assumptions of modern writers—such as the invocation of an unbroken history 
linking the modern and ancient pirate—into question. It suggests that a variety of 
phenomena in the ancient world have been brought into the category of piracy. Some 
of these map onto modern piracy and the pirate partially, but others bear a more 
uncertain relationship with them. 
COMPARING HISTORICAL PHENOMENA 
Piecing together a coherent picture of legal attitudes in antiquity is complicated by the 
fragmentary nature of sources. Much modern commentary draws on literary texts with 
legal conclusions extrapolated from the attitudes expressed or from fragmentary 
epigraphical sources that mention various acts of maritime violence only in passing 
and seldom in a specifically legal context. 
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Where such references are found, ‘piracy’ and ‘pirate’ have been used by 
modern scholars as translations of a variety of different Greek and Latin terms. But 
these terms are used in ancient sources to refer to and describe various phenomena, 
some bearing a greater resemblance to modern piracy than others. Alfred Rubin begins 
his seminal work on the law of piracy with a warning that ‘[t]ime changes the meaning 
of words, and it is an error in scholarship to attribute to ancient or even not very ancient 
authors the full range of implication that a word carries in current usage.’12 When it is 
not the same word but a variety of terms, some etymologically related, but others not 
so, even greater caution seems warranted. There is a need, Rubin insists, for ‘great 
circumspection’ in drawing legal conclusions on the basis of Greek or Latin words in 
ancient sources.13  
Rubin’s warning points to the historical specificity of concepts and their 
historical rootedness in specific social and historical conditions. ‘If the Greeks did not 
“have a word for” something we want to talk about’, Geoffrey de Ste. Croix observes, 
‘it may be a salutary warning to us that the phenomena we are looking for may not 
have existed in Greek times, or at any rate not in the same form as today’.14 By the 
same token, Neil Davidson notes, the reverse is also true: ‘some of the things for which 
the Greeks did have words are almost impossible to accurately convey in modern 
languages’.15 In the case of piracy and the pirate, modern authors have assimilated a 
variety of Greek and Latin terms to these modern English categories. But as Alasdair 
MacIntyre has warned, ‘[t]o understand a concept, to grasp the meaning of the words 
which express it, is always at least to learn what the rules are which govern the use of 
such words and so to grasp the role of the concept in language and social life. This in 
itself would suggest strongly that different forms of social life will provide different 
roles for concepts to play.’16 That we have a translation for a word does not mean that 
we share the same conceptual elements. 
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Certainly the etymology of the words pirate and piracy can be traced to early 
Greek and Roman cognates, but the more important question is whether such cognates 
conveyed the same concept, let alone the same legal consequences.17 There is little 
doubt that violent theft and pillaging by seaborne raiders was familiar in the 
Mediterranean in ancient times. Many classicists have tended to follow—or more 
likely lead—legal scholars in treating piracy as a ‘relatively straightforward and 
unchanging phenomenon, assuming, implicitly or explicitly, that terms pirate and 
piracy meant much the same in the Graeco-Roman world as they did up to the end of 
the nineteenth century’.18 Recent scholarship in the classics has begun to problematise 
such assumptions, placing emphasis on the historical and cultural contexts in which 
particular labels are used and encourages a ‘sceptical approach’.19 This chapter adopts 
such an approach in considering the various and changing forms of violence in the 
ancient world labelled by modern authors as piracy. 
THE ARCHAIC PERIOD 
Montesquieu famously remarked ‘Les premiers grecs étaient tous pirates’,20 but who 
exactly were the pirates of ancient Greece? The earliest Greek term regularly rendered 
as pirate in modern translations is ληστής or leistes. The term emerged in regular use 
in the archaic period of Greek history (c. 800-500 BC), although its use continued into 
the first millennium. It is found repeatedly, for instance, in the work of Homer. Who 
was the leistes and what were contemporary attitudes towards him? In the Homeric 
poems, the term and its derivatives are applied to persons engaged in some form of 
plunder. Odysseus, in the guise of the Cretan son of Kastor, uses the term to describe 
his companions on his plundering raids.21 The term recurs too in the formulaic greeting 
repeated more than once in the Odyssey: ‘Strangers, who are ye? Whence do ye sail 
                                                        
17 For etymological discussions, see Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of 
Nations (Zone Books, 2009); Rubin (2006); Philip de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
18 de Souza (2002) 2. See, e.g., Henry A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997) [1924]. 
19 See, e.g., de Souza (2002) 2. 
20 Montesquieu, Esprit des lois (Firmin Didot Frères, 1845) 291. 
21 See, e.g., Hom. Od. 17.425; Homer, The Odyssey, trans. A.T. Murray (Harvard University Press, 
1919): ‘But Zeus, son of Cronos, brought all to naught—so, I ween, was his good pleasure—who sent 
me forth with roaming pirates [ληϊστῆρσι]’. The Harvard University Press edition is typical in 
translating leistes as pirate. 
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over the watery ways? Is it on some business, or do ye wander at random over the sea, 
even as pirates [ληιστῆρες], who wander hazarding their lives and bringing evil to men 
of other lands?’22 Such a greeting seems to imply a negative connotation for the latter 
who, after all, are ‘bringing harm’. And yet, there is little in terms of concrete actions 
to distinguish the leistes from those celebrated in the Odyssey as heroes engaged in 
warfare: both ‘set off in their long ships to distant shores to plunder and kill’.23 
The line between one form of plunder and the other appears at best indistinct, 
their ‘aims and methods . . . virtually indistinguishable’—an ‘essential aspect of 
Homeric warfare’, de Souza explains, is the accumulation of booty with a ‘direct 
equation of booty with status’.24 Odysseus’s distinction in battle, for instance, as 
Heller-Roazen observes, was ‘measured by the magnitude of that which he would take 
back with him from his raids’.25 But the leistes, too, could attain high status and 
prestige, as Thucydides later observed in his Archaeologia.26 Odysseus himself, in 
Cretan guise, for instance, explains how his standing grew as a result of his raiding: ‘I 
had nine times led warriors and swift-faring ships against foreign folk, and great spoil 
had ever fallen to my hands. . . . Thus my house straightway grew rich, and thereafter 
I became one feared and honored among the Cretans.’27 Moreover, the violent 
acquisition of plunder set both off from the far less honourable occupation of trader. 
While raider and warrior both can attain high status in the Homeric poems, Phoenician 
traders maintain a uniformly low status; the label ‘trader’ or ‘merchant’ is directed at 
Odyssues as an explicit insult.28  
If the Homeric leistes often travelled by ship, he was not uniquely a sea-borne 
depredator; the term was used to refer no less to those plundering by land. As de Souza 
                                                        
22 Hom. Od. 3.71-74; 9.252-255. De Souza suggests that the question might be understood along the 
lines of ‘Are you friend or foe?’ or ‘Are you good or bad?’: de Souza (2002) 18. 
23 de Souza (2002) 19. 
24 Ibid 18-20. 
25 Heller-Roazen (2009) 77. 
26 Thuc. 1.5; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Martin Hammond (Oxford University Press, 
2009) 5: ‘Such occupation did not yet carry any stigma: rather it even brought some glory.’ 
27 Hom. Od. 14.230-234. 
28 Hom. Od. 8.159-164: ‘Nay verily, stranger, for I do not liken thee to a man that is skilled in contests, 
such as abound among men, but to one who, faring to and fro with his benched ship, is a captain of 
sailors who are merchantmen, one who is mindful of his freight, and has charge of a home-borne cargo, 
and the gains of his greed. Thou dost not look like an athlete.’ See also Elton T.E. Barker, Entering the 
Agon: Dissent and Authority in Homer, Historiography and Tragedy (Oxford University Press, 2009) 
116. 
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remarks, ‘[t]he clear semantic difference which is found in modern English’, between 
say pirates operating on sea and bandits operating on land, is ‘not inherent in the 
ancient Greek words as they are used in the surviving sources’.29 Similarly, the raids 
taken by Odysseus could be described, in present day terminology, as banditry, piracy 
or even warfare. Sharp distinctions between these characterisations were not yet 
possible. Indeed, where to draw the line between warfare and other activities involving 
the violent acquisition of booty in the Homeric world remains the subject of significant 
debate. Some scholars have argued for a clear distinction between warfare and other 
forms of raiding in the Homeric poems.30 Others insist that they are largely 
indistinguishable.31 Even the former, however, if insisting that warfare brought greater 
status, tend to accept that the methods and conduct of both are essentially the same. 
As Otto Brunner observes, ‘In Homeric times booty was the main reason for war, and 
to destroy a city was also to plunder it . . . . The Greek “leis” covers both such military 
booty and the fruits of brigandage, indiscriminately’.32 
CLASSICAL GREECE 
References to maritime raiding and plunder continue in sources from the Classical 
period, particularly in those relating to the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). The war, 
Thucydides tells us, involved thousands of soldiers and sailors and hundreds of ships, 
ranging from ‘full-scale hoplite and trireme battles’ to ‘“guerrilla” actions and 
plundering raids’.33 In the case of the latter, Thucydides refers repeatedly to leistes or 
one of its derivatives.34 For instance, in one case Thucydides describes Athenian 
attempts ‘to prevent the Peloponnesians launching triremes from the harbour of 
Megara unobserved, as they had done before, or sending out privateers [λῃστῶν]’.35 
Here, multiple translators of Thucydides have chosen to render the plural of leistes as 
                                                        
29 de Souza (2002) 9.  
30 See, e.g., Hans van Wees, Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History (Gieben, 
1992) 208-17. 
31 de Souza (2002) 21. 
32 Otto Brunner, Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria, trans. Howard 
Kaminsky & James Van Horn Melton (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) 74. 
33 de Souza (2002) 31. 
34 See, e.g., Thuc. 2.32 (λῃστὰς), 2.69 (λῃστικὸν), 3.51 (λῃστῶν), 7.26 (λῃσταὶ), cited in de Souza 
(2002) 31. 
35 Thuc. 3.51. 
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‘privateers’ rather than ‘pirates’ or ‘bandits’.36 Certainly the individuals described by 
Thucydides in this instance appear more akin to what today might be considered 
guerrillas or mercenaries accompanying regular naval forces. Yet such a distinction, 
while making sense on today’s legal understanding, arguably did not exist in 
Thucydides’ own era, where the concept of leistes could encapsulate a range of 
behaviours. 
Elsewhere Thucydides distinguishes formal warfare from what he calls 
λῃστεία or leisteia.37 The latter, rendered as ‘predatory warfare’ in a new Oxford 
University Press edition, appears from Thucydides’ description to involve a series of 
plundering raids on the enemy’s territory. Such raids, de Souza notes, might be carried 
out to undermine the authority of political opponents by harassing their subjects or be 
carried out in reprisal for perceived injuries by an enemy.38 As in Homeric times, the 
leistes engaged in such raids operated by ship and land. But in both cases—seaborne 
raids and terrestrial banditry—such plunder was arguably political in objective: 
‘Wherever raiding was carried out those who claimed to be the legitimate political 
leaders would naturally be expected to justify their authority by protecting the local 
population from the attackers. Failure to do so could result in their downfall.’39 The 
exact identity of the raiders is not always clear from Thucydides’ descriptions, but it 
is apparent that they operated on behalf of a belligerent in the war, ‘sent out’, for 
example as described above, by the Peloponnesians.40 
Such use of the leistes by Greek city-states continued into the fourth century 
BC. Xenophon describes his use by both the Athenian general Iphikrates and his 
opponents during the Corinthian War (395-387 BC), for instance when Iphikrates and 
Anaxibius ‘made war upon one another by sending out raiding parties [λῃστὰς]’.41 
Those sent on raids might be regular soldiers, but they might just as often be locals, as 
in 389 BC when the Spartan Eteonikos invited volunteers from the population of the 
                                                        
36 This is true of both Martin Hammond’s translation, quoted here, and that of Richard Crawley: 
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley (J.M. Dent, 1910).  
37 See, e.g., Thuc. 4.41. 
38 de Souza (2002) 31. See, e.g., Thuc. 3.85, 5.115. 
39 de Souza (2002) 31. 
40 Thucydides uses the term in a similar manner on other occasions such as at Thuc. 2.69, rendered in 
that instance as ‘Peloponnesian freebooters’ by Hammond and ‘Peloponnesian privateers’ by Crawley. 
41 Xen. Hell. 4.8.35; Xenophon, Hellenica, Books I-IV, trans. C.L. Brownson (Harvard University Press, 
1968). See also discussions in de Souza (2002) 33 and W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, 
vol. 2 (University of California Press, 1974) 82. 
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island Aigina to plunder Attica.42 Similarly, in the face of the growing power (and 
army) of the Macedon kingdom under Philip II, the Athenian Demosthenes called for 
the use of such tactics: ‘it is not in our power now to provide [a force] fit to meet 
[Philip] in pitched battle: we must adopt guerrilla tactics [λῃστεύειν] to start with’.43 
What the translator of the 1930 Harvard University Press edition of Demosthenes’ 
orations renders ‘guerrilla’ tactics, de Souza translates as ‘piratical’ tactics.44 
Such semantic disagreements, and the practices underlying them, illustrate 
how ambiguous the distinction between warfare and banditry or plunder remained in 
the Classical period. If contemporaries such as Thucydides regarded such plundering 
now distinct from formal warfare, it remained, in de Souza’s words, ‘a common 
feature of warfare and, in the form of reprisals, an alternative or supplement to larger-
scale conflict’.45 However, a change in attitudes was underway. De Souza suggests 
that although attackers ‘might have considered themselves to be engaged in legitimate 
raiding or warfare, their victims (and their allies) were likely to label them pirate [or 
more literally leistes] as a way of illegitimizing their actions’.46 Leistes was 
increasingly a term employed to justify one’s opposition to the thus labelled group. 
THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD 
From the third century BC a new term can be found in Greek language sources, 
πειρατής or peirates, likely derived from the noun peira meaning trial or attempt and 
the verb peirao, meaning to make an attempt.47 The new term did not replace leistes; 
rather, the two appear to have been used, at least initially, synonymously and 
interchangeably.48  
                                                        
42 de Souza (2002) 34 citing Xen. Hell. 5.1.1-5. 
43 Demo. 4.23; Demosthenes, Demosthenes: With an English Translation, trans. J.H. Vince (Harvard 
University Press, 1930). 
44 de Souza (2002) 36. 
45 Ibid 42. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Heller-Roazen (2009) 34-35. De Souza notes that given the strong oral tradition in ancient Greece, 
the word may have existed earlier than its first written context: de Souza (2002) 9. There is some 
suggestion that peirates may be derived from prasso, meaning to pass through or achieve, although de 
Souza is sceptical. 
48 Polybius and Strabo, for instance, both use leistes, peirates and their cognates as synonyms. 
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The earliest use of peirates is found in an inscription from the mid-third 
century at Rhamnous on Attica. The inscription records a decree honouring the general 
Epichares during the Chremonidean war and ‘mentions a ransoming or exchange of 
prisoners arranged by Epichares and that the prisoners were taken by peiratai [pl.]’.49 
Who were these peiratai? De Souza explains that the episode took place during war 
with the Macedonian king Antiognos Gonatas and ‘it may be that the peiratai were 
allied in some way to Antigonos’. Alternatively, the exact identity of the raiders may 
have been unknown to their victims and, indeed, de Souza concludes that the ‘simplest 
and most logical interpretation of the use of peirates is that it is a pejorative term for 
a raider or plunderer, as it is found in later texts’.50 
As with leistes, the term peirates is neutral as to whether the episodes involving 
peiratai (pl.) occur on land or sea. For instance, in the case of the Attic inscription, 
while Rhamnous is a coastal town, it could also be easily accessed by land and there 
is insufficient context to determine whether the peiratai raided by land or sea. Another 
inscription from Aigiale on the island of Amorgos describes a raid on a town in which 
the individuals concerned ‘made an incursion into the countryside at night’.51 Many 
such references to peirates from the Hellensitic period provide little information on 
the actual identity of the perpetrators of attacks or whether they came by sea or land. 
In some cases, though, it is apparent that the term extends to both media. Peirates and 
its derivatives are used by Polybius in his Histories, from the mid-second century BC, 
to describe groups both land-based and active at sea. In one case, Polybius describes 
peiratón (πειρατῶν) following the command of Dorimachos in the Peloponnese in 222 
BC. Here the term is used to describe the individuals engaged in what are clearly raids 
on land: ‘These injurious acts were at first confined to the sheep on the border lands; 
but becoming more and more reckless and audacious, they even ventured to break into 
the farm-houses by sudden attacks at night.’52 Elsewhere a variation of the same term 
is used to describe a group involved in battle at sea: ‘When the [peiratai] saw the 
Roman fleet was coming they turned and fled’.53 
                                                        
49 de Souza (2002) 3. 
50 Ibid 4. 
51 Quoted and translated in ibid (emphasis added). 
52 Plb. 4.3; Polybius, Histories, trans. E.S. Shuckburgh (Macmillan, 1889). 
53 Plb. 21.12. Both incidents are mentioned by de Souza (2002) 8. 
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References to peirates in this period generally appear in the context of warfare. 
Many of the groups mentioned in the sources are in the employ of various Helenistic 
monarchs, acting essentially, it seems, as mercenaries of one sort or another.54 
Polybius, for example, writes of Euripidas’s attack on Sicyon in 218 BC, in which his 
army included ‘two companies of Eleans, who combined with the pirates [peiratón] 
and mercenaries made up an army of two thousand two hundred men, besides a 
hundred horse’. Evelyn Shuckburgh, whose edition I quote here, translates peiratón 
as pirates, while William Paton, renders the word as ‘freebooters’.55  
Diodorus Siculus, writing slightly later in around 60 BC, also uses the term 
when recounting Demetrios of Macedon’s attempt to capture Rhodes in 305 BC. 
Demetrios, he writes, travelled to Rhodes with ‘two hundred warships of all sizes and 
more than one hundred and seventy auxiliary vessels; on these were transported not 
quite forty thousand soldiers besides the cavalry and the pirates [peiratai] who were 
his allies.’ Arriving at the island, he ‘at once sent out fit and proper men from the 
pirates [peiratón] and others to plunder the island both by land and by sea’. 56 Later in 
his account, Diodorus writes of peiratai ‘fighting as allies’ of Demetrius, overpowered 
by the Rhodians in a ‘naval battle’.57 
In the examples of both Polybius and Diodorus, peirates and its derivatives 
appear to be applied not to robbers or pirates as we understand the term today, but to 
groups understood as participants in wars between recognised political leaders, 
capable of forming recognised alliances with those leaders.58 Whether or not these 
groups were, as de Souza argues in the case of Demetrios, motivated by the prospect 
of wartime booty, is of little consequence.59 
THE ROMAN WORLD 
With the emergence of Rome as a power, one finds a growing number of references 
in Latin sources to what modern scholars have translated as pirate. In Latin, as in 
                                                        
54 See G.T. Griffith The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Bouma’s Boekhuis, 1968) [1935]. 
55 Plb. 4.68; Polybius, The Histories, vol. 2, trans. W.R. Paton (Harvard University Press, 1954) 461. 
56 Diod. 20.82-83; Diodorus Siculus, The Library of History, vol 10, trans. R.M. Greer (Harvard 
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57 Diod. 20.97. 
58 Rubin, surveying similar material, reaches the same conclusion. Rubin (2006) 5. 
59 de Souza (2002) 44. 
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Greek, multiple terms appear to have been used synonymously. Praedo and latro have 
both been regularly translated as both pirate and bandit and are used in the extant 
sources in much the same way as their Greek counterparts to refer, often 
interchangeably, to various forms of banditry and plunder.60 And like their Greek 
counterparts, both terms were similarly ambiguous as to the nature of the plunder 
involved. To distinguish between bandits operating, for instance, on sea and land, the 
addition of a qualifying adjective or phrase might be used, as in plunder at sea, or 
maritimos praedones.61 
Once more, we can ask who were the praedones and latrones of the Roman 
world. However, as with Greek sources, one is again confronted with the difficulties 
inherent in parsing the distinct ways in which a given term is used. As Brent Shaw 
observes of latrones—which he translates as bandits—and latrocinium—the 
phenomenon of banditry—‘almost every kind of violent opposition to established 
authority short of war was subsumed under the catch-all rubric . . . with little or no 
conscious differentiation of the subcategories of violence beneath that umbrella 
term’.62 A review of contemporary sources suggests that banditry, including its 
maritime forms, was a ubiquitous concern. Not only were many laws, for instance, 
directed at repressing banditry, but so too were many unrelated legal acts nonetheless 
directly affected by banditry. For instance, ‘[a]mong the common causes of death 
recognized by the laws are old age, sickness and attacks by bandits.’63 If the Digest is 
full of references to latrones and praedones, it makes no distinction between robbers 
and brigands acting on land and those plundering by sea. As Shaw observes, Roman 
law gave ‘formal recognition to the type of organized violence conducted by the 
Roman state itself, or directed against it by other states, by labelling it “war” or 
bellum.’ All other forms of violence, though, were ‘lumped together under the rubric 
of banditry or latrocinium’.64 
The line, then, between warfare and other forms of plunder or banditry, 
indistinct in the ancient Greek world, took on greater clarity in Rome. The distinction 
                                                        
60 For etymologies, see Heller-Roazen (2009) 35; Brent D. Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’ 105 
Past and Present (1984) 3, 27-28. 
61 Heller-Roazen (2009) 36. 
62 Shaw (1984) 6. 
63 Ibid 8-9 citing Dig. 13.6.5.4. 
64 Ibid 9. 
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between legitimate war and illicit violence can be seen in an opinion contained in 
Justinian’s Digest, often cited as evidence of Roman jurists’ conception of the pirate. 
Ulpian held that ‘Enemies [hostes] are those against whom the Roman people have 
publicly declared war, or who themselves have declared war against the Roman 
people; others are called robbers [latrunculi] or brigands [praedones].’65 Praedones, 
here, is regularly translated as ‘pirates’, rather than the more general ‘brigands’ or 
‘bandits’ or ‘plunderers’, and Policante, amongst others, reads this as a statement 
about the arch-criminality specifically of the pirate in Roman law. Unlike lawful 
hostes, against whom legal war [bellum] was to be waged according to rituals of the 
ius fetiale, pirates are outside the ius gentium—literally outlaws, their acts are not 
merely improper but render them ‘Universal criminals’.66 Coleman Phillipson, in his 
wide-ranging study of international law and ancient Greece and Rome, also cites this 
same passage when arguing that pirates in both Greece and Rome ‘were not regarded 
as “regular enemies”, iusti hostes, but as enemies of mankind generally’.  
Yet a closer reading of Ulpian’s remarks suggests his concern is quite narrow, 
specifically the issue of property rights following legal capture. He continues 
immediately following the passage quoted above: ‘Therefore, anyone who is captured 
by robbers [latronibus] does not become their slave, nor has any need of the right of 
postliminium.’ 67 An individual captured by persons defined as bandits or robbers, in 
other words, remains legally free and retains her rights and privileges as a Roman 
citizen. Were she taken by recognised hostes, such as Germans or Parthians, Ulpian 
further clarifies, she would become their slave and would, at the conclusion of war or 
upon recapture, recover her former status by right of postliminium. 
If the implications of Ulpian’s comments are narrower than Policante or 
Phillipson would wish, they do suggest that the latro and praedo were not seen simply 
as common criminals. As Shaw remarks, there existed ‘quite separate definitions of 
them’ that placed them in ‘a penumbral category between persons within the scope of 
the law (criminal and civil, largely overlapping) and enemies of the state’.68 Indeed, 
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he notes, Roman law in general denied to the latro ‘all legal rights of citizens, even 
those normally retained by criminal defendants’.69 Normal legal procedures were 
discarded, torture was the norm, and latrones were signalled out for the summa 
supplicia—burning alive, crucifixion, and throwing to the beasts.70  
To summarise, by at least the early Roman Empire, and likely already in the 
Republic, banditry, including acts of depredation and violence at sea, was considered 
illegitimate, even especially so, and deserving of harsh treatment. But there is little to 
suggest in Roman law that seaborne plunder was considered any different from other 
forms of banditry, at least insofar as its authors were identified as latrones or 
praedones.  
Starting in the first century BC, a further Latin term, pirata, from the Greek 
peirates, emerged: it was this term specifically that is the source of the English word 
pirate. The new term appears to have carried a narrower meaning than latro and 
praedo, used specifically to describe sea-based groups. Its exact nature, and 
distinctiveness from the other terms, is, though, a matter of some confusion. Modern 
translators tend to render all three terms, at least when related to sea-based activity, as 
‘pirate’ and legal scholars have similarly tended to treat the terms as synonymous. 
Rubin, though, insists on a significant distinction between latro and praedo, on the 
one hand, and pirata, on the other. Whereas clear impropriety attached to the former, 
as discussed above, pirata carried no implication of criminality, let alone exceptional 
punishment.71  
That conclusion is complicated, however, by Cicero’s use of pirata in De 
Officiis, his handbook on moral duties for Roman aristocrats. Discussing the sanctity 
of oaths, Cicero makes a distinction between oaths that must be kept and those that 
may be broken without dishonour. ‘[F]idelity to an oath’, he explains ‘must often be 
observed in dealings with an enemy [hoste]’. An exception, however, may be made 
for the praedo or pirata (Cicero appears to use the terms interchangeably): ‘suppose 
that one does not deliver the amount agreed upon with [praedonibus] as the price of 
one’s life, that would be accounted no deception’. One need not keep one’s word, ‘for 
a [pirata] is not included in the number of lawful enemies [perduellium], but is the 
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common foe of all the world [communis hostis omnium]; and with him there ought not 
to be any pledged word nor any oath mutually binding’.72 
Much significance, as we have seen, has been attached by modern scholars to 
his characterisation of pirata as ‘common foe of all the world’ (in Walter Miller’s 
translation quoted above) or, in an alternative translation, ‘enemy of all communities’. 
Policante, for example, reads in Cicero’s brief remark on the keeping of oaths an 
explicit condemnation of pirates as disqualified from a universal ius gentium, excluded 
from the ‘human community’ such that they must be ‘ruthlessly persecuted’.73 Other 
scholars have even conjured from Cicero’s words an established theory, and even 
practice, of universal jurisdiction. Rubin, by way of contrast, suggests that Cicero here 
‘merely denies any legal obligation to keep an oath to “pirates”’.74 If they are enemies 
of all communities, then they must not be subject to whatever overarching law of a 
broader society makes oaths binding between different communities. 
Cicero certainly elaborated elsewhere a philosophy positing a universal law 
binding all communities. Drawing on early Stoic cosmopolitanism, he spoke of a ius 
gentium rooted in nature with Rome the enforcer of this law. It is possible to read his 
remarks on the keeping oaths as implying that the pirata is excluded from this societas 
omnium inter omnes, but it is a leap to read Cicero’s communis hostis omnium as 
synonymous with the more famous bon mot enemy of humankind or humanity. 
Cicero’s notion of universal community does not clearly map onto a modern concept 
of humanity. Walter Rech provides clarity when he suggests that, despite his 
cosmopolitan prose, Cicero’s society of all communities in reality was a far narrower 
conception, coinciding with Rome and its political allies, not an actual universal 
humanity. Moreover, Rech stresses, it in no way followed from Cicero’s remarks that 
he was suggesting all nations should repress piratae or, in Policante’s phrasing, 
persecute them ‘ruthlessly’.75 
Whatever Cicero’s understanding of the pirata, he appears to be alone in 
conflating the term with praedo. The term pirata and its derivatives are used in the 
extant sources almost entirely with reference specifically to the Cilicans of Asia Minor 
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in ways quite distinct from contemporaneous uses of praedo and latro. The same 
appears to be true of the Greek peirates, as it continued to be used in the Roman period. 
Who, then, were the Cilicians? In many accounts, they are cast as bands of sea raiders, 
attacking ships passing along the rugged Cilician coast since time immemorial. Some 
ancient sources go so far as to suggest the Cilicians, as a people, were naturally 
inclined to plunder—an ethnic trait, Strabo seems to imply, when he writes that ‘the 
Pamphylians, who share much in the traits of the Cilician stock of people, do not 
wholly abstain from the business of piracy [λῃστρικῶν].’76 Strabo here uses a 
derivative of leistes, which the editor of the Loeb Classical Library edition translates 
as piracy, but later, in referring directly to the Cilicians, Strabo uses a derivative of 
peirates. The Pamphylians, he writes, ‘used their places as bases of operation for the 
business of robbery [λῃστήρια]’, offering them to ‘pirates [πειρατής] as markets for 
the sale of booty and as naval stations’. The pirates in question, now identified as 
peiratai, are quickly identified: ‘In Side, at any rate, a city in Pamphylia, the dockyards 
stood open to the Cilicians’.77 It was Cilicians, too, who held Julius Caesar for ransom 
in 80 BC. Plutarch, with whose account the chapter opened, refers to Caesar’s captors 
as peiratón (πειρατῶν), identified thereafter as Cilicians (Kilissi).78 And Velleius 
Paterculus, in recounting the same incident, uses piratis to describe the Cilician 
aggressors.79 
The actual origins of the Cilicians and their apparently habitual plunder are 
somewhat unclear owing to a lack of contemporary sources, particularly for the 
Eastern Mediterranean—Strabo and Plutarch, for instance, wrote of events before their 
own time. Surveying the available sources, Avi Avidov suggests that most in fact 
associated the appearance of Cilician piratae with the outbreak of the Mithridatic 
wars. He concludes that the Cilicians’ ‘imputed past record may be no more than the 
retrojection of Roman allegations stemming from precisely’ the period in which the 
Romans met the Cilicians in war.80 What limited evidence is available, De Souza 
suggests, indicates a region populated by ‘fiefdoms’ of varying sizes along the Cilician 
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coast in which ‘individual leaders exercise autocratic power and from which (it is 
implied) they direct piratical forces against their neighbours and more distant 
targets’.81 Appian, for instance, writes of communities led by ‘tyrants’ and ‘kings’, 
some of whom, de Souza notes, were powerful enough to enter the historical record.82 
These small polities acknowledged neither the authority of the Seleucids, the nominal 
rulers of Anatolia after Alexander’s death, nor that of Rome.83 Instead, they followed 
their own traditions and religion worship, with ‘strange sacrifices’ and ‘secret rites’ 
Plutarch records.84 
The Romans, for their part, seem for a long time to have been largely 
indifferent to Cilician raiding. Some scholars such as Henry Ormerod suggest this was 
due to the role of the Cilicians as a source of slaves.85 Alternatively, such indifference 
may have been maintained simply because the Romans did not, until at least the end 
of the second century BC, ‘consider themselves responsible for the general “security” 
of this region’.86 By the outbreak of the Mithridatic wars, this situation had changed. 
Mithridates VI Eupator, king of Pontos (120-63 BC) fought a series of wars from 88 
BC to his death in 63 BC challenging Roman domination over the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The Cilicians, it seems, were drawn into this war as active belligerents. 
According to Appian, when Mithridates went to war with Rome, he ‘sent out 
[peiratás] on the sea’ and, with their help, invaded the Roman protectorate in Asia 
Minor.87 Under Mithridates, the Cilicians assembled a large war fleet and, at one point, 
according to Plutarch, garrisoned Sinope against Roman attack ‘for the king’.88  
Modern scholars have largely agreed with these sources, painting similar 
pictures of Mithridates and the Cilicians working in unison. Ormerod writes that ‘[t]he 
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war against the pirates became, in fact, identical with the war against Mithridates’89, 
while Harry Gould suggests that the Cilicians were ‘the formal allies of Mithridates; 
their fleet effectively constituted his navy.’90 Surveying the source material, Avidov 
observes that, although they are referred to as ‘pirates’, wherever the Cilicians’ actions 
are described in any detail, ‘they are seen to be engaged in large scale operations that 
do not seem to be aimed primarily at obtaining plunder, but rather to the attainment of 
strategic objectives’. They are described as organised in large fleets, with ‘hierarchies 
of command and all other trappings of ordinary fighting forces’. Moreover, Avidov 
concludes, their actions were directed solely at the enemies of Mithridates.91 
With defeat against Sulla’s Roman army on land in 85 BC, Mithridates had 
lost much of Asia Minor and it is unclear to what extent Mithridates continued to direct 
the Cilicians’ operations.92 Nonetheless, hostilities between Rome and the Cilicians 
continued, with the latter attacking a Roman fleet in Ostia, sacking Caietae and even 
capturing two Roman praetors. The Cilicians had come to appear, in Kellet-Marx’s 
words, ‘a standing refutation of Rome’s claim to imperium, above all in the East, 
where many notable cities had been captured and plundered, including Cnidus, 
Colophon, Samos, and Delos’.93 Cicero could thus write ‘did you think this was 
imperium, when legates, quaestors, and praetors of the Roman People were being 
seized, when we were cut off from public and private communication with all the 
provinces?’94 At the same time, the Cilicians’ hostilities frustrated Roman trade, in 
grain especially, which by the late Republican period had taken on great importance. 
The Romans, Plutarch wrote, were short of food and feared famine;95 the Cilicians, 
Livy recorded, had ‘blocked the grain-trade’.96 Massive grain imports were required 
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to feed the slave labour on which the Roman economy relied as well as a growing 
urban population of plebeians.97 
It was in this context that, in 67 BC, Pompey, otherwise known as Gnaeus 
Pompeius Magnus,98 was granted a sweeping military command (imperium maius) to 
fight a ‘war against the pirates’ under the lex Gabinia de piratis persequendis.99 As 
Appian explains, ‘[w]hen the Romans could no longer endure the damage and 
disgrace, they made Gnaeus Pompey, who was then their man of greatest reputation, 
commander by law . . . with absolute power over the whole sea within the Pillars of 
Hercules, and of the land for a distance of 75 kilometres from the coast.’100 Again, the 
question is whether this was, as many modern commentators are quick to argue, an 
operation of ‘global policing’ against piracy, in the modern sense of brigandage at sea, 
as Policante suggests, or whether it conformed, as Gould puts it, to a ‘quotidian inter-
polity conflict’ with political agenda and strategic goals.101  
Analysis of contemporaneous sources suggests that the Romans themselves 
took the latter view, writing of the Cilicians, if at the same time labelling them pirata 
or, in the Greek, peirates, in terms more akin to wartime belligerents than the pirates 
of the modern legal imagination. Velleius Paterculus, for instance, clearly noted that 
the Cilicians were not organising individual raids for plunder but rather moved in large 
fleets.102 Livy certainly referred to the conflict as ‘war’ (bello).103 Even Cicero, in 
reference to Pompey’s role in the war, speaks not of actions against criminals or even 
pirates but of a naval war—‘bellum maritimum’ and ‘bellum navale’, not bellum 
contra piratas or contra praedones.104 
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Finally, such a view is further supported by accounts of the conclusion of the 
war in what appears as a negotiated surrender. Livy’s description of the war ends with 
an account of how Pompey, ‘having ended the war against [the Cilicians], . . . accepted 
the surrender of the pirates [piratis] and assigned them land and towns’.105 Plutarch, 
too, writes of the surrender: ‘Some . . . begged for mercy, and since [Pompey] treated 
them humanely, and after seizing their ships and persons did them no further harm, 
the rest became hopeful of mercy too and . . . betook themselves to Pompey with their 
wives and children, and surrendered to him.’106 Again, the clear impression from these 
authors is that Rome treated the Cilicians not as brigands or outlaws, subjected to the 
particularly severe punishment reserved for latrones and praeodones, but as ‘enemies 
to be met in war and defeated’.107 The ‘results of Roman victory’, Rubin writes, ‘were 
the normal results of a victorious war at that time and in that place’; in short, relations 
with the piratae were relations of war.108 
THE PIRATE OF ANTIQUITY 
A variety of both Greek and Latin terms found in ancient sources have been regularly 
rendered as ‘pirate’ by modern scholars—leistes, peirates, praedo, latro, pirata. Some 
appear only at particular junctures, while others overlap in their usage. There are some 
resemblances between the individuals these terms described and the pirates of the 
modern era, but also distinctions, just as there are distinctions between the ancient 
terms themselves. All appear to have been used to refer to various instances of raiding 
and plunder, but only pirata was limited to seafaring individuals. The peirates and 
leistes of the ancient Greek world could raid by land, while the latro and praedo of 
the Roman world included a diverse range of individuals who did violence to Rome. 
Nor were any labels, including pirata, used solely to refer to private individuals 
pursuing their own private ends; political actors pursuing strategic goals were also 
encompassed by such terms.  
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Moreover, in ancient Greece, there was nothing inherently criminal about these 
groups. Leistai could attain high status and prestige and there was little to distinguish 
the raids of, say, Odysseus from contemporary modes of warfare. In the Classical 
period, one finds the term used to describe what might today be understood as 
individuals and groups employing guerrilla tactics, often alongside and in the service 
of larger military forces. The ambiguous distinction between warfare and plunder 
continued into the Roman era. The piratae against whom Pompey went to battle 
resembled at times forces in Mithridates’ army and at other times autonomous 
communities, albeit ones on the margins of, and violently opposed to, Roman 
imperium. It is difficult to escape Rubin’s conclusion that, by this time, the Greek term 
peirates and its Latin cognate pirata were applied ‘to traditional Eastern 
Mediterranean societies operating in ways that had been accepted as legitimate for at 
least a millennium’ but which were increasingly at odds with a growing Roman 
hegemony.109 These were certainly communities against whom great hostility was 
directed, disparaged by Cicero as hostes communis omnium, enemies of all civilised 
communities: that is, enemies of Rome and its allies. But they were not yet figures of 
universal enmity, persecuted in the name of humanity. Efforts to suppress the maritime 
violence traditional to the Cilicians took on the character of littoral warfare typical of 
the period, with the Cilicians engaged, in practice, as lawful belligerents. Against the 
variety of phenomena and actors of the ancient world, the pirate of modern 
international legal thought appears quite distinct. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Depredation in the medieval Mediterranean 
In October 1397, Francesc Colomer was returning to his native Catalonia with a rich 
cargo from Sicily. A native of Barcelona, Colomer had spent much of the 1390s in 
Genoa and had become a prominent member of the Catalan merchant colony there. A 
1230 treaty had opened Genoa to Aragonese and Catalan merchants and large numbers 
from southern France and eastern Spain took advantage of these commercial 
privileges.1 Catalan merchants from the city of Tortosa were particularly prominent in 
the sale of Muslim slaves, with Genoa an important market in the western 
Mediterranean slave trade. The sale of Spanish slaves in Genoa had declined after 
1250, but the city’s colony of Catalan merchants had remained. 
Colomer’s ships plied a regular trade across the western Mediterranean 
carrying such cargo as wool for Pisan merchants and the Datini company of Prato. On 
this trip he was accompanied by a Valencian, Ramon Almenar, who had chartered the 
voyage, and a number of fellow merchants and nobles. As the ship passed close to 
Sardinia, poor weather forced Colomer and his companions to weigh anchor off the 
small island of San Macário, south of the port of Cagliari. Before they could once 
more make sail, the Catalans came under attack from a light galley commanded by 
Sologrus de Nigro, a native of Genoa. Accompanying de Nigro was a motley crew 
including merchants from Genoa, Montpellier, Avignon and Arles, as well as a group 
of knights from the French priories of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem—better 
known as the Knights Hospitallers—including the Grand Prior of France, Regnault de 
Giresme. The attackers seized the ship’s merchandise as well as the belongings of all 
aboard—‘to the last stitch of clothing’, de Nigro’s victims would later complain.2 
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De Nigro’s act of plunder was by no means exceptional. Banished from his 
native Genoa earlier the same year for defying a communal official, de Nigro had 
taken to attacking merchant vessels along the French Riviera and in the Tyrrhenian. 
In the months that followed his attack on Colomer’s ship, de Nigro would sail east to 
Zara (now Zadar in Croatia), using the port as a base for raids on Venetian shipping 
in the Adriatic and as far east as the Levant. By the summer of 1399, he had become 
such a nuisance that the Venetian Senate awarded Hermolao Lombardo command of 
a three-galley fleet to patrol the Adriatic with the mission of ending de Nigro’s 
harassment. By the autumn, de Nigro had returned west to harry shipping along the 
Ligurian and French Rivieras.3 
Nor were de Nigro’s actions exceptional in the context of late medieval 
Europe. Violence and plunder were endemic, a staple of political and economic life. 
Heavy wagons followed armies to battle to collect the spoils of war. Merchants were 
robbed on highways. In a memorable passage from his Feudal Society, Marc Bloch 
writes of William Marshal, a ‘valiant knight’ who, nonetheless, when encountering a 
monk on the road, ‘did not scruple to rob the poor devil of his cash . . . . One of his 
companions even reproached him for not having seized the horse as well.’4 But 
merchants were not only victims. If ‘burgess’, as Bloch suggests, was ‘employed in 
unequivocal opposition to the words knight, cleric, villein’, merchants ‘shared with 
the knight a warlike disposition and the practice of bearing arms’.5 No meaningful 
distinction, Nicholas Rodger remarks, could reasonably be drawn between violent and 
peaceful trade.6 
In southern Europe, much of that trade was conducted along the watery 
highways of the Mediterranean. Here too commerce and violence went hand in hand 
in a fierce rivalry for the fruits of the medieval trading system. But if acts of plunder 
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such as that off San Macário were hardly exceptional, how were they understood by 
contemporary legal thinkers? Was this an act of piracy and de Nigro a pirate in the 
modern sense of these terms? Such legal categories, this chapter argues, still did not 
yet exist in the medieval Mediterranean. With the dissolution of the Roman empire, 
the pirate had lost its association with Cilicia in particular and banditry in general. The 
pirate remained a figure associated with maritime violence, but one that carried no 
inherent pejorative connotation. A pirate might be celebrated or condemned, 
championed by a political community or repudiated as an enemy. Normative 
judgements, though, were exogenous to the piratical identity itself. 
This did not mean, however, that all depredation was treated alike. If violence 
was endemic to economic life, a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
plunder was beginning, in the late medieval period, to take shape. That distinction, the 
chapter argues, would turn on sovereign license and was adumbrated initially within 
a theory of reprisals that sought to both justify and limit maritime seizure. Using the 
example of de Nigro’s attack and the reactions it provoked, the chapter charts how 
maritime plunder was conceived by contemporary legal thinkers and situates the 
emerging distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy within a conjuncture 
marked by the expansion of merchant capital and the proliferation of politically 
autonomous centres of trade and accumulation. This was the crucible in which such a 
distinction was formed—a necessary first step towards the pirate’s eventual 
association with one half of that equation.  
MERCHANT CAPITALISM AND INTER-STATE RIVALRY 
The medieval European economy was based primarily on agrarian production, with 
aristocratic rule exploiting the peasantry and extracting a surplus for lordly 
consumption. Yet the political, ideological and military means of exploitation were 
not concentrated in a centralised and unified state, but rather were spread across the 
nobility.7 The fragmented character of political power meant both that war was 
constant and that lords wishing to make war would have to look beyond the ‘day-to-
day mechanisms of ruling class reproduction’ for financing.8 To raise an army required 
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borrowing, usually from the emerging merchant-entrepreneurial class in the cities. 
One by-product of feudal war-making, then, Alex Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu 
remark, was an ‘attendant rise in the political autonomy, power and influence of 
merchants, with increasing degrees of representation in the decision-making structures 
of states’.9  
Medieval towns thus formed ‘urban enclaves’ within a sea of feudal social 
relations, with merchant capital exercising ever greater political influence.10 Yet 
within the political geography of medieval Europe, North and Central Italy formed an 
exceptional zone, with the alienation of city-states to moneyed interests exceeding that 
seen anywhere else at this time. By the 14th century, for example, the same merchant 
families in Venice controlled trade, transport, and finance and exercised significant 
political power.11 Philip Curtin observes that Venice was ‘a commercial republic that 
systematically used state power, not merely to increase state income, but also to 
increase the income of the Venetian merchants’.12 Genoa was much the same. 
Administration of its Black Sea colonies, for example, was ceded to the private Banco 
di San Giorgio, its merchant owners exercising exclusive political power in those 
territories.13  
The success of these islands of merchant capitalism rested, in the first place, 
on trade, with the accumulation of wealth deriving from unequal exchange. As Marx 
put it: ‘the major profit was made not by supplying a specific national product, but 
rather by mediating the exchange of products between commercially—and generally 
economically—undeveloped communities and by exploiting both the producing 
countries’.14 Genoa, on the Ligurian coast of Italy, created a network of colonies and 
outposts across the Mediterranean. Civis ianuensis, ergo mercator, a popular aphorism 
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held: a Genoese citizen, therefore a merchant.15 From the east, Genoese ships brought 
spices, grain and Tartar slaves to the Italian peninsula’s market ports, while from the 
west, Genoese merchants plied the coasts of the Iberian peninsula as well as those of 
Sicily, Corsica and the Balearic islands. Meanwhile, on the eastern coast of the Italian 
peninsula, Venice continued to enjoy hegemony in trade with Byzantium stretching 
back to the 11th century.16 
The 13th century saw a massive expansion in trade across Eurasia with 
transcontinental trading links stretching from England to China.17 This was in part a 
product of the Pax Mongolica, with the Mongols allowing ‘unhindered access for 
foreigners in the lands which they governed’ and offering safe passage for traders.18 
Trade flowed from east to west as never before.19 Although the Mongol empire was at 
the fore of this expansion of trade, the primary promoters and organisers, and the main 
beneficiaries, were the northern Italian city-states. These politically autonomous 
trading centres played a crucial role in creating the regional links made possible by 
Mongolian protection in Central Asia and the Black Sea region.20 
While trade was in its expansionary phase, these emerging centres of 
accumulation could enjoy its benefits more or less harmoniously based on a division 
of labour, with each city-state enjoying its own niche in the trading system: a 
‘specialization’, as Giovanni Arrighi puts it, ‘in interrelated but spatially or 
functionally distinct circuits of trade’.21 Florence and Milan were primarily engaged 
in overland trade with north-western Europe—Florence focused on textile trades and 
Milan on metal trades—while Venice and Genoa shared maritime trade with the east–
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Venice focused on the spice trade and Genoa on the silk trade.22 To the Italian city-
states were added newcomers, most importantly Catalonia and Aragon to the west.23 
By the early 14th century, however, the expansion of trade made possible by 
the Mongol empire had tapered off. Competition between the autonomous centres of 
trade, once tolerated, increasingly became a source of friction. Decreasing returns 
from trade led the city-states to invest, Arrighi observes, in ‘the hostile takeover of the 
markets or of the territories of competitors’.24 An escalation of inter-mercantile 
struggle followed such that the late 13th and 14th centuries were marked by near 
constant warfare as the cities sought to shore up their trade routes and assert control 
over the Mediterranean beyond their territorial waters. Pisa claimed dominion over the 
Tyrrhenian sea, Genoa over the Gulf of Liguria, Venice over the Adriatic. Any foreign 
merchants wishing to make passage through the Adriatic, the Venetians demanded, 
would have to pay a toll.25  
The Battle of Meloria, in 1284, saw the Genoese push Pisan trade out of the 
Black Sea, only for Genoa to engage in a running series of conflicts over the course 
of the next century with Venice, each vying for control of trade with the eastern 
stretches of the Mediterranean and a monopoly on trade in the Black Sea.26 Their 
rivalry would culminate in the War of Chioggia (1376-1381), ending with the Peace 
of Turin in 1381 which saw Genoa ousted from the most profitable eastern 
Mediterranean markets. In the western Mediterranean, Genoese attempts to 
monopolise trade ran up against an expanding Catalan-Aragonese power leading, for 
example, to war between 1331 and 1335 over control of Sardinia. 
Even in the absence of formal war, violence was a constant. In fact, formal 
military operations and more haphazard commercial raiding were not always easily 
distinguished. Commune and crown alike relied on private citizens—the same 
merchant captains who plied the trade routes—to secure their jurisdictional claims. 
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The Mediterranean, in short, was marked by what Janet Abu-Loghud has called 
‘endemic war on the high seas’.27 
THE PIRATE IN THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN 
Francesc Colomer, along with the merchants and nobles whose cargo he was carrying, 
had suffered significant losses at the hands of de Nigro. If such attacks were a constant 
risk to merchants—who might themselves, on another occasion, turn perpetrator—
how were they treated under law? The example of Colomer and di Nigro offers an 
insight into how maritime depredation was understood and treated by legal thinkers, 
as well as its relationship with the figure of the pirate in this juncture. 
The response to depredation at sea was, by the late 13th century, remarkably 
uniform across much of southern Europe, with legal authorities drawing on traditions 
rooted in Roman law. Yet it was not to Roman criminal law or the treatment of the 
latrones or praedones that they looked but to the law of delicts (delicta)—private 
wrongs such as theft (furtum) and theft by force (rapina) which entitled a victim to 
compensation. Under Roman law, furtum involved either the removal of another’s 
property or an intentional handling thereof with a particular intention: stealing but 
also, say, collecting money from another’s debtor. It could be prosecuted only by the 
person suffering the loss.28 Rapina, by way of contrast, was a theft committed with the 
use of violence. Moveables alone could be the object of rapina and like its non-violent 
counterpart, it was to be prosecuted only by the injured individual.29  
In the medieval Mediterranean, maritime seizures were treated, in the first 
place, as instances of furtum and rapina. A plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof fell, 
was to set out the details of her complaint in a written deposition, to be supported by 
witnesses to whom the defendant could then respond.30 But to whom should a plaintiff 
bring her complaint? Under the Roman Imperium, all were subject to a single central 
juridical authority. If the Holy Roman Emperor still maintained a de iure claim to such 
                                                        
27 Ibid 113. 
28 Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (American Philosophical Society, 1953) 480. 
See also Alan Watson, The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (Clarendon Press, 1965) 
220-27; George Long, ‘Furtum’, in William Smith, A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (John 
Murray, 1875) 563. 
29 Berger (1953) 667. On civil penalties for theft in Roman law, see The Digest of Justinian, vol. 4, ed. 
Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger, trans. Alan Watson (Philadelphia, 1985) 737–59, 761, 765–68. 
30 Tai (2004) 37. 
 73 
authority, the reality of medieval Europe was a plurality of autonomous and semi-
autonomous political communities. Victim and attacker seldom shared any political 
allegiance. 
One option was to seek redress directly from the attacker’s own authorities, 
but more commonly, plaintiffs approached first their own authorities who might then 
intercede on their behalf. Such was the course of action pursued by Colomer and his 
fellow plaintiffs, the merchants and nobles whose cargo Colomer had carried, when 
they brought their case before the royal curia of King Martí I of Catalonia-Aragon. In 
their written depositions, or libelli, to the curia, Colomer claimed he had incurred some 
9,000 gold Aragonese florins worth of damage to his ship and provisions, while the 
Valencian Ramon Almenar, who had chartered the voyage, claimed 6,000 florins 
worth of loss. In addition, the various merchants who had lost cargo aboard the ship 
and the shareholders in Colomer’s venture claimed damages totalling more than 31 
thousand florins. In total, more than 28 merchants and petty nobles came forward as 
plaintiffs.31 
Convinced of the veracity of their claims, the royal curia took up the plaintiffs’ 
case. Letters were dispatched to Genoa in January and May of 1939 petitioning the 
commune’s French governor, Colart de Calleville, for restitution—de Nigro was, after 
all, a native of Genoa, as were several of his accomplices. Such restitution, the royal 
curia suggested, should be drawn from whatever assets de Nigro and his Genoese 
merchant-collaborators held in Genoa. At the same time, another letter was sent to the 
bailiff of Montpellier: Jean Cerda, another of de Nigro’s companions, was a merchant 
from the city. Finally, the attack had also involved members of the French priories of 
the Knights Hospitallers. Martí’s curia therefore dispatched additional letters to both 
the Grand Master of the Knights at Rhodes, Philibert de Nailac, under whose 
jurisdiction the order fell, and to King Charles VI of France as sovereign over the 
French merchants and Knights Hospitaller.32 
Each letter named the plaintiffs and described the attack at Saint Macaró, 
providing a detailed statement of damages drawn from the depositions submitted 
before the curia. In describing the attack, the letters identified de Nigro and his 
accomplices as having perpetrated their plunder in modo piratico (in a piratical 
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fashion) against ‘friends’.33 This characterisation was important as belligerent rights 
during war existed as a matter of course; Genoa owed nothing to an enemy. It was 
therefore essential to establish that an attack had been perpetrated on friends who were 
owed the protection of treaty, alliance or simply truce. 
It is tempting to read a modern meaning of piracy into the description of de 
Nigro’s attack as in modo piratico. But the expression ‘piratical’ carried with it a much 
narrower meaning, not pejorative or even invoking illegitimacy, but rather describing 
the manner of an attack. Thus, as Tai observes, in many situations the term was used 
interchangeably with violenter (violently) or hostiliter (in a hostile manner).34 Indeed, 
Thomas Heebøll-Holm suggests that the term seems to refer simply to the waterborne 
nature of attack, such as in Abbot Suger’s chronicle of 12th-century France in which 
he described forces attacking Gournay Castle on the river Marne as fighting piratarum 
more.35 
In fact, King Martí’s correspondence itself, while describing the act of 
depredation as ‘piratical’, contained no suggestion that the seizure might be 
considered criminal in any way. His letter to Governor Colart de Calleville had 
requested restitution for the losses caused by de Nigro’s seizure, but was altogether 
silent on the treatment of de Nigro himself. It contained no request for de Nigro’s 
capture or punishment. Likewise, his letters to Montpellier, King Charles VI, and 
Philibert de Nailac mentioned only the restitution demanded by Martí’s subjects. 
Moreover, his apparent indifference to the treatment of de Nigro was by no means 
exceptional. The legal sources from this period that deal with maritime plunder are 
almost entirely related to civil and prize disputes, not criminal prosecutions. 
Restitution of ship and cargo was a plaintiff’s primary concern, not punishment of the 
attacker. 
This ambivalence towards the treatment of seaborne depredators is echoed in 
various codifications of maritime law at this time, such as the Catalan Consolat de 
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Mar.36 Drawn up in mid-13th-century Barcelona, the Consolat de Mar was the first 
comprehensive codification of maritime law in the Middle Ages. Writing in 1874, 
A.T. Whatley remarked that, in the Consolat, ‘we should, perhaps, expect to find the 
subject of piracy largely treated of and condemned, but it is not so’.37 In dealing with 
instances of plunder, the Consolat referred to vessels engaged in an assault as ‘armed 
enemy ships’ (lenys armats de enemichs), and also characterised them as ‘evil ships’ 
(mals lenys) carrying ‘evil men’ (males gents).38 Yet there is no suggestion that the 
depredation involved constituted any internationally proscribed crime or that the mals 
gents who committed acts of plunder were anything more than morally dubious. In 
short, the code’s specific provisions in no way proscribed maritime seizure, but merely 
sought to regulate its practice and the attendant commercial consequences. As J.W. 
Boutlon puts it, the tendency of the Consolat and other codes during this period was 
‘to regulate from the shore in order to mitigate the consequences of piracy rather than 
repress upon the sea’.39 
Like its adjectival form, the term ‘pirate’, appears to have also been used in 
medieval Europe without any pejorative implication. In the 13th-century Chronicle of 
Bury St. Edmunds, the Genoese merchant Benedetto Zaccaria is identified as a ‘pirate 
from Genoa’ (pirate de Ianuensibus) and praised for his 1293 attack on a Muslim 
vessel and his seizure of the infidels’ possessions as booty.40 Indeed, where one finds 
condemnation expressed in texts of the period, the term ‘pirate’ is conspicuously 
absent, as when Hugh Despenser the Younger is condemned for his acts of plunder in 
the Vita Edwardi Secundi. He is described not as a pirate, but a belua marina or sea 
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monster.41 Heebøll-Holm, in his detailed study of 13th and 14th century legal, 
diplomatic and narrative sources concludes that ‘pirate’ was used strictly ‘terminus 
technicus’ and invoked most often simply to mean nothing more than a ‘warrior 
specialized in maritime warfare’.42 
Certainly, efforts were made to curb plunder. Genoa, for instance, 
promulgated a new civil and criminal code in 1375. Citizens were forbidden to arm 
without formal authorisation and those who did so were subject to capital and 
corporal sanction.43 Indeed, even before the promulgation of the new code, Genoa 
had executed an unlicensed depredator in 1346. Yet across western Europe, the 
enforcement of criminal penalties for maritime depredation was at best haphazard. 
Reginald Marsden, in his oft-cited collection of historical Documents Relating to 
Law and Custom of the Sea, could find only a single recorded death sentence for 
piracy in English sources before the 16th century: the hanging of William Briggeho 
in 1228.44 More recently, Heebøll-Holm, analysing English and French legal and 
diplomatic records, reports finding only a handful of additional cases.45 ‘Cases of 
persons punished for piracy in the Middle Ages’, he writes, defining piracy simply as 
seaborne appropriation, ‘are rather hard to come by’.46 Despite employing violence 
and even killing in the course of their maritime theft—crimes which, on land 
certainly, would attract punishment—‘pirates’ were rarely indicted of any crime.47 
Further complicating matters is the fact that even when plunder at sea was 
followed by legal penalty, it is difficult to separate out in the sources what specific 
acts were being punished. In 1369, for instance, the Catalonia-Aragon crown 
tortured and executed Jean Bayonne (Jean de Bourguignon) of Provence for an 
assault on the merchant ship Saint Anthony. It was certainly a violent robbery: the 
captain, Guillem Arius, had been thrown overboard to his death. Yet Bayonne had 
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been engaged by the rebel Judges of Arborea to challenge Catalan-Aragonese 
authority on Sardinia.48 Did his punishment stem from his violent seizure or from his 
rebel status? Contemporaneous sources are ambiguous. 
What can we conclude about the pirate in late medieval southern Europe? The 
pirate remained, as in Rome, a figure associated with maritime violence, one that 
carried no inherent criminal or even pejorative connotation. Indeed, a pirate could be 
celebrated for his acts of plunder, as with the Genoese Benedetto Zaccaria. The term, 
and its adjectival counterpart, in modo piratico, appear to have had no specific 
meaning beyond a general invocation of maritime violence. This is perhaps nowhere 
clearer than in the 13th century Law of Aragon, which held that ‘[a]ny pirate who arms 
against enemies must give security not to hurt friends, and to bring captures to the 
place from which he started’. The term ‘pirate’ here explicitly encompassing state-
sanctioned mariners—‘privateers’, as such individuals would come to be known in the 
modern era.49 
LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE PLUNDER 
The extant sources do not record what, if any, response King Martí’s letters received 
from the Governor of Genoa, the bailiff of Montpellier or the King of France. Faced 
with an earlier similar petition from the Venetian Doge, the Genoese governor, de 
Calleville, had offered the exculpatory argument that de Nigro had acted without the 
consent of the commune, citing his banishment and alleged attacks upon fellow 
Genoese.50 No doubt this remained the governor’s position. A response was, however, 
received from the Knights Hospitaller. Writing to Martí in June 1399, the Grand 
Master denied the accusations against the order. Acknowledging that several knights, 
including the Grand Prior of France, had been on board a vessel present during de 
Nigro’s attack on Colomer, he nonetheless insisted that none had been complicit in 
the attack itself.51 
Responses such as those from de Calleville to the Doge or de Nailac to Martí 
were not uncommon. In the Mediterranean of the 14th century, when maritime theft 
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was common and plunder frequent, authorities were in no rush to offer restitution to 
every alleged victim. In such situations, plaintiffs were not without recourse. Martí’s 
letters to de Calleville et al. had closed with the threat of reprisal should redress not 
be provided in good speed.52 
Reprisals—repraesalia in contemporary Latin sources—sought to provide 
compensation for injuries and hostile acts by foreigners.53 A reprisal opened the way 
to such compensation by entitling its holder to recover her losses not from her attacker 
directly, but from that attacker’s compatriots.54 They had their origin in the Germanic 
laws and customs of the Teutonic tribes, originally in the context of family feuding: 
revenge for a wrong was permitted not only against the perpetrator but also against his 
family members. Their extension to inter-polity relations occurred only gradually and 
by no means displaced this earlier form of reprisal. As late as 1260, the principle arose 
in a trial before the Parlement in Paris. Marc Bloch describes how the knight Louis 
Defeux demanded compensation from one Thomas d’Ouzouer who had attacked and 
wounded him. D’Ouzouer’s defence rested on the fact that he himself had been 
previously attacked by Defeux’s nephew. The court, Bloch recounts, sided with 
d’Ouzouer: Defeux was indeed liable for his relative’s actions.55 
Already in the ninth century some basic forms of reprisal could be found in 
northern Italy, although they would become common features of inter-polity relations 
only from the late-12th century.56 In the 13th century, their use spread west from 
Mediterranean Italy to Aragon and France and, by the 14th century, their use had 
spread as far as England: the earliest mention of reprisal in English sources is from 
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1293,57 while an ordinance from 1354 provides formal provisions for the granting of 
reprisals.58 
In practice, reprisals allowed a merchant or traveller robbed on foreign territory 
by the subjects of a foreign prince, or a creditor seeking payment from a foreign debtor, 
to recover her losses. Where redress was denied by the foreign prince, the victim or 
creditor could seek authorisation from her own political masters to exact a reprisal 
against citizens of the offending polity.59 Authorisation for reprisal was given in the 
form of a letter of reprisal or marque—licentia marchandi or simply marcha, derived 
from the German mark meaning frontier—the license a commission, in effect, for 
private justice along the fluid borders of medieval polities. 
Reprisals, however, presented a difficulty for jurists schooled in the Roman 
tradition. In their narrowest sense, when exercised immediately and directly against 
the original malefactor, a reprisal might be understood as on par with self-defence. 
But the collective responsibility implied by their common, more expansive meaning, 
and found in early Teutonic legal culture, ran contrary to Roman law. Mediterranean 
jurists could cite numerous examples, such as Justinian’s Novella 52, which appeared 
to leave no room for ambiguity: ‘Nor shall one man be troubled or injured because 
some other man struck or injured some one.’60 Yet a reprisal specifically involved 
making the innocent suffer for the guilty: on the view of many 14th-century jurists 
such as Albericus de Rosate, they were simply contrary to natural law.61 Writing at 
the end of the century, Honoré Bonet likewise insisted that a reprisal should be ‘by no 
means permitted, and the law does not allow its exercise; for on this theory one person 
suffers loss for another, and receives damage and molestation for the deeds of another, 
which ought not to be, either according to reason or written law’.62 Albericus and 
likeminded thinkers could cite not only Roman authorities but also canon law. The 
Second Council of Lyon in 1274 had damned the practice as against ‘law and natural 
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equity’ and threatened excommunication to those who took or even allowed reprisals 
against ecclesiastical persons or church property.63 
Such prohibitions failed to eliminate reprisals and the late 13th and early 14th 
centuries in fact saw a steady increase in their incidence.64 The first efforts to 
legitimise the practice came with the identification of exceptions to their prohibition. 
The 13th-century French canonist Guilielmus Durantis, or William Durand, set out a 
number of exemptions to the Council of Lyon’s ban: ‘heirs punished for the crimes of 
their parents, lords punished for the crimes of their slaves, illegitimate children 
punished for the sins of their fathers’.65  
Exceptions went only so far to justifying the very real incidence of reprisals. 
One of the first thinkers to offer a systematic justification for reprisals was Giovanni 
d’Andrea (Johannes Andreae).66 Giovanni was faced with Roman and canon law 
clearly holding that innocent victims were not to be punished for the misdeeds of 
others. How, then, could the apparently innocent victims of reprisals in fact be 
understood to be legitimate targets? They would have to be implicated, Giovanni 
realised, in the original injustice giving rise to the reprisal.  
The injustice punished by a reprisal, Giovanni argued, was not the original 
robbery, but rather the failure of a prince or judge to do justice—that is, to make right 
the original wrong. And a community, Giovanni sought to show, could be held 
responsible for its ruler’s actions. St Augustine had argued that a war is just where it 
‘avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make 
amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized 
unjustly’.67 Since it was legitimate to wage war against a city refusing to make amends 
or do justice for the wrongs of its citizens, it was surely legitimate also, Giovanni 
reasoned, to take reprisal against that city. Thus, Giovanni could conclude, a reprisal 
was allowed ‘against a negligent lord and city, after they have been summoned [to do 
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justice] and after the injured party’s judge has declared the guilty city and lord 
negligent and in default.’68 
Giovanni’s formulation pointed, however, to a further problem. If the innocent 
were, under particular circumstances, implicated in the guilt of their ruler, who had 
the authority to punish them? Innocent IV had made clear that a war ‘properly so 
called’ could be declared only by a prince with no superior: a just war was the 
prerogative of an independent prince alone.69 The grantor of a reprisal, it followed, 
must also be a sovereign with no superior. But what of the negligent judge? Could the 
injured party’s ruler not still appeal to that judge’s superior? As Giovanni himself 
noted, ‘in the absence of a secular judge an ecclesiastical judge can always be called 
upon’.70 The issue was further complicated as, at least de iure, rulers of the Italian 
communes remained subjects of the Holy Roman Emperor. 
THEORISING REPRISALS 
In practice, officially sanctioned reprisals along the Mediterranean coast were still 
relatively limited at the close of the 13th century. Much as in Colomer’s case, the 
Italian communes and other Mediterranean princes, as well as the Parlement of Paris, 
issued reprisals only when other attempts at recovery had failed. ‘The correspondence 
from court to court,’ Cheyette notes, ‘even when the individuals originally involved 
were of no great account, could sometimes become voluminous and continue for 
years.’71 
As the new century progressed, however, the pressures militating in favour of 
the granting of reprisals increased. In the first place, the rise of the Italian city-states 
throughout the century contributed to the Holy Roman Emperor’s de facto loss of 
power. If de iure the Italian communes could exercise jurisdiction only within their 
walls, the Emperor was ‘often de facto unable to adjudicate disputes that were outside 
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the scope of the jurisdiction of individual city-states. This led to a dramatic rise in the 
use of reprisals as a means of individual self-help’.72 
At the same time, the resort to self-help became particularly important in view 
of the increasing alienation of the city-states to merchant capital. As Frederic Chayette 
observes, ‘the control the great [merchant banking] houses exercised over their 
communal governments virtually immunized them to judicial attacks in their local 
courts’. The Florentine bankruptcies of the 1340s—the collapse of the Bardi and 
Peruzzi companies most notable—brought such concerns to a head. Reprisal was ‘thus 
in practice not the last but sometimes the only recourse’.73 
These were the realities facing legal thinkers by mid-century. The most 
important such thinker was Bartolus de Saxoferrato, a professor at Pisa and the most 
famous of the postglossators. In 1353, Bartolus set out his own answer to the question 
of reprisals in a treatise titled Tractatus represaliarum.74 Like Giovanni, Bartolus 
could find no license for reprisals under Roman or canon law.75 But this was hardly 
surprising, he noted, as reprisals were not necessary in Rome at its apex when 
centralised power was strong. Only with the collapse of centralised power was there 
no longer a ‘supervisory authority’ to oversee relations amongst the empire’s various 
communities. Indeed, in the face of de facto imperial decline, the Italian communes 
had, from the 13th century, sought to extend their traditionally limited jurisdiction. 
Their tribunals increasingly developed inquisitorial functions and by the time Bartolus 
was writing, many communal cities were asserting the same ‘judicial solidity’, with 
their own policing and judicial institutions, as other polities possessing ‘regalia or 
imperial rights’.76 Indeed, in Venice, the Signori di Notte was already exercising 
policing functions by the late 13th century. 
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The resulting tension between de iure imperial power and increasing 
independence of the Italian cities was ‘one of the central dilemmas of Italian urban 
politics’ at this time.77 It was also one in which Bartolus was immersed. Already before 
tackling the question of reprisals, Bartolus had been concerned with establishing 
municipal sovereignty, an issue which he addressed in his numerous consilia as well 
as his commentaries on Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis and works such as ‘On the 
Government of the City’. The motivation undergirding much of this work was to offer 
the northern Italian communes a legal defence of independence against the Holy 
Roman Empire.78 In his commentary on the Code, for instance, Bartolus accepted that 
de iure, the Emperor remained sovereign and that the Empire constituted, in Quentin 
Skinner’s paraphrase, ‘the sole jurisdictional unit in Europe, with the independent 
kingdoms or regna being no more than Imperial provinces, while the City Republics 
or civitates are equivalent to Roman Imperial cities’.79 But regardless of the Emperor’s 
de iure status, there were, Bartolus observed, ‘many peoples who de facto do not obey 
him.’80 Likewise, he insisted, if it was hardly in doubt that de iure the Emperor alone 
enjoyed the power to make laws, ‘in our day all the governors of cities throughout 
Italy’ de facto exercise that power.81 Regardless of what claims to jurisdiction the 
Emperor might make, a commune which in practice wielded its own imperium and 
recognised no superior should be treated sibi princeps, a prince unto itself.82 
This was, Skinner suggests, nothing short of a ‘revolutionary political claim’, 
one which was soon generalised to all of Europe: Rex in regno suo est Imperator—
‘every king within his own kingdom is equivalent in authority to the Emperor’.83 What 
did this mean for reprisals and the delimitation of legitimate maritime depredation? If 
the new political communities in northern Italy and along the Mediterranean coast 
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were understood as civitates superiorem non recognoscentes, then their leaders were 
in a position to issue reprisals: in short, to determine the legitimacy of violence at sea. 
A reprisal was to be granted by a sovereign prince and justified on the same grounds 
as would render a war just. Indeed, on Bartolus’s view reprisals were a species of 
public war: concedere repraesalias est indicere bellum.84 Like a public war, then, a 
reprisal was the act of one sovereign against another. 
In taking up the task of setting out a legal framework for the practice of 
reprisals, Bartolus and his contemporaries were not starry-eyed about this recourse to 
violence. While the threat of reprisal encouraged royal courts and communal rulers to 
address the grievances of foreign merchants, left unregulated they could easily lead to 
a state of continuous violence.85 If reprisals were granted too easily, the injured would 
likewise resort to violence to recover their losses, with a quick descent into an endless 
series of reprisal and counter-reprisal. An ‘odious’ expedient, Bartolus recognised, 
reprisals were not to be granted lightly.86 
In linking the practice to the ius belli and just war, the Pisan jurist had found 
both a source of legitimation for reprisals but also an apparent check: just as waging 
war required the authorisation of a superior authority, so too did reprisals. Only a 
prince who has no superior may grant them: ex parte concedentis repraesalias, 
requiritur quod sit talis qui superiorem non habet.87 Yet, in the face of the plurality of 
polities claiming de facto sovereignty, the formal requirements of civitas sibi princeps 
and a causa legitima would go only so far in limiting reprisals.  
One answer was to insist on a strict procedure for the granting of reprisals. The 
importance of procedural rectitude was already a feature of Bartolus’s writing. In one 
of his numerous consilia, Bartolus considered a case involving self-defence and stated 
that the judgment was void due to improper consideration of the plea and the failure 
to hear witnesses. His conclusion rested on these procedural aspects alone, not the 
legality of the alleged act or plea themselves.88 
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In the case of reprisals, Bartolus set down a careful procedure to be followed. 
An injured individual must first approach an accused’s civitas requesting judgment 
from the authorities there: that is, from a judge with authority over the accused. Like 
Giovanni, Bartolus was adamant that the only justification for a reprisal was the failure 
of the foreign judge or prince to render justice. Reprisals, he explained, echoing 
Giovanni, ‘are not granted by reason of the wrongful act of the private person [who 
actually committed the wrong], but by reason of the wrong of the whole city in 
refusing to do justice’.89 Only when the injured party fails to gain redress abroad may 
he seek a reprisal from his own sovereign who, in turn, should consider all the 
evidence presented before him and establish that an injustice has indeed been done.90 
Bartolus further indicated that the accused should also be allowed, where possible, to 
offer a defence.91 If justice was still denied, then a reprisal could be licensed on behalf 
of the injured party, the loss to be recovered from the subjects of the sovereign who 
has allowed the injustice—the failure to provide redress—to be perpetrated.92 
Bartolus’s formulae were highly influential. Giovanni da Legnano, following 
quickly on his heels, would repeat much of the latter’s reasoning in his own 
Tractatus.93 Bartolus’s influence could also be found well beyond the Italian 
communes or even the Mediterranean. More than three centuries after Bartolus wrote 
his tract, much the same reasoning could be found in the writings of Irish jurist Charles 
Molloy.94 In England, already from the early 15th century, the issuing of reprisals was 
regulated by statute, while in France, Parlement heard requests for reprisal, 
dispatching letters requesting justice and, if unanswered, issuing letters of marque 
under the King’s seal.95 
                                                        
89 ‘non exigitur propter delictum illius private sed propter delictum totius civitatis denegantis facere 
justitiam’: quoted in Sereni (1943) 47. 
90 Tractatus, Quaestio. IV. 1 cited in Keen (1965) 221. 
91 ‘item quod eis, contra quos conceduntur, sit salva defensionis facultas, quod est de jure naturali vel 
gentium, quod per principem tolli non potest’: Tractatus, Quaestio. IV. 1 quoted in Keen (1965) 221 
note 1. 
92 The procedure set out by Bartolus is discussed in further detail by Keen (1965) 219-21. See also 
Giltaij (2014). 
93 Giovanni da Legnano, De bello, de represaliis et de duello, ed. Thomas E. Holland, trans. James L. 
Brierly (Carnegie Institution, 1917). For a discussion of this tract, see O’Brien (2002). Bonet also relied 
on Bartolus in his own discussion of reprisals: see Bonet (1949) 173-87. 
94 Charles Molloy, De jure maritimo et navali: or a Treatise of Affairs Maritime, and of Commerce, 2 
vols, 9th ed. (T. Waller, 1769) [1676]. 
95 Keen (1965) 221. 
 86 
‘A SEQUENCE OF MUTUAL REPRISALS’ 
Bartolus would no doubt have approved of the Catalan-Aragonese procedures for the 
granting of reprisal on display in the case of Colomer and de Nigro. King Martí’s royal 
curia had carefully considered the libelli offered by Colomer and his fellow plaintiffs 
before dispatching letters to Genoa and elsewhere. In the event, their efforts to gain 
redress from the Genoese were thwarted by changing political imperatives. In 1396, 
Genoa had become a French protectorate. The ‘long shadow of the French Crown’ 
would have made Martí hesitant to antagonise his northern neighbour by granting a 
reprisal that would hurt the crown’s subjects in Genoa. Nor was Martí likely inclined 
to pursue a reprisal more doggedly in the face of diplomatic negotiations with Genoa 
which would ultimately lead to a treaty in December 1402.96 
Philibert de Naillac and the Knights Hospitaller were another matter. The 
Catalan-Aragonese crown and the Hospitallers were bitter rivals throughout much of 
the fourteenth century. Faced now with Colomer’s suit, de Naillac had denied any 
liability for the attack; according to him, the presence of Knights aboard de Nigro’s 
ship did not make them accomplices to the seizure. The royal curia was not persuaded 
and, in June 1400, King Martí circulated instructions to royal officials throughout the 
kingdom informing them that a reprisal had been issued against the Knights of Saint 
John of Jerusalem for a duration of five years and up to a value of more than 30 million 
Aragonese pounds. The Order enjoyed an extensive network of priories throughout 
western Europe, including many in Catalonia-Aragon, from which it amassed sizeable 
revenues through annual collections. The indemnity would thus be drawn from the 
Hospitaller’s collections, to be seized from the Order’s priories throughout the 
kingdom.97 
Often, as in this case, reprisals were collected by state officials on behalf of 
their beneficiaries. Were a merchant awarded reprisal for an illegitimate seizure by a 
Genoese depredator, for instance, this might take the form of an import duty levied on 
Genoese merchants. Alternatively, it might take the shape of seizure of goods directly 
from merchants of the offending polity—Genoese merchants based in Catalonia-
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Aragon, for instance. No less often, however, a reprisal might be effected by the 
injured party herself. With a writ of reprisal in hand, she could seize goods equal to 
the value of the indemnity claimed in what was in effect a retaliatory act of plunder. 
Of course, in practice reprisals often led to further retaliation—precisely as 
Giovanni and Bartolus feared. In May 1401, the Grand Prior of France, Regnault de 
Giresme, put into port at San Feliu de Guixolls on his way to Rhodes. Citing the 
marque issued the previous year, King Martí’s officials seized the Hospitaller 
property. The Order, however, had a friend in the French crown and Charles VI 
threatened ‘retaliatory reprisals against the subjects of Catalonia-Aragon’ were the 
marque not retracted. It was subsequently suspended and, in 1405, rescinded 
altogether.98 
Similarly, when an individual merchant in possession of a writ of reprisal took 
to the sea to extract an indemnity from his own attacker’s compatriots, his subsequent 
victims were no happier knowing that their loss had been authorised by some foreign 
prince. To the Knight Hospitaller whose goods were seized in an Aragonese port, or 
whose ship was sacked by a Catalan merchant, the licensed act of plunder appeared 
no more legitimate than an unlicensed seizure. Indeed, in the eyes of the new victim 
and his own political authorities, the retaliatory attack lacked all legitimacy. The new 
victim’s judge—in our example, Philibert de Naillac—had, after all, already denied 
the legitimacy of the original victim’s claim to restitution. It was precisely that denial 
that constituted the ‘injustice’ to which the reprisal was to rectify. In practice, then, 
one reprisal often begat another.  
The same act of plunder could appear as both a violent injustice and a justified 
act of vengeance. The legitimacy of plunder was not rooted in the act itself, but the 
political recognition bestowed on it. As Spiegel notes, ‘whether justice had actually 
been denied in a particular case was . . . purely a question of power.’ Once one 
community had authorised its members to make reprisals against another polity, one 
alleged to have denied justice, ‘there was no impartial judge who might have been 
entitled to investigate the underlying facts’.99 The consequences of the denial of justice 
in practice overshadowed the actual doctrine set out so painstakingly by Bartolus and 
his contemporaries. One consequence of this state of affairs, Mark Hanna observes, is 
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that much ‘early modern maritime violence and plunder’ might best be understood as 
‘a sequence of mutual reprisals’.100  
What might we conclude about the pirate in this period? As with antiquity, one 
can conclude that the modern figure of the pirate had not yet taken form. A distinction 
was starting to take shape between legitimate and illegitimate depredation, albeit one 
that in practice left much scope for conflicting judgements. This distinction, based in 
a theory of legitimate reprisals rooted in sovereign authority, was still primarily 
concerned with the resolution of property disputes—the determination of prize and 
claims to restitution, in essence an extension of the rules of postliminy to private 
disputes. At the same time, determinations of legitimacy remained framed in terms of 
the law of war. The theory of reprisals was fundamentally rooted in just war concepts, 
not criminal law: official license by a sovereign could qualify civilians involved in 
maritime depredation as public enemies, granting them the rights of a belligerent 
including the right to retain booty. While the framing of unauthorised maritime 
depredation as illegitimate vaguely gestures to certain modern elements of the piratical 
identity, the figure of the hostis humani generis remained beyond the horizon. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The pirate, the devil and universal enmity 
In 1504, two galleys made their way across the Tyrrhenian Sea. Flying the colours of 
Pope Julius II, not long enthroned in St Peter’s chair, the galleys were richly laden 
with cargo from Genoa destined for Rome’s port at Civitavecchia. As they passed in 
sight of the island of Elba, off the coast of Tuscany, they encountered a small galliot 
captained by one Arūj Barbarossa, named for his scarlet beard. Arūj and his brother 
Khair ad-Dīn, originally from the Aegean island of Lesbos, had achieved a degree of 
fame in the eastern Mediterranean raiding Christian trading galleys before moving 
west to the North African coast. The island of Djerba, in the Gulf of Tunis, provided 
a base for raiding trips into the Tyrrhenian. 
Despite the much larger size of the papal galleys, Arūj enjoyed the element of 
surprise. The 18th-century English historian Joseph Morgan, drawing on 
contemporary accounts, describes the attack. As the galliot pulled alongside the first 
galley, the papal sailors broke into ‘the utmost Hurry and apparent Consternation’ 
upon seeing the ‘Turkish Habits’ of Arūj’s men. 
The Turks, encouraged by the Confusion in which they perceived those 
on board the Galley, got as near the Enemy as they could, and pouring 
in their Shot and Arrows very smartly, killed some Christians, 
wounded many, and terrified all the rest; so that with small Opposition 
and less Damage, they immediately boarded, and forced her to a 
Surrendry.1 
The second galley was taken with equal ease and Arūj returned triumphant to the 
Tunisian port of La Goulette. The Spanish chronicler Diego Haedo, in his 
Topographia e Historia General de Argel, describes the reaction on both sides of the 
Mediterranean: 
The wonder and astonishment that this notable exploit caused in Tunis, 
and even in Christendom, is not to be expressed, nor how celebrated 
the name of Arūj Rais was become from that very moment; he being 
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held and accounted, by all the world, as a most valiant and enterprising 
commander.2 
Further attacks would follow. The next year, off the coast of Sicily, the brothers 
took the Cavalleria, a Sardinian warship bound for Naples. By 1510, the Barbarossas 
commanded eight galliots and were harassing Christian shipping across the western 
Mediterranean, quickly establishing themselves as the most famous Barbary raiders of 
the early 16th century.  
We have seen in the previous chapter that, by the 15th century, a distinction 
had emerged between legitimate and illegitimate maritime depredation. The latter had 
become synonymous with an absence of authorisation by a recognised sovereign, 
although pirate and piratical—in modo piratico—remained ambiguous as terms, not 
clearly mapping onto either side of the juridical divide. Chapter 3 focused on the 
development of this distinction within the context of an emerging plurality of 
Mediterranean polities dominated by merchant capitalist interests. Increasingly, 
however, maritime depredation was evaluated not solely through the lens of 
sovereignty, but also against a background of religious enmity. Thus, while Haedo 
could commend Arūj as a ‘valiant and enterprising commander’, he could also 
demonise him as a figure of malevolence. The Muslims of the North African littoral, 
of whom the Barbarossas were exemplars, were, in Haedo’s view, an uncivilised, 
brutish population, sadistic with an atavistic propensity to greed and violence. The 
mere sight of their ‘Turkish Habits’ was enough to instil fear and loathing in the 
Christian sailors. Such attitudes were a staple of anti-Muslim polemics in a 16th 
century marked by Christian chauvinism and racism rooted in theological hostility to 
Islam. 
This religious aspect of maritime depredation is largely absent from dominant 
accounts of the epoch. Piracy, in the standard Weberian narrative, is synonymous with 
unauthorised plunder, suppression becoming easier with the emergence and 
consolidation, in the 16th century, of sovereign territorial states and the concomitant 
transition from a religiously defined order to a secular order of inter-state intercourse.3 
Such accounts, however, overlook the extent to which the Mediterranean continued to 
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reflect an enduring ambiguity between what Molly Greene has called ‘two competing 
visions . . . one territorial, the other religious’.4 The merchants, ‘pirates’ and other 
individuals who traversed the ‘inland sea’ were the subjects of sovereigns, but they 
were also Muslims, Christians and Jews. And many of these actors themselves 
continued to define friends and enemies, and the legitimacy of depredations, in 
religious terms. ‘Time and again’, Greene observes, ‘they insisted on a world divided 
into Christians and infidels’.5  
The Mediterranean, in short, was not only a collection of sovereign states but 
also a frontier where ‘two hostile religions face[d] each other in perpetual enmity’.6 
This was the ‘forgotten frontier’, as Andrew Hess famously called it.7 Whereas 
Braudel had emphasised the geographical unity imposed by the Mediterranean on its 
people and polities, Hess insisted that the region in the 15th and 16th centuries was in 
fact marked by a separation of ‘well-defined cultural spheres’.8 Reflexive 
identification of Europe with Christendom, as in Haedo’s account of Barbarossa, was 
the norm. 
This chapter argues that these religious identities and ideologies were 
important in shaping emerging conceptions, popular and legal, of maritime 
depredation and the figure of the pirate. Specifically, it suggests that the association 
of the pirate with universal enmity has its roots in Christian theology and its 
identification of a universal enemy of the Christian community. This tradition, the 
chapter argues, came to inform Christian views of the Muslim pirates of the 16th-
century Mediterannean, such as the Barbarossas, against the background of Ottoman 
expansion and the perceived existential threat it, and they, posed to a universal 
Christian community. The universal enmity of the pirate, in other words, was in its 
initial conception rooted in religious ideology.  
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MUSLIM PIRATES AND CHRISTIAN KNIGHTS 
Maritime depredation, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, was a common 
feature of the medieval Mediterranean. ‘It was endemic’, writes Braudel, with all, 
‘from the most wretched to the most powerful, rich and poor alike, cities, lords and 
states’ caught up in ‘a web of operations cast over the whole sea’.9 Many of those who 
sailed in modo piratico were motivated by the need to make a living, as Braudel puts 
it,10 and, like de Nigro in the 14th century, were opportunistic in selecting their targets. 
Others, however, were motivated by confessional identities. 
Muslim depredators based in the ports of the North African littoral, and 
attacking Christian vessels, are recorded as far back as the 8th century.11 In the 13th 
century, though, their incidence increased. The Cantigas de Santa Maria, a Galician 
collection of poems from that century, record several clashes with ‘Moorish’ pirates.12 
Cantiga 35, titled De liberatione clericorum Sanctae Mariae in mari a piratis or ‘The 
Clerics Saved from Pirates’, tells of a ship carrying priests and merchants attacked by 
Moorish corsairs (cossairos), only for a sudden mighty wind to destroy the corsair 
galleys, the mast of one galley striking dead the Moorish admiral. 
The following century, Ibn Khaldun, the noted Arab historian, wrote of 
Muslims ‘on the coasts of Ifriqiya’—the region today stretching from Tunisia to 
eastern Algeria—raiding the lands of ‘the Christian Franks’ and attacking 
‘unbelievers’ ships, often taking them away from them, and return[ing] with booty, 
slaves, and captives’.13 Khaldun dated the emergence of Maghrebin pirates as a serious 
presence in the Mediterranean from around 1360,14 although the contemporary 
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chronicler Marino Sanudo Teorsello already reported Muslim raiders active three 
decades earlier.15 
Christian raiders, too, were active in the Mediterranean, although they have 
traditionally been overlooked in modern accounts. As Molly Greene observes, ‘within 
the already tiny space that is allotted to the Mediterranean in studies of early modern 
piracy, there is no mention of anything other than Muslim violence’.16 Stanley Lane-
Poole’s Barbary Corsairs, published in 1890, is exemplary of this historiographical 
tradition, portraying an early modern Mediterranean plagued by parasitical North 
African violence.17 In the works of Lane Poole and other 19th-century historians, one 
finds a complete erasure of non-Muslim depredation. European states are presented, 
in one critic’s words, as ‘peaceful commercial powers harassed by bloodthirsty 
African mobs’.18 
Godfrey Fisher’s Barbary Legend, published in 1957, started to correct such 
misconceptions, showing that there was little unique to Muslim-authored 
depredation.19 One-sided accounts were, Fisher suggested, a corollary to nineteenth-
century western chauvinism that drew ‘a rigid dividing-line in the Mediterranean 
between Christians and Moslems, or between Western civilization and oriental or 
African barbarianism’.20 Braudel, too, criticised those historians who ‘taught us to see 
only the Muslims, only the Barbary corsairs’ whose ‘fate overshadows the rest of the 
landscape’. Christian pirates were also active in ‘Malta, Leghorn [Livorno] . . . with 
their prisons, their slave markets, their sordid procurements’.21 
Especially prominent in the history of Christian depredation were several 
Catholic military orders. The Knights of St Stephen, founded by Cosimo de’ Medici, 
operated out of the port of Livorno wreaking havoc on Ottoman trade. More notorious 
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still were the Knights of Malta, formed in the mid-11th century as the Knights 
Hospitallier of Jerusalem to provide care for pilgrims in the holy city before turning 
to a martial role during the First Crusade of 1099. Pushed out of Jerusalem by 
Saladin’s armies in 1291, the Knights re-established themselves first on Cyprus and, 
in 1308, on the island of Rhodes, from where they began maritime attacks on Muslim 
(and some Christian) shipping in the Levant. When Rhodes was lost in 1522 to 
Ottoman forces, Charles V granted the order the island of Malta, which they would 
establish as the ‘capital par excellence’ of Christian raiding in the Mediterranean.22 
In short, Muslim and Christian alike took to the seas to plunder. Each, Braudel 
suggests, were two sides of the same coin, both participants in a perpetual religious 
war—a ‘secondary form of war’, as he put it—between two inimical communities. 
Their depredation, he argues was an ‘ancient institution’, one termed la course, from 
the Latin cursus, denoting voyaging in search of plunder.23 The derivative term 
corsair—corsario in Spanish, corsaire in French—in turn, was used to describe those 
who sailed la course. With time, corsair would come to denote legitimacy, used 
synonymously with privateer to indicate the possession of a sovereign’s licence, a 
meaning Braudel tries to read into the early modern Mediterranean. In the 16th 
century, however, the term was still used to describe anyone who systematically 
undertook voyages of depredation, licensed or otherwise. Contemporaries referred to 
both Muslim and Christian depredators as corsairs and both also as pirates. The French 
jurist, Jean Bodin, for instance, used corsaire and pirate interchangeably, the former 
used to invoke both sovereign-sanctioned and unlicensed depredation. Still, Braudel’s 
important point is that these were not the pirates of modern legal thought, their raiding, 
and legal treatment, more akin to that of low-intensity warfare. While certainly not 
welcomed by its victims, la course was nonetheless accepted as an unavoidable staple 
of Mediterranean life. 
Attitudes were, however, beginning to change. With the westward projection 
of Ottoman power and the confrontation it presaged, the Barbary raiders took on a new 
significance in the Christian imagination. 
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THE OTTOMAN THREAT 
Ottoman power first emerged in the late 13th century and quickly proved a formidable 
geopolitical force. While Christendom remained largely confined to the continental 
area bounded by the North Atlantic and Mediterranean in the 14th century, the 
Ottomans had penetrated the Indian Ocean and established a network of trading 
routes.24 They would soon push westward, too, into Christian Europe. Viewed by 
contemporary Christians as a religiously-fuelled holy war, the Ottoman Empire’s 
expansionary impulse in fact lay in the political-economic foundations of the imperial 
formation. 
Resting on a tributary mode of production, Ottoman society was composed of 
a ruling class around the Sultan and a peasant class comprising the majority of the 
population from whom production surpluses were appropriated.25 The Sultan’s control 
of land and the rotation of land allocations amongst the ruling class served to prevent 
the growth of provincial power centres, while institutionalising land holders and 
Sultan in a relationship of dependence: tributary ruling class relations between a 
patrimonial authority in the Sultan and his household and a local nobility dependent 
on the former.26 
The potential for conflict could be curtailed—and the tributary mode 
reproduced—so long as the surplus was expanded. At the same time, as Anievas and 
Nişancıoğlu observe, ‘the burgeoning central state required greater access to taxes, 
tributes and a population from which to recruit slave elites. Both objectives were 
possible only through continual territorial accumulation.’27 Only by conquering more 
land could the tributary state extend its control of the means of production—land—
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and thereby extract further tribute. Territorial conquest, put simply, provided the 
means for the Ottoman state to control the ruling class. In this way, territorial 
accumulation operated as an externalisation of internal contradictions.28 As Perry 
Anderson put it some years ago, ‘[t]he structure of the Osmanlilar ruling class had 
rested on perpetual military conquest’—‘so long as the frontier unwound before the 
march of the Ottoman armies’, the internal balance of power could be maintained.29 
By the late 14th century, Ottoman expansion had seen Turkish forces pushing 
deep into Christian Europe, taking much of the Balkan peninsula: in 1389 Serbian, 
Bosnian and Bulgarian forces were defeated at Kosovo. In 1453, Constantinople fell 
and Sultan Mehmed II established the empire’s new seat in the former Byzantine 
capital. In the following decades, Mehmed’s armies consolidated control of Anatolia 
and pressed westwards into Greece, Serbia and Bosnia. Egypt and Syria fell to Selim 
I in 1517 and, with them, a key axis in the Eurasian trade routes.30 By 1520, the 
Ottomans, now under the suzerainty of Süleyman I, were the leading power in the 
Muslim world and had also penetrated deep into south-eastern Europe: Belgrade fell 
in 1521 and by 1529 Vienna was under siege.31 
The Ottoman expansion established control over the highways of trade 
connecting Europe with Russia, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Osmanlı 
realm thus formed ‘the hinge that connected the rapidly growing economies of Europe 
with those of the East’.32 Within this realm, Ottoman rule facilitated inter-regional 
trade through the building of roads and canal routes, to the benefit of both European 
and Ottoman merchants.33 Yet for Christian Europe, Ottoman incursions were widely 
experienced as a ‘semi-apocalyptic event’.34 With a standing army unmatched by any 
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European monarch and a revenue twice that of his nearest rival,35 Süleyman posed a 
formidable military threat to Christian Europe and, with his forces moving on Vienna, 
a direct challenge, in particular, to Habsburg pretentions. 
With the death of his paternal grandfather Maximilian I in 1519, Charles I of 
Spain had inherited the Habsburg territories in central Europe, bringing under his rule 
an extensive European empire, in addition to Spanish viceroyalties in the Americas 
and Asia. His election as Holy Roman Emperor—making him Charles V—the same 
year cemented his status as the most powerful monarch in Christendom. The 
encroachment of the Ottoman Empire thus coincided with the near-simultaneous 
expansion of the Habsburg Empire. This inter-imperial rivalry would be staged across 
multiple fronts. In central Europe, Charles’s brother Ferdinand would hold off the 
Ottoman advance at Vienna. The Mediterranean, meanwhile, would see a series of 
long-running battles, by sea and by land, over the lucrative trading routes connecting 
Europe to the Levant and Asia—battles in which the Barbary pirates would play a 
prominent part. 
A UNIVERSAL ENEMY 
The idea of a universal human community could be found already in nascent 
form in the Stoic cosmopolitanism of the Greco-Roman world, a moderate rendering 
of which is evident in Cicero’s De Officiis, as discussed in Chapter 2. While Rome 
regularly claimed to act in the interests of a broader community, especially in the 
imperial era, in Cicero’s writing, as in that of contemporaries such as Appian, Florus, 
and Pliny, any larger philosophical cosmopolis quickly collapsed back into the Roman 
patria itself. With the universalism of early Christianity, however, the Stoic 
cosmopolis took on both theological stamp and concrete shape.36 As Francisco de 
Vitoria would put it in On Civil Power (1528), ‘Christendom is in some sense a single 
commonwealth and a single body, according to the Apostle’s words: “we, being many, 
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are one body in Christ”.’37 A universal human community might gain salvation and 
ascend to the City of God, but so too, theological writings asserted, did humankind 
face an existential threat: the first true universal enemy in the shape of the devil. 
This figure of universal enmity emerged only gradually in Christian theology. 
The ‘satan’ of the Old Testament was originally conceived not as evil but, quite to the 
contrary, as one of God’s obedient servants. Satan, from the Hebrew ‘har-Shatan’ 
meaning ‘the Adversary’, acted in alliance with God, under his command, testing 
humans’ faith.38 As Christianity was consolidated, though, and its reach spread, the 
figure of satan transmogrified from God’s angel into a malevolent figure, one invoked 
increasingly to characterise the Church’s opponents.39 In its efforts to suppress 
paganism, Christianity now placed the devil in a narrative of ‘primordial combat 
between gods’.40 Satan, on this view, was ‘a god rebelling against Yahweh’ who made 
earth an extension of his empire in order to reign there by the power of sin and of 
death.’ Here he was ‘opposed by the son of the Creator, Christ’ who fought a ‘battle, 
which would end only at the end of time’ in the role of ‘potential liberator of humanity, 
in the face of Satan, his chief opponent’.41 
In this newly emerging demonology, God and satan appear in opposition, the 
various satanic figures of the Old Testament now reinterpreted as a single rebel against 
God.42 He is ‘less and less one of God’s faithful servants and more and more . . . God’s 
rival, God’s antagonist, God’s Adversary.’ 43 What was created, Mark Neocleous 
observes, was ‘a set of claims and assumptions about not just a satan of the kind who 
tests [Old Testament figures], but Satan; not just a devil but the Devil; not just an 
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enemy, but a Demonic Enemy; not just an adversary but a Universal Adversary with 
which there can be nothing but absolute enmity.’44 
The devil, already invoked as an enemy or ‘hostis’ throughout the Catholic 
liturgy, increasingly became known by the longer epithet hostis humani generis: 
enemy of humankind. The Sacramentarium Veronense, attributed to Pope Leo I (440-
61), contains numerous references to the devil as both hostis humani generis and 
humani generis hoste.45 The following century, in the Sacramentarium Gregorianum, 
attributed to Pope Gregory I (590-604), the epithet is again used: ut de hoste generis 
humani maior Victoria duceretur.46 And it is by that term, amongst his various other 
names, that the devil is summoned in the Church’s official exorcism ritual, set down 
in the Rituale Romanum, the Vatican’s service manual: 
Hear then and obey, Satan, attacker of the faith, enemy of the human 
race [hostis generi humani], messenger of death, robber of life, 
destroyer of justice, root of all evils, spark of vices, seducer of men, 
merchant of peoples, rouser of hatred, origin of avarice, cause of 
discord, instigator of deceit.47 
By the end of the first Christian millennium, Satan had become a 
fundamentally evil enemy, not only marked by hatred of God but also associated now 
with, and responsible for, the downfall of humankind—no longer perceived as an 
abstract idea but a concrete, Christian, entity. He was an Enemy that threatened every 
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Christian soul—‘no one was safe from the devil’s temptations’48—but also an 
existential threat to Christendom, with its claims to universality, itself.49 The battle 
against the devil was henceforth a universal struggle, with the hostis humani generis 
an adversary to Christian power embodied by the Universal Church and the Universal 
Holy Roman Empire.50 
The construction of the devil as universal enemy was, as already noted, rooted 
in the church’s early political struggles against paganism. But its invocation proved of 
further use to a Church threatened by the dissent of heretical sects against 
ecclesiastical authorities. These groups were inevitably castigated as worshippers of 
the Devil. Founded in the 13th century, the Inquisition was to seek out heretics in 
league with the universal enemy. The following century Pope John XII issued three 
bulls justifying the persecution of the Templars on anti-Satanic grounds. Later still, in 
the 16th century, the Inquisition would turn its focus to Protestants, castigated as 
heretical devil-worshipers, as well as forced converts from Islam and Judaism. 
Throughout, the Church held fast to a Manichean view of a demonic army pitted in 
universal war against God and Christianity. 
‘OF THE DEVIL’: OTTOMANS IN THE EUROPEAN IMAGINATION 
The devil and his army were to be found not only within Christendom, amongst 
heretical sects and converts, but also closing in on Christendom’s frontiers from 
without. As noted in Chapter 3, the belief in a literal universal Christian 
commonwealth had begun to wane in the Middle Ages. The ideal remained, though, 
reproduced in crusading ideology with Christian unity embodied, if not in a single 
religio-political empire, then in the efforts of pious princes united under the spiritual 
power of the pope. Even then, while temporal power was divided, Christians might 
still desire, Vitoria observed, a common political ruler to protect Christendom against 
threats, especially that of the Muslim infidel.51 
                                                        
48 Edelstein (2009) 31. 
49 See, e.g., Lactantius, Divine Institutes, trans. Anthony Bowen & Peter Garnsey (Liverpool University 
Press, 2003) 37. 
50 See Neocleous (2016) 80. 
51 Vitoria (1991) 31. 
 101 
By the start of the 16th century, then, the universal enemy of medieval 
theology had come to be embodied in the Christian imagination by the infidel and, in 
particular, the forces of the Ottoman empire, pushing at the eastern and southern 
borders of Christendom. As Ottoman armies marched west, authorities increasingly 
cast their appeals for military action in religious terms and western thinkers put an 
eschatological cast on Ottoman expansion.  
Already before the fall of Constantinople, relations with the Osmanlı foe were 
viewed in terms of religious-military confrontation, a view only strengthened with the 
fall of the Byzantine capital.52 This was, one could read in Matteo Pisano’s Lamento 
di Constantinopoli, bemoaning the loss of the eastern Christian Empire, one more 
chapter in the retreat of Christendom since the loss of the Holy Land.53 In a Europe 
marked by a history of crusading, the Ottomans were easily cast as the latest infidel 
threat to Christendom. Europeans, as Robert Schwoebel has noted, drew on a large 
medieval corpus dealing with Islam, clinging ‘tenaciously to established categories’ 
and reading the new Ottoman threat into the ‘forms of thought and expression 
developed in the anti-Moslem and crusading literature of the Middle Ages’.54  
Most western Christians’ knowledge of Muslims was rooted in medieval 
crusade propaganda. In sermons and chansons de geste, such as the Song of Roland 
(c. 1100), Muslims were styled as ‘impious idolaters’ and associated with animalistic 
and demonic characteristics.55 And yet, in the 14th century, a growing body of 
literature in the vernacular began reaching a wide audience, especially among the 
mercantile classes, offering them new depictions of Muslims and their faith, not all 
negative. Dante’s Divine Comedy, for instance, while treating Muslims on the whole 
as enemies, nonetheless acknowledged ‘the talents of certain individuals who greatly 
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distinguished themselves’.56 In Giovanni Boccaccio’s Decameron (c. 1351), Muslims 
appear as ‘benevolent rulers’ and ‘partners in trade’, or ‘simply as regular characters 
caught up in tragic and comic circumstances’.57 On the whole, Bisaha suggests, by the 
mid-14th century European views of Islam had ‘acquired a complexity and richness’ 
in which intolerance and compassion could be found in equal measure.  
With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, however, the ideal of a united 
Christendom under attack by demonic forces was revived and the existential threat 
posed by the Muslim infidel reasserted. As the Ottoman Empire expanded westward, 
Renaissance thinkers fell back on the hostile religious-racial representations of 
crusading rhetoric.58 When news of Mehmed’s sacking of Constantinople reached 
western Europe, commentators responded with a newly inflamed rhetoric. The Turks, 
Cardinal Bessarion, the titular Latin Patriarch of Constantinople opined, were ‘the 
most inhuman barbarians [immanes barbari] and the most savage enemies of the 
faith’. ‘Men have been butchered like cattle women abducted, virgins ravished, and 
children snatched from the arms of their parents’.59 Some, such as Vespasiano writing 
in 1480, saw in the infidels’ advance God’s punishment for the ‘spiritual poverty’ of 
Italians living ‘obstinate in sin’.60 In general, however, the Turks were described with 
reference to a set of formulaic descriptions of Islam: infidels (infideles), enemies of 
the faith (fidei hostes), barbarians (barbari).61 As such they were juxtaposed with a 
Europe cast in religious terms, a res publica christiana, against which they posed an 
existential threat—the destruction of the Christian religion, warned Pope Pius II from 
Rome. 
Where once ‘Saracen’ had stood in the medieval Christian vernacular for 
Muslims in general, now ‘Turk’ became synonymous with the infidels, regardless of 
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their geographic origin. For instance, in texts such as Wynkyn de Worde’s, Treatyse 
of the Turkes Lawe called Alcoran (1519), the first English publication on Islam, we 
find Muhammad presented as a prophet of the ‘Turks’.62 And just as representations 
of Ottomans drew on the crusading rhetoric pitting Christian against infidel, so too 
was Islam now viewed through the prism of an expansionist Ottoman empire with a 
‘superimposition of the Ottomans’ imperial danger onto religion so that Islam became 
synonymous with Ottoman military expansion’.63 Muslims were reproduced in the 
European imaginary once more as ‘a tribe of warring anti-Christians’.64  
As enemies of the faith, the ‘Turks’ were quickly associated with that other 
hostis of medieval Christian theology: they not only shed the ‘innocent blood’ of the 
faithful (fidelium), but destroyed also their souls ‘in detestable sacrifice to Satan’, 
wrote the Italian humanist Poggio Bracciolini in 1448.65 In Pope Pius II’s words, Islam 
was ‘of the devil’,66 while in the epic poetry of Leonardo Dati, Mehmed II was cast as 
the devil’s minion, recalling a poetic conceit already familiar, as noted above, in Song 
of Roland.67 Dati’s Carmen ad Nicolaum, likely written in late 1453, pitches Satan and 
Mehmed II in battle against the Virgin and Christ. Opening with the fall of 
Constantinople, we find the devil emerging from the underworld to meet ‘the harsh 
Mehmed, that victor stained with the blood of Constantinople coming from the 
despoiled city’.68 Mehmed has been chosen by Satan as his accomplice in destroying 
Christianity: ‘he is mine’, proclaims the devil, ‘the one whom I desired with all my 
heart. This is that sharer of evil deeds to whom I will give ghastly sceptres of the 
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world.’69 The pact is sealed: Mehmet will rule as Satan’s servant, the mirror to 
Christendom’s temporal princes pledge of allegiance to God. 
Confronted not merely by the danger of military attack but also fear of an 
ideological religious onslaught, the papacy called for Christian unity. In the wake of 
Constantinople’s fall, Aeneas Sylvius, future Pope Pius II, bemoaned a Christendom 
that was like ‘a body without a head’, one in which ‘every state has a separate prince, 
and every prince has a separate interest. . . . Who will make the English love the 
French? Who will unite the Genoese and the Aragonese? Who will reconcile the 
Germans with the Hungarians and Bohemians? . . . If you lead a small army against 
the Turks you will easily be overcome; if a large one, it will soon fall into confusion.’70 
In popular literature, too, the threat posed to a fragmenting Christendom by 
Mohammed and his followers was emphasised, as in Sebastian Brant’s Ship of Fools 
(1494): 
At first the cruel heretic 
did tear and wound it to the quick 
and then Mohammed shamefully 
abused its noble sanctity 
with heresy and base intent. . . . 
So strong the Turks have grown to be 
they hold the ocean not alone, 
the Danube too is now their own . . . .71 
In the early 16th century, the call for a defence of Christendom was taken up 
by Charles V. His election as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was based, at least 
in part, on his ostensible ability to repel the feared ‘Turk’, his legitimacy premised on 
a view of the Habsburg Empire as the new bulwark of the res publica Christiana.72 
Charles, the Navarrese jurist Miguel de Ulzurrum opined in his Catholicum opus 
imperial regiminis mundi (1525), was the emperor of a new universal Roman 
                                                        
69 Hic, ait ille, meus quem tota mente poposci / Hic est ille comes scelerum cui lurida mundi / Sceptra 
dabo et poterit nihil exitale videri: quoted in Bisaha (2004) 163. 
70 Quoted in Paul Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) 100. 
71 Sebastian Brant, The Ship of Fools, trans. Edwin H. Zeydel (Columbia University Press, 1944) 315. 
72 İnalcık (1973) 35. 
 105 
Empire.73 If the pope enjoyed spiritual authority over the ‘congregation of the faithful’, 
it was the emperor who was the ‘one sole lord of the world’ and who enjoyed world 
dominion, his power extending to believers and unbelievers alike.74 The Turkish 
infidels, in resisting the emperor’s authority, would be ‘reduce[d] . . . to obedience’.75 
Three years later, Gonzalo de Arredondo y Alvarado would write, at the emperor’s 
behest, the Castillo inexpugnable de la fe, a call for a renewed crusade against the 
‘Turk’ to stop the spread of the maldicta secta mahometana.76 
Increasingly, the conflict between Christendom and ‘Turk’ was marked in the 
Christian imagination not so much by a spatial divide as one ‘between those chosen 
by heaven and those serving the interests of the devil’.77 With the fall of Belgrade in 
1521 and Süleyman’s forces at the gates of Vienna, Christian thinkers increasingly 
cast the ‘Turk’/Muslim in apocalyptic terms as the scourge of God. Arredondo y 
Alvarado, for instance, portrayed the Ottomans not only as violent, cruel and lustful; 
they were also, he insisted, followers of the devil.78  
Religious imagery abounded, a focus the depiction of Ottoman armies as 
Islamic infidels and devotees of Satan—emphasised by the horrendousness of their 
cruelty—fighting against the Christian Habsburg armies. In 1530, for instance, the 
German Hans Guldenmundt produced a series of woodcut images by Erhard Schoen 
with a view to rallying imperial troops. Depictions include mounted Turkish warriors 
leading Christian captives on foot, a baby carried by one infidel upon his spear. The 
accompanying text laments ‘the evil, gruesome Turk’, who kills children and 
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condemns Christians to slavery.79 Another Guldenmundt and Schoen collaboration 
depicts ‘Turks’ killing babies by impaling them on stakes or slicing them with 
scimitars.80 Two decades later, the Hungarian pilgrim Bartholomew Georgiewitz 
would offer the same image of the ‘Turk’ as demonic foe of Christ. In his De Turcorum 
moribus epitome (1553), Georgiewitz describes savage, bloodthirsty infidels lacking 
all restraint, tearing Christian children from their weeping parents’ arms.81  
By the mid-16th century, the Reformation had undermined the idea of a united 
Christendom. And yet, in the Protestant imagination too, the ‘Turk’ figured 
prominently as existential threat and agent of the devil, albeit now alongside the 
Catholic. ‘[P]apacy and empire’, ‘Mohammed and the Saracens’, ‘Turk, Gog and 
Magog’: each, Luther decried, were part of the ‘devil’s final wrath’ such that 
‘Christendom is plagued most terribly and miserably, everywhere and on all sides’.82 
Similarly, in his ‘On War Against the Turk’, Luther argued that ‘the Turk . . . is the 
servant of the devil, who not only devastates land and people with the sword . . . but 
lays waste the Christian faith and our dear Lord Jesus Christ’.83 Whereas pope and 
emperor employed the demonization of Ottomans as a call to arms, Luther was more 
ambiguous. If servant of the devil, the ‘Turk’ was also the ‘rod’ of ‘God’s Fury’, the 
instrument of his divine wrath and a punishment for the deterioration of Christianity. 
For Luther, to take up arms against the Ottomans might be considered resistance to 
God, but despite such caution, he was nonetheless committed to the same bellicose 
rhetoric as his Catholic counterparts in demonizing Islam and the Ottomans.84 
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In 16th-century Germany, Protestant congregations implored God ‘graciously 
to preserve us from the monstrous designs of the Turk’.85 Their ministers warned of 
‘an enemy who not only robs us of money and possessions, wife and child, and 
maltreats people in the most horrible manner, but whose purpose and intention is to 
root out the name of Christ and put his own devil, Mahomet, in His place’.86 Even in 
Protestant England, where the excommunicated Elizabeth courted Ottoman support 
for her war against Spain, calls for holy war against the ‘Turks’ were a commonplace. 
De Worde’s Treatyse of the Turkes Lawe called Alcoran was illustrated with an image 
of a Muslim preacher before the figure of a horned, beast-like devil.87 And Thomas 
More wrote widely of the ‘Turks’ who, he insisted, posed both theological and military 
danger.88 The most popular text in 16th-century England, after the bible, was John 
Foxe’s stridently anti-Catholic Acts and Monuments. Although written in response to 
Mary Tudor’s persecution of English Protestants, the work included, from its 1570 
edition onwards, a section on ‘The History of the Turks’, which offered readers lurid 
depictions of dangerous Muslims committed to anti-Christian violence.89 Further 
cementing the existential threat posed by Muslims in the English imaginary was 
Foxe’s ‘Prayer against the Turks’, which ended the section: 
O Lord God of hosts, grant to thy church strength and victory against 
the malicious fury of these Turks, Saracens, Tartarians, against Gog 
and Magog, and all the malignant rabble of Antichrist, enemies to thy 
Son Jesus, our Lord and Saviour. Prevent their devices, overthrow their 
power, and dissolve their kingdom.90 
The struggle with the infidel enemy was, on Foxe’s telling, in fact a cosmic struggle, 
Christian and Turk merely standing in for God and the devil: ‘the whole power of 
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Satan, the prince of this world, goeth wyth the Turkes; which to resist, no strength of 
man’s army is sufficient, but only the name, spirit, and power of our Lord Jesus, the 
Son of God, going with us in our battles’.91 Wild theologically-driven depictions of 
Muslims would remain the norm in English texts into the 17th century with Turks and 
‘Mahometans’ denounced as agents of the devil. Church sermons, political polemics 
and pamphlets, devotional tracts: all bore the stamp of such imagery.92 
‘ENEMYES OF THE CHRISTEN FAYTH’: BARBARY PIRATES AT THE 
OTTOMAN VANGUARD 
It was through this larger geopolitical and religious prism that the pirate took further 
shape in the European imagination. Maritime depredation, as already discussed, was 
far from an ‘Islamic’ phenomenon, yet it was the plunder associated with the Muslim 
‘Barbary’ raiders of North Africa that came to be inextricably linked with piracy in 
European thinking. The identity of the pirate in the European mind came to be infused 
with Europeans’ racialised religious ideology so that the actions of Islamic pirates 
were interpreted within the general fear and animosity toward Islam and the Ottomans 
outlined above. The depredators of North Africa, in particular, came to be seen in the 
western Mediterranean as the primary avatars of Muslim expansion, the Maghrebin 
frontier the privileged site of inter-imperial confrontation. 
The fall of Granada in 1492, completing the Reconquista of the Iberian 
peninsula, had given Ferdinand and Isabella control of the Andalucian littoral from 
which they continued their war against the infidel across the new frontier marked by 
the Strait of Gibraltar. The stage was set, as Barbara Fuchs puts it, ‘for an increasingly 
expansionist Spain . . . as the crusading fervor of campaigns on the peninsula was 
furthered on the coasts of the Maghreb’.93 In 1494, the Spanish crown received papal 
blessing for this African crusade; Pope Alexander VI also authorised a continuation 
of the cruzada, the extraordinary tax paid by clergy and laity to fund the campaign of 
conquest. Isabella’s testament upon her death in 1504 urged Castilians to devote 
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themselves to the war against Islam and the conquest of Africa. Six months later, 
Ferdinand had prepared an army of seven thousand to ‘make war on the Moors’. By 
1510 the Spanish had established enclaves and fortresses—presidios—along the 
Barbary coast including at Peñón de Vélez, Orán and Tripoli.94 
Around the same time, Muslim depredation increased dramatically. The 
raiders along the Barbary coast, long engaged in le course, now grew in number as 
they were joined by Moors expelled by the Reconquista or fleeing the repression that 
followed Granada’s fall. Although Ferdinand and Isabella had promised cultural and 
religious freedom upon surrender, by the turn of the century the Moors faced a choice 
of conversion or expulsion; forced baptisms were instituted in 1501 with the neophytes 
known as Moriscos or ‘little Moors’.95 From Tripoli to Morocco, the émigrés fought 
a guerrilla war, assaulting the Spanish coast in a mirror image of the Christian assault 
on the Maghrebin littoral. 
Support came from the Ottomans, happy to open a new front against the 
Habsburg empire and harness the Moors and Moriscos to their cause. Already in 1487, 
Kemal Reis had been sent by Sultan Bayezid II to support Muslim Granada, landing 
Ottoman troops at Málaga and briefly capturing the city.96 With Granada’s fall in 
1492, other Ottoman subjects soon followed, most famously the Barbarossa brothers, 
Arūj and Khair ad-Dīn, described memorably by Haedo at the start of this chapter. 
Basing themselves on the Tunisian island of Djerba, the brothers spent the 1510s 
attacking Spanish presidios along the Maghribi coast under Ottoman patronage and 
rallying followers against the Spanish under the banner of Islam.  
Local political leaders along the North African coast welcomed the growing 
bands of depredators, providing them with markets for the sale of prize and safe 
harbour, in the belief that they might protect local ports from Spanish attack. For 
instance, in 1513, Sultan Muhammad V of Tunis allowed the Barbarossas use of the 
port of La Goletta: they would sail under his protection while paying a percentage of 
the booty seized from the infidel.97 In 1516, Arūj seized control of Algiers, 
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proclaiming himself king. ‘A certain Copper Beard—vulgarly called Barbarossa—has 
turned from a pirate into a terrestrial troublemaker in Africa’, wrote Pietro Martire 
d’Anghiera from the Spanish court.98 
When Arūj died in battle with the Spanish two years later, he was succeeded 
by his brother. Looking to counter the threat of an Iberian invasion, he sought 
protection from the Turkish sultan and placed Algiers under Ottoman suzerainty, the 
city becoming a new Ottoman sancak or province, quickly bolstered by Ottoman 
janissaries. Khair ad-Dīn was appointed beylerbey (provincial governor) and spent the 
following two decades conducting campaigns of pillage on Italian and Spanish 
shipping and coasts, nominally on behalf of Sultan Süleyman. He would eventually be 
appointed grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet in 1534, capturing Tunis from the 
Spanish the same year.99 
Under Khair ad-Dīn, Algiers became a major maritime power, one, María 
Antonia Garcés suggests, ‘more dreaded by Christian nations and people than its 
nominal superior, the Ottoman Porte’.100 Khair ad-Dīn’s ranks were filled with 
refugees from Andalucía and, increasingly, Christian renegades who arrived in 
increasingly large numbers as the century progressed. By mid-century, Algiers had 
become a powerful community organised around maritime depredation, ‘a dungeon of 
corsairs and robbers’, wrote one contemporary, ‘and a strong post, from which 
Barbarossa had done so much damage inside and outside of Spain’.101  
In 1541 Charles V launched an attack against Algiers only for a tempest to 
destroy the entire imperial fleet, some 400 vessels shattered by hail. In the aftermath, 
Nicholas Durand de Villegagnon, a witness to the defeat, published a widely circulated 
pamphlet. Entitled Carlo V Emperatoris Expeditio in Africam ad Algeriam, its subtitle 
stressed once more that this battle against the ‘Turkish’ corsairs, ‘the Enemyes of the 
Christen Fayth’, was one in defence of Christendom.102 
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The Ottoman advance westwards would be checked only in 1571. The 
conquest of Cyprus the previous year illuminated the crisis for Christendom and, under 
Pope Pius V’s urging, a confederation of Christian states was formed to create a 
bulwark against the infidel threat. This Holy League, comprised of the Papal States, 
Spain, Venice, Genoa, Tuscany, Savoy, Parma, Urbino and Malta, formed an armada 
which, in October 1571, confronted the Ottoman fleet in the Gulf of Lepanto.103 
Almost 300 vessels with 44,000 sailors and 28,000 soldiers—‘the largest naval force 
mounted by Christendom’104—defeated an Ottoman force of similar size. ‘[T]hat day 
which was so fortunate for Christendom’, Miguel de Cervantes, who was present at 
the battle, would later have a character recount in Don Quijote, ‘all nations were then 
undeceived of their error in believing that the Turks were invincible by sea . . . . on 
that day . . . Ottoman pride and haughtiness were broken’.105  
The Ottoman defeat at Lepanto has long been a popular trope for those 
advocating an enlightened Christendom’s victory over a despotic Islam.106 In actual 
fact, though, the Ottomans quickly rebounded from Lepanto, retaking Tunis in 1574 
with a naval force larger than that at Lepanto. Christendom, by way of contrast, faced 
as many internal divisions as external threats. The Holy League, disbanded only a year 
after Lepanto, proved exceptional. Venice, looking to protect its commercial interests 
in the Mediterranean, sought peace with the Ottomans, abandoning its support for the 
continuing Habsburg military campaign in North Africa.107 Yet that campaign itself 
dampened after Lepanto as both Spanish and Ottoman empires turned their attention 
away from the western Mediterranean, the former to the consolidation of its New 
World territories and the latter to its land borders.  
If fears that the Ottoman infidel would once again launch an invasion of 
Christianised Spain waned, depredations by his perceived proxies in North Africa did 
not. Large military confrontations decreased but small-scale raiding was on the rise. 
                                                        
103 Braudel (1995) 1080-103. 
104 Mark Greengrass, Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517-1648 (Allen Lane, 2014) 505.  
105 Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote de la Mancha, trans. Charles Jarvis, ed. E.C. Riley (Oxford 
University Press, 1992) [1605] 346. Braudel likewise sees Lepanto as marking ‘the end of a period of 
profound depression, the end of a genuine inferiority complex on the part of Christendom and a no less 
real Turkish supremacy’: Braudel (1995) 1103. 
106 See Hans-Georg Betz & Susi Meret, ‘Revisiting Lepanto: the political mobilization against Islam in 
contemporary Western Europe’, 43(3-4) Patterns of Prejudice (2009) 313. 
107 Greengrass (2014) 506. 
 112 
By the mid-16th century, Barbary depredators had consolidated themselves not only 
in Algiers but also in the neighbouring regencies of Tripoli and Tunis, both also 
acknowledging Ottoman suzerainty, as well as independent Salé in Morocco. 
Although nominally Ottoman provinces, the Barbary polities enjoyed a devolved 
power relationship with the Sublime Porte. Their actions were motivated less now by 
Ottoman expansionary aims or religious interests, and more by the economic 
opportunities offered by growing Mediterranean commerce. In theory, the Sublime 
Porte expected the Barbary corsairs to honour Ottoman treaties and not attack 
nationals of Christian nations at peace with the Sultan. In practice, attempts to 
discipline those who broke with the treaties—and they were many—were half-
hearted.108 Moreover, as the Sublime Porte focused its attentions eastwards after 
Lepanto, the Barbary regencies’ autonomy vis-à-vis the Sublime Porte increased, their 
economies more and more dependent on corsair depredations. 
As the century progressed and the growing autonomy of the Barbary powers 
was asserted, their depredations became increasingly organised and systematic. For 
the victims of those depredations, the raiders of Barbary represented the western wing 
of the enemy’s front line in its war on Christendom. But they represented also a more 
immediate danger which kept them prominently in the popular imagination: the threat 
of enslavement and forced conversion. 
THE BAÑOS OF BARBARY: PIRATES AND CAPTIVITY 
The Ottoman empire, in general, and the Muslim pirates of North Africa, in particular, 
were by the mid-16th century well established in the European imagination as the 
universal enemy of Christendom. Yet they also began to represent a more prosaic 
threat: not to Christendom as a whole, but to individual Christians. Maritime plunder 
in the popular imagination became indelibly linked with captivity, encouraged by the 
emergence of the captivity narrative as a pervasive literary topos.  
                                                        
108 Peter Lamborn Wilson, Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs & European Renegadoes, 2nd ed. 
(Autonomedia, 2003) 143. Tinniswood similarly argues that ‘Istanbul turned a blind eye: it suited 
Ottoman foreign policy to allow the Barbary states to chip away at the economic might of Christian 
powers, disrupting their trade, frightening their merchants, and intimidating their coastal settlements’: 
Adrian Tinniswood, Pirates of Barbary (Vintage Books, 2011) 11. 
 113 
From the mid-16th century onwards, tales of captives held by Muslims in 
North Africa were published widely and regularly.109 Some of the earliest accounts of 
Barbary captivity were published by Richard Hakluyt in his Principall Navigations 
(1589),110 a volume which offered English readers a glimpse of the geographically 
expanding world including ‘vivid, but also intimidating, descriptions of North 
Africa’.111 One narrative included by Hakluyt concerns the seizure of John Foxe in 
1563. Foxe would spend 14 years as a galley slave based in Alexandria before 
escaping with some 266 other Christian captives.112 Ballads soon joined narrative 
accounts in warning of the fate of Christians at the hands of Muslim pirates. ‘The 
Lamentable Cries of Prisoners in Algiers’ tells of Christians ‘dragged’ to Algiers for 
a life of captivity, often as a galley slave: 
O wretched state of Christian souls so taken! 
To look upon whose torments would awaken 
Tyrants to thrust their arms up, through their graves, 
To guard from blows these Christian galley slaves. 
. . .  
Being boarded so, and robbed, then are they tied 
On chains, and dragged t’Argiers to feed the pride.113 
Captivity tales were by no means an English species. In Spain, Cervantes 
contributed to the genre. In 1570, he had enlisted in the Habsburg military offensive 
against ‘the Turk’ and participated in various campaigns including the Battle of 
Lepanto. Returning to Spain in 1575, his ship was attacked by North African corsairs 
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off Catalonia and he was taken captive and sold as a slave in Algiers.114 Cervantes 
remained a slave in the baños of Algiers for a further five years, eventually ransomed 
for some 300 ducats.115 His experience in Algiers would leave an indelible mark on 
his thought—‘the most transcendental event in his spiritual career’, says Américo 
Castro; ‘the hinge which forcefully organizes [his] entire life’, affirms Juan Bautista 
Avalle-Arce.116 Certainly, Christian captive and Algerian pirate are figures who 
constantly reappear in his work—in Don Quixote, but also his popular dramas such as 
The Bagnios of Algiers and The Great Sultana, each reflecting his own experience of 
captivity.117 Although these were popular works with happy endings, they emphasised 
themes of Christian submission and martyrdom, while depicting the repeated attacks 
by Barbary depredators faced by the Spanish. ‘Captivity, on stage as in 
autobiography’, note MacLean and Matar, ‘illustrated both the power of the Ottoman 
Muslims and how dangerous they were’.118 
That danger was no mere literary trope. Although many popular accounts were 
embellished and exaggerated, captivity was nonetheless a very real concern for 
Spaniards and Europeans further afield.119 The sustained threat of Barbary raiding led 
many Spaniards to abandon coastal areas; by 1600 long sections of the Spanish littoral, 
in particular the Granadan and Murcian coasts, had been deserted. Fears of North 
African slavery extended well beyond Iberia. In Italy, Cosimo I de’ Medici founded 
the Knights of the Order of St Stephen specifically to combat captivity at the hands of 
Muslim pirates increasingly penetrating the Tyrrhenian Sea and appearing alarmingly 
close to Livorno.120 In Sicily today, William Brenner reports, the saying ‘pigliato dai 
turchi’ (‘taken by the Turks’, although in its origin referring specifically to Barbary 
raiders) is still used to indicate being caught off guard.121 To the west, as the North 
African depredators made inroads into the Atlantic, even English shores were not 
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immune. The reign of Elizabeth I saw England’s maritime and commercial expansion 
into the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, exposing English merchants and sailors to 
capture and enslavement, as reflected in Hakluyt’s compilation. But in the early 17th 
century, Barbary raiding itself extended as far as the British Isles. In 1625 Cornwall 
was attacked, while in 1631, Barbary pirates based in Morocco sacked the town of 
Baltimore, taking 107 captives. Barbary corsairs could even be seen in the Thames 
estuary. So feared were Barbary pirates that special prayers for protection therefrom 
were incorporated into Anglican church services.122 
An economy of capture and ransom developed with its own unique institutions. 
Some were continuations of the religious orders set up for the redemption of Christian 
crusader captives—for example, the Order of the Most Holy Trinity and of the 
Captives, also known simply as the Trinitarians (1198) and the Order of the Blessed 
Virgin Mary of Mercy, also known as Our Lady of Ransom or the Mercedarians 
(1218).123 In the 16th century, these served as templates for further redemptive 
confraternities across the Mediterranean sponsored by the Spanish crown, the Papal 
states and the major Italian republics. Large campaigns to raise funds for the rescue of 
captives were a common occurrence.124 
‘TURNING TURK’ AND THE THREAT TO CHRISTIAN SOULS 
The risk of capture by Barbary depredators loomed large in the European imagination. 
Loss of ship and freight to raiders had long been a risk faced by merchants, hence the 
development of a regime of restitution and reprisal as discussed in Chapter 3. The 
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surge of maritime violence and attendant imagery of captivity associated with the 
Barbary coast, however, changed the character of piracy in the popular imagination. 
Here was the Ottoman enemy of Christendom, not an abstract threat to the east but 
very much incarnate; at any moment one might be pigliato dai turchi. Yet the danger 
posed by the raider was not limited to captivity and life as a galley slave. A worse fate 
still awaited many of the ‘Christian souls so taken’, publicists warned: the pirate was 
to be feared not only for his power to seize Christian subjects against their will, but 
also for the threat he posed to those subjects’ very Christian identity.  
Renegade, or in Spanish renegado, referred to an apostate who renounced his 
or her faith—‘one that was first a Christian’, explained Richard Hakluyt, ‘and 
afterwards becommeth a Turke’.125 Writing of his captivity in Algiers in the late 
1570s, the Portuguese-born cleric Antonio de Sosa argued that over half of the 
inhabitants of the city were ‘Turks by profession’, that is, ‘renegades who, descending 
from Christian blood and parents, have voluntarily converted into Turks. . . . Both 
these Turks and their children are more (numerous) than the other inhabitants, the 
Moors, Turks, and Jews of Algiers’.126 The renegades’ origins, de Sosa suggested, 
were diverse: ‘There is no Christian nation in the world from which there are no 
renegades in Algiers.’127 By the early 17th century, Paul Baepler suggests, as many as 
two-thirds of the corsair captains based in Algiers were renegades.128 
The renegade pirates touched on an already well-honed fear of apostasy in 
Christian Europe, coinciding with similar anxieties. In England, for instance, the 
growing fashion of drinking coffee created consternation, the imbibing of the drink 
quickly linked with the image of apostasy.129 Coffee, one anonymous detractor 
warned, was ‘Turkish Renegade berry while water was English and loyal: their mix or 
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marriage was the befouling of the latter’. The imbibing of coffee, he further warned, 
makes the drinker as ‘faithless as a Jew or infidel’.130 
The Barbary pirate, like the beverage, conjured an Ottoman force invading and 
defiling Christian waters and threatening Christian identity. Anxieties over ‘turning 
Turk’ were ever present in literary accounts of captivity in Ottoman territories and the 
resulting renegades were presented in much the same register as the indigenous 
‘Turks’. They too were marked by depravity. ‘Most of those who are called Turkes of 
Alger’, wrote the 16th-century French geographer Nicolas de Nicolay, ‘are Christians 
renied, or Mahumetised, of all Nations, . . . giuen all to whoredome, sodometrie, theft, 
and all other most detestable vices’.131 An English contemporary, Thomas Dallam, 
suggested that many of those captured by pirates were compelled to convert so as to 
avoid living ‘in moche more slaverie and myserie’. In time, though, he warned, the 
‘Renied cristians’ too become ‘most berberus and villanus’. Their Christian souls lost, 
they take ‘pleasur in all sinfull actions’ and, in the ultimate betrayal, ‘take moste delite’ 
in capturing and selling into slavery their former co-religionists.132 In the 1580s, 
Christopher Marlowe would reference the renegades in Tamburlaine. 
. . . the cruel pirates of Argier, 
That damned train, the scum of Africa, 
Inhabited with straggling runagates 
That make quick havoc of the Christian blood.133 
The ‘scandalous confusion’ of Moors and renegades shocked many a 
contemporary. Samuel Purchase, the chronicler of voyages, saw in Algiers ‘the 
Whirlepoole of these Seas, the Throne of Pyracie, the Sinke of Trade and the Stinke 
of Slavery; the Cage of uncleane Birds of Prey, the Habitation of Sea-Devils, the 
Receptacle of Renegadoes of God, and Traytors to their Country’.134 As much as the 
threat posed by pirates to the bodies of the captured, Purchase and his contemporaries 
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feared the threat to Christian souls.  
By the end of the 16th century, the danger of the renegade had only added to 
the evil and religious enmity epitomised by the Barbary pirate. In fact, as one popular 
ballad had it, the renegades with ‘their Christ denying’ were ‘worse than Turkes’.135 
In Robert Daborne’s A Christian Turn’d Turk, the English dramatist denounced the 
religious apostacy of the renegade as ‘the heart itself of villainy’.136 His 1612 play 
dramatized the historical exploits of John Ward, an Englishman pressed into Royal 
Navy service only to mutiny and seek refuge in Tunis, where he converts to Islam and 
pursues a campaign of depredation against Christian shipping.137 Ward, and others like 
him, provoked righteous fury amongst English audiences. As Tinniswood writes, 
‘[t]his was the ultimate betrayal, as far as the English were concerned—worse, even, 
than robbery or murder. Turning to crime was bad, but for Ward to compound his 
crimes by voluntarily handing over his immortal soul to the enemy was horrible.’138 
Ward the pirate was, as the satirist Samuel Rowlands put it in a poem, also penned in 
1612, ‘[a] villain, worse than he that Christ betray’d’.139  
None of this is to claim that the image of the Barbary pirate in popular 
consciousness was in any sense ‘objective’. Hostilities coexisted with regular 
commercial and diplomatic contact and certainly other depictions of Barbary and the 
Islamic world were in circulation. Diplomatic correspondence by ‘hardnosed 
businessmen serving in consular roles’ lacked the ‘melodrama of accounts by captives, 
who always presented themselves as suffering Christian heroes’.140 But it was the 
captivity narrative which captured the public imagination and shaped the way 
generations understood the Islamic world—and the pirate. 
Captivity and conversion, as threat and lived experience, disseminated in 
narratives both sober and embellished—and hyperbole was certainly the norm—
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contributed to the production and reproduction of the Barbary pirate as demonic 
enemy in popular European consciousness. For the Spanish, reminders were constant. 
‘From the massive campaigns led by the ransomer monks to raise funds for the rescue 
of captives’, writes Garcés, ‘to the processions held when these ransomed men and 
women returned home, to the chains and shackles hung in churches and public 
buildings to signify liberation, the cruel reality of captivity in Barbary was ever present 
for the Spaniards’.141 Similarly, observe MacLean and Matar, the first image that the 
English public encountered of Muslims in general, and Barbary pirates in particular, 
was one ‘imbued with danger, violence, and religious opposition’.142 Accounts of 
piracy and captivity—the two were inevitably one and the same—both authentic and 
fictional, wielded great influence on the popular imagination, affirming the ‘hostile 
stereotypes about the “Mahometans” that appeared in sermons and chronicles’.143 
Authors, dramatists, painters, preachers: all depicted in print, on stage, on 
canvas and from pulpit the brutality, anti-Christian violence, and universal enmity of 
Muslim pirates. The Barbary pirate represented a threat more troubling than the 
unauthorised pillage of di Negro and his ilk in the medieval Mediterranean. And, in 
the shape of the renegade, he represented not merely the satanic other of Islam and the 
threat of captivity and slavery: he was the embodiment of the ultimate corollary of 
Islamic encroachment, the abandonment of Christianity and the ‘ever-present 
possibility of apostasy’.144 
THE BARBARY PIRATE IN LEGAL THOUGHT 
The pirate was no longer an abstract figure of depredation, one who merely robbed at 
sea: he was a figure of religious enmity associated with the infidel threat to 
Christendom and the baños of Barbary. As Jean-Baptiste Gramaye of Flanders put it 
following his own captivity in Algiers, the pirates’ base was ‘[t]he Whip of the 
Christian World, the terror Europe’.145 It was against this popular sentiment and 
concomitant literary topos that legal thinkers grappled with the issue of piracy and that 
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they too began to identify the pirate with universal enmity, ultimately rendering him 
hostis humani generis. 
One of the first prefigurations of this new identity, and the first step in a move 
from a paradigm based on the laws of war and sovereign licence to one premised on 
universal enmity, was found in the work of the northern Italian jurist Pierino Belli. 
Belli discussed piracy in the context of his major 1563 work on war, De Re Militari et 
Bello tractatus. Citing Cicero’s command that war should begin only with a formal 
declaration, Belli suggested that an exception should nonetheless be made ‘in the case 
of pirates [piratae], since they are both technically and in fact already at war’. The 
pirate ‘whose hand is against every man should expect a like return from all men, and 
it should be permissible for any one to attack them.’146 Yet Belli nonetheless affirmed 
‘the applicability of the law of war to relations with pirates’.147 Pirates are to be 
distinguished from those outside the law, sint extra omne legum: only public enemies 
branded such by the Pope or Holy Roman Emperor—latrones, say—are ‘outlaws’ to 
whom those laws of war do not apply.148 
Almost two decades later, Balthasar de Ayala would advance the pirate’s 
conceptual move into outlawry and universal enmity. Ayala was Jurisconsult and 
Judge Advocate General of the Habsburg Royal Army in the Low Countries, his De 
iure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari (1582) written to justify and bolster Philip 
II’s imperial project in the Low Countries and polemically attack the Protestant Dutch 
rebels who sought secession from the Habsburg Empire.149 Philip, like his predecessor 
Charles, saw himself as ‘God’s standard bearer’, the protector of Christendom from 
the both Turk and Lutheran heresy. In this context, Ayala drew an explicit equation 
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between rebel and pirate: neither, he insisted, could fight a bellum iustum. Just as 
Bartolus had argued that the illegitimate depredator lacked the authority of a 
sovereign, a summus princeps, so too, argued Ayala, did the rebel. Only a sovereign 
authority enjoyed the power of making war; rebels were no legitimate authority and 
had no ius belli. Whereas two sovereigns at war each enjoyed the legal status of 
belligerent—hostis—such status could not apply to rebels. As such, Ayala argued, 
rebels were not protected by the laws of war and were to be treated like robbers and 
pirates. 
Pirate and brigand, pirata and latro, had, as we saw previously, remained 
conceptually distinct in Roman law—with the most severe treatment reserved for the 
latter. On Ayala’s reading, however, references to latrones in the Digest were taken to 
apply equally to piratae, thus going one step further than Belli and denying altogether 
the status of lawful enemy, hostis, to pirates. ‘[T]he laws of war and of captivity and 
of postliminy, which apply to enemies, do not apply to rebels, any more than they 
apply to pirates [piratis] and robbers [latronibus] (these not being included in the term 
“enemy” [hostes])’.150 Pirates, robbers, and rebels were not protected by the laws of 
war: they could be enslaved and could ‘not acquire the ownership of what they capture, 
this only being admitted in the case of enemies’. Still, Ayala insisted ‘all the modes of 
stress known to the laws of war may be employed against them, even more than in the 
case of enemies’.151 The rebel and robber, he suggested—and presumably the pirate, 
although this third figure is not listed again—‘merit severer reprobation than an enemy 
who is carrying on a regular and just war and their condition ought not to be better 
than his’.152 
In collapsing any distinction between brigand and pirate, Ayala offered a 
justification for a discriminatory legal regime—only the just belligerent, the 
sovereign, could benefit from the protections of the laws of war—reminiscent of the 
medieval ‘holy war’.153 Extending that unequal treatment beyond questions of 
postliminy and the legality of prize, as had preoccupied Bartolus’s generation, Ayala 
rendered the pirate (and rebel) much like the heretic and infidel of the medieval laws 
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of war. This was surely no coincidence for, as we have seen, the pirate was by the late 
16th century, synonymous in the Christian imagination with the Moorish infidels of 
North Africa. 
The discriminatory approach to those labelled pirates was adopted likewise by 
Alberico Gentili. Following those before him, Gentili maintained that only sovereign 
princes enjoyed the legal power to resort to war, war being ‘a just and public contest 
of arms’ between equal parties.154 Private individuals cannot resort to war—‘to the 
arbitrament of Mars’—since they can always ‘obtain their legal rights before their 
superiors’ tribunal’.155 Only the sovereign has ‘no earthly judge’ and can be rightly 
considered an enemy (hostis).156 Here, Gentili looked to Roman authorities, citing 
Ulpian’s insistence that ‘[e]nemies are those against whom the Roman people have 
publicly declared war, or who themselves have declared war against the Roman 
people; others are called robbers or brigands.’157 The latter do not wage war: latrones 
bellum non gerunt. Pomponius is likewise offered as authority: ‘Those are enemies 
who declare war against us, or against whom we publicly declare war; others are 
robbers [latrones] or brigands [praedones].’158 Like Ayala, however, Gentili once 
again collapsed the Roman law distinction between pirata, on the one hand, and 
latrone and praedone, on the other; the pirate was assimilated to the status of the latter, 
a criminal, not a lawful belligerent: ‘[a] state of war cannot exist with pirates and 
robbers [cum piratis & latrunculis bellum non est]’.159  
As with Bartolus, the license of a recognised sovereign was central to Gentili’s 
identification of a lawful belligerent (and, in the inverse, a pirate). An enemy (hostis) 
is one ‘who has a state, a senate, a treasury, united and harmonious citizens, and some 
basis for a treaty of peace, should matters so shape themselves’.160 Writing of 
Frenchmen captured by the Spaniards following the expulsion of António, pretender 
to the throne, from Portugal in 1580, Gentili maintained that it was wrong to have 
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treated them as pirates [piratae]: ‘I say this because of no argument derived from the 
number and quality of the men and ships, but from the letters of their king which they 
exhibited’.161 The written authority of the French king, establishing that ‘it was that 
king whom they served, not Antonio’, was sufficient to remove them from the 
category of pirate.162 For Gentili, as for Ayala, those who lacked the sovereign 
authority to issue an authorisation could be treated as pirates. The King of France 
enjoyed such authority, whereas the pretender to the Portuguese throne and the Dutch 
rebels did not. 
Having collapsed any distinction between pirate and brigand and denying both 
the status of hostis, Gentili’s formulation meant that the labelling of rebels, or any 
other group, ‘pirates’ denied them the benefits of the status of belligerency. ‘With 
pirates and brigands who violate all laws, no laws remain in force.’163 Even when they 
follow the customs of warfare, ‘yet they do not wage war’: they are not lawful enemies 
with the privileges of a just war (iusti hostes).164 ‘Such men’, Gentili opined, citing 
Cicero, ‘are no more deserving of consideration in establishing a code of laws than 
wild beasts . . . “Such savagery in human form and bestial cruelty should be banished 
from what we may call the body of human society”.’165 Pirates are quite literally 
outlaws, existing outside the law: they are outside of and enemy to the universal 
society of that make up the societas gentium: ‘the common enemies of all’, hostes sunt 
communes.166 And against such common enemies, all war is just. On this Gentili was 
quite insistent, repeating it in various forms: ‘If war is made against the wicked’, he 
argued, for instance, ‘it is not disgraceful to make war’.167 Finally, with an appeal to 
Roman precedent, Gentili insisted that ‘[i]t is right to make war upon pirates, and the 
Romans justly took up arms against the Illyrians, Balearans, and Cilicians, even 
though those people had touched nothing belonging to the Romans, to their allies, or 
to anyone connected with them; for they had violated the common law of nations’. 
Piracy, he went on, ‘is contrary to the law of nations and the league of human society. 
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Therefore war should be made against pirates by all men, because in the violation of 
that law we are all injured’.168 
As Gould is quick to note, Gentili was mistaken in asserting that Rome moved 
against the Illyrians, Balearans, and Cilicians as pirates and in the absence of prior 
injuries.169 These were recognised polities—piratae in the Roman meaning of the 
word, not latrones or praedones, as in Gentili’s rendering—with whom the Romans 
engaged in war. Illyria, for instance, was regarded as a ‘predatory state’ by the 
Romans,170 and as Polybius’ Histories makes clear, the immediate cause for war was 
the assassination of Roman ambassadors on the orders of Illyrian queen Teuta.171 As 
with the Cilicians in the context of the Mithridatic wars, the conflict with the Illyrians 
should be understood as part of Rome’s broader struggle against the Macedonians. 
Certainly Roman historians—Plutarch, Velleius Paterculus, among others—wrote of 
these conflicts as outright wars: bella piratica.172 
In Gentili, then, we find one of the earliest formulations of the pirate as a 
universal enemy. And yet, as his historical allusions, although sometimes confused, 
affirm, Gentili’s legal construction of the pirate did not in fact rest on its supposed 
universal enmity. As Rech has observed, Gentili’s ‘common enemies of all’ rhetoric, 
and even his invocation of a societas gentium, had no radical implications for his anti-
piracy position, which remained, like that of antecedent thinkers, grounded on the 
Roman dichotomy between lawful and unlawful belligerents.173 Moreover, while 
Gentili went some way in advancing the pirate’s status as a universal enemy, he was 
in practice still, like those antecedents, most directly concerned with questions of 
postliminy in its modern form. The identification of depredation as the work of pirates 
remained, for legal thinkers, primarily of relevance in disputes over the determination 
of title to goods seized at sea.  
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This is nowhere clearer than in his role as the Spanish crown’s advocate before 
the Royal Council Chamber in London.174 In his pleadings before the Royal Chamber, 
Gentili argued once again that pirates are the enemies of all: ‘piratae sunt hostes 
omnium’.175 Such status, however, was now explicitly linked to a determination of title 
following capture. Lawful title might only pass to the captor of goods, Gentili insisted, 
‘once the capture is perfected by the captive people, goods or vessel being brought to 
the territory controlled by the capturing person’s sovereign and the capture declared 
good there.’176 But pirates have no territory or sovereign to which to take their prize, 
being the enemy of all legitimate sovereigns: ‘[t]o pirates and wild beasts no territory 
offers safety’177. They cannot thus alter legal title. So, for example, in a case in which 
Gentili represented the interests of Spanish traders who had fallen prey to Barbary 
corsairs, he argued that the subsequent sale of their plundered goods to English 
merchants did not pass title. Although Barbary officials had overseen the sale, giving 
it an appearance of legality, this was at best a legal fiction and did not bestow sovereign 
authority onto the pirates’ seizure: ‘the substance of the contract was with the 
pirates’.178 It followed that legal title remained that of the original Spanish traders. 
Who were the contemporary pirates that Gentili had in mind who, ‘wearing the 
human form, live the life of the most brutal of beasts’? As in the work of so many of 
his antecedents, the pirate existed in Gentili’s theoretical work—namely De iure 
belli—more as an abstract category to which others were assimilated—rebels, say—
or from which others were differentiated—the Frenchmen fighting with the pretender 
António, for instance. But here, in his collected pleadings, the recurring embodiments 
of the pirate are specifically the Barbary raiders, the seamen of the North African coast 
who were the major antagonist of Christian shipping in the Mediterranean at this time. 
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The two strands running through Gentili’s work, the pirate as unlawful 
belligerent/unauthorised depredator and the pirate as universal enemy, are likewise 
found in the work of his contemporaries. Bodin described pirates as enemies of 
humankind (‘ennemis du genre humain’) at the start of his 1576 Six Books of the 
Commonwealth.179 Like Gentili, Bodin cites both Ulpian and Pomponius’ remarks on 
brigands to distinguish both robbers and pirates from ‘lawful enemies’. While the 
‘rightly ordered commonwealths’ with ‘well-ordered government’ are correctly 
recognised as sovereign, robber and pirate communities are at best criminal 
organisations and do not enjoy the right to make treaties or declare war—or authorise 
depredations.180 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the thinkers who would demonise the pirate 
as a universal enemy and even embrace the designation of the pirate as hostis humani 
generis were familiar with the epithet’s theological origins. Jean Bodin, although 
today famous as a theorist of sovereignty, was in his own time a noted author of 
demonological tracts, most notably On the Demon-Mania of Witches, published four 
years after his Six Books of the Republic.181 Modern legal commentators have tended 
to dismiss Bodin’s concern with devil-worship and the chthonian world as an 
embarrassing footnote, but as Mark Neocleous has recently shown, Bodin’s defence 
of absolute sovereignty and his concern with ‘demon-mania’ in fact went hand in 
hand.182 
Bodin, like many pious Christians, was deeply invested in rooting out the 
enemies of Christendom. Pope Innocent VIII’s bull of 1484 had warned of persons 
who ‘have abandoned themselves to devils, incubi and seccubi . . . at the instigation 
of the Enemy of Mankind’ and set the groundwork, further developed in the Malleus 
Maleficarum published two years later, for an organised campaign of witch-
hunting.183 A century later, Bodin and his contemporaries would echo the same 
concerns. Satan, Bodin wrote in Demon-Mania, seeks, through his servants, to destroy 
the human race: he is, in fact, the ‘great Enemy of the human race’, hostis humani 
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generis—‘unseen he flies everywhere to deceive and destroy the human race’.184 Most 
prominent amongst his servants were witches, the devil’s ministers, who Bodin argues 
must be rooted out: ‘to secure the safety of the good, and to punish the most despicable 
wickedness that the human mind can imagine, it is [necessary] to chastise witches with 
the utmost rigour’.185  
The key agent in the war against witches—and their master in Satan—is the 
state and the magistrate, the latter imbued with the power of the former. Bodin’s book 
on witches is, as Neocleous puts it, essentially ‘a handbook for how to mobilise the 
state and its law against an Adversary with seemingly universal and demonic 
powers’.186 The witch here occupies the same role as those who challenge the order 
and security of the state in Bodin’s political theory: ‘The Witch and the rebel constitute 
one kind of enemy and thus one kind of threat’.187 And, by the same token, these 
internal enemies also have their external counterparts. Like the witch who hides often 
in plain sight inside the Christian state, outside it is through ‘pagans and infidels’ that 
the devil works.188 They too are seduced by the devil for the destruction of the 
Christian state. In the Six Books, these are joined by the pirate—and it is precisely the 
infidel pirates of Barbary who Bodin invokes. Indeed, Bodin explicitly juxtaposes the 
well-ordered commonwealth that is the sovereign state with the pirate community 
which, despite what trappings of internal organisation they may enjoy, are the polar 
opposite of the state. (No doubt influenced by France’s own diplomatic priorities, 
Bodin nonetheless allowed for the transformation of pirates from hostes humani 
generis into sovereign princes, conceding that Algiers and the other Barbary regencies, 
despite home to pirates, were, by the late 16th century, to be recognised as states). 
Like the witch, the pirate was hostis humani generis, the same language deployed in 
both demonological and political treatise. As Lyndal Roper has observed, what united 
Bodin’s concerns was a determination ‘to root out the enemies of Christendom and 
the state’, internal and external.189 
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At the very least, then, in the Barbary depredators, religious and legal identities 
coincided. Some commentators have gone further, though, and argued that the 
religious character of the Barbary pirates explicitly influenced the development of the 
hostis humani generis concept in legal thought. In a recent intervention, Sonja 
Schillings suggests that the fact that so many Barbary pirates were European renegades 
was of central importance. ‘The conspicuous mix of native and renegade Barbary 
corsairs’, she notes, complicated what was essentially a question of contractual 
legitimacy.190 The depredators condemned by Bartolus fell into illegitimacy when 
their attacks were not licensed by a sovereign. Could the Barbary regencies be 
considered sovereigns capable of authorising reprisal? As Rech shows in compelling 
detail, the status of the Barbary polities was a matter of great debate and would remain 
a central preoccupation of legal thinkers for several centuries.191 But it was at least 
conceivable for Europeans, as Schillings argues, that the North African depredator 
‘acted loyally in the name of his native faith and sovereign’ even if ‘faith and sovereign 
were not deemed civilized’.192 The same, however, Schillings suggests, could not be 
said of the renegade, ‘someone who had treacherously abandoned his native faith and 
sovereign and turned against them (at least if these original allegiances were European 
and had been abandoned for a barbarous alternative)’.193 Here, in the Barbary 
renegades, Schillings suggests, lie the origins of a conception of pirates as individual 
transgressors at war with all states. ‘Whereas the native Barbary corsair was 
collectively Muslim’, she argues, ‘the renegade Barbary corsair had to convert 
individually. Native Barbary corsairs could claim to represent a cultural collective that 
was larger than themselves and epitomized by Islam; they could claim to represent a 
common public cause and were imagined as culturally homogenous, a collective bloc 
of Otherness.’194 Not so the renegades, who were, Schillings writes, ‘solely compared 
to other converts to Islam and thus legally grouped with other individual, isolated 
transgressors like them: people who were originally European and Christian but acted 
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as if they were not, and who did so only because they wanted to serve their private 
ends of personal profit.195 
It is unclear on what basis Schillings ascribes ‘personal profit’ as the sole 
motive for Christians to ‘turn Turk’. Nonetheless, her work is interesting in drawing 
particular attention to the renegade. He alone, she suggests, was the prototype of the 
modern pirate: with his ‘explicit spiritual abandonment of the Christian God’ he was 
‘a true renegade to barbarism for the entire world to see. Therefore, he could become 
the prototype of the pirata, the epitome of civilization-abandoning degradation.’196 At 
once a traitor to their nation and to their faith, the renegades recall the pirate-rebel 
nexus of Ayala. And in Spain and Portugal, it was the Inquisition, an institution 
established for the suppression of heresy, that tried thousands of Barbary pirates.197 
This important kernel gives way to less convincing theoretical abstraction in 
which the pirate is in fact a secondary figure of enmity after the praedon. If the 
renegade is the model of the pirate, Schillings suggests that he ‘remained a side-show’ 
to the true ‘king of evil’, the indigenous Barbary raider, whom he merely imitated.198 
She attempts to map this hierarchy onto the Roman conceptions of praedon and pirata, 
which she projects into the modern era as distinct legal identities within a broader 
‘hostis humani generis constellation’. Whatever merit this theoretical abstraction has 
for her subsequent analysis of the hostis humani generis concept in various literary 
works, it has no basis in either Roman law or early modern legal thinkers who, as we 
have seen, in fact collapsed the classical distinction. 
Still, if we take Schillings’ broader observation seriously, she can be 
understood simply to argue that the Barbary pirate—encompassing both Moor and 
renegade—could simultaneously embody two piratical identities. On the one hand, the 
pirate represented Islam, the ‘agent of moral bankruptcy’ and an avatar of ‘the central, 
gruesome antagonist’, the infidel.199 And, on the other, he was a Christian who had 
‘turned against his homeland’. ‘Turning Turk’ was at once conversion and treason: 
‘simultaneous acts, the political and religious sides of one and the same 
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abandonment’.200 As such, he epitomised the universal enemy both as threat the 
universal pretensions of Christendom and enemy to all nations, having rejected and 
rebelled against the authority of all Christian princes. 
By the early 17th century, the pirate as the enemy of all humankind, regularly 
called hostis humani generis, was well established. Francis Bacon’s discussion in his 
An Advertisement Touching a Holy War, written in 1622, reflects the growing 
consensus.201 Here, Bacon closely follows Gentili, although without explicit reference. 
Pompey’s campaign against the Cilicians is offered once more as an illustration that 
‘[i]t was never doubted but a war upon pirates may be lawfully made by any nation, 
though not infested or violated by them.’202 So too was one justified in making war on 
‘the pirates now being’, namely the Barbary raiding communities of North Africa: 
they may have the appearance of organised states, with ‘a receptacle and mansion in 
Algiers’, Bacon acknowledges, but they are pirates all the same, just as ‘[b]easts are 
not the less savage because they have dens.’203 They are ‘communes humani generis 
hostes; whom all nations are to prosecute, not so much in the right of their own fears, 
as upon the band of human society’. It is worth noting that Bacon’s militant 
denunciation of piracy came in the context of an extended dialogue canvassing the 
wisdom of a holy war against the Ottomans and their proxies in North Africa. 
THE PIRATE AS FIGURE OF RELIGIOUS ENMITY 
Attempts to recover past attitudes are fraught with difficulties and misapprehension of 
an earlier period by presentist concerns is never far. There is a risk, especially in light 
of today’s ‘deepened fault lines’ between Christianity and Islam, of seeing the 
Mediterranean as a hypostasized border between two existentially opposed 
religions.204 Many scholars have certainly read a ‘clash of civilizations’ avant la lettre 
into the 16th-century Mediterranean. Andrew Hess’s influential Forgotten Frontier 
did much to shape 20th-century attitudes toward the Ibero-Ottoman confrontation in 
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the Mediterranean, describing the emergence of ‘two increasingly different 
civilizations’ with the ‘wide belt of cultural pluralism’ of the 15th century shrinking 
to ‘a thin line’.205 A long tradition of Eurocentric mythologizing has depicted the 
Ottomans as savagely martial, frenzied soldiers committed to holy war. The Ottoman 
Empire, one late-20th century historian writes, ‘lived for war’.206 Another insists that 
the Ottomans, ‘[f]rom the point of their first entrance into history as a nomadic war-
band’, pursued a ‘ruthless dedication to conquest and predation’, not as a matter of 
considered policy but as ‘a law of life, the principle that animated’ an entire society.207 
In the late 19th and 20th centuries, it was a commonplace to locate the Barbary pirates 
at the frontlines of this clash between Christian and Islamic civilizations.208 In such 
accounts, the Ottomans, Barbary pirates, and Islam in general, with their atavistic 
violence, stand in sharp contrast with an advanced, pacific Christian Europe. Implicit 
in the ‘fixation on divergence’, Daniel Goffman notes, is ‘an assumption of inferiority, 
of uncivilized savagery (such as the conventional if hackneyed argument that plunder 
was the exclusive stimulus for Ottoman empire-building)’.209 
It is certainly the case that this was a juncture marked by conflict between 
imperial powers with strong confessional identities. And the focus on religion in the 
historiography of Ottoman-European relations is not without foundation, given the 
role of such identities in shaping popular attitudes towards the conflict and its agents 
in the western Mediterranean. Certainly, as Goffman notes, early modern Europe 
‘emerged from a Christian ecumene that had helped define and grant legitimacy to a 
medieval Europe that presided over several crusades against Islam. . . . Christian 
Europe—particularly in its relations with non-Christian societies—continued to cast 
its existence in terms of a “universal” faith.’210 While confessional hostilities were 
longstanding on the margins of Europe, religious anxiety was heightened in the 16th 
century by fear of the Ottoman Empire. With their impressive military prowess and 
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rapid westward expansion, the Ottomans represented not only a formidable 
geopolitical adversary but also a menace to Christendom.211  
Piracy was not, of course, the exclusive preserve of Islamic mariners. Yet, in 
the early modern European imagination, piracy was associated primarily with the 
North African corsairs—and the Europeans ‘turned Turk’ who joined them in large 
numbers—who plundered Christian shipping and shoreline alike. Alongside the view 
of piracy as unlicensed belligerency, the pirate as a figure of universal enmity in 
international legal thought began to emerge and, this chapter has argued, can only be 
understood against the backdrop of religious enmity in the 16th century. Through this 
larger geopolitical and religious prism, the identity of the pirate in the European mind 
came to be infused with Europeans’ racialised religious ideology so that the actions of 
Islamic pirates were interpreted within the general fear and animosity toward Islam 
outlined above. The pirates of North Africa, in particular, came to be seen in the 
western Mediterranean as the primary avatars of Islamic expansion. 
The expression hostis humani generis—which had initially gained currency in 
early Christian theological and demonological writings, where it was used as a 
common epithet for the devil—now reappeared in jurisprudence to project a ‘supreme 
degree of hostility’ onto new universal enemies.212 As this chapter shows, the universal 
enmity represented by the pirate in the 16th century, like earlier incarnations of the 
hostis humani generis, was still very much religious in nature. As figures of religious 
enmity and piratical plunder, the Muslim pirates of northern Africa were central to 
popular and literary accounts of piracy. These Islamic pirates were easily assimilated 
in the popular Christian imagination with other demonic foes of Christendom—an 
ideological association encouraged by the imperial powers of Europe, tasked with 
defending Europe against the infidel and holding threats at bay. Rooted in imperial 
rivalries and the religious ideological formations produced and encouraged by 
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Habsburg-Ottoman hostility, the universal enmity of the pirate took hold in the legal 
imagination. It was only here, within this specific social and geopolitical context, and 
not earlier, that this enmity characteristic of the pirate in modern legal thought first 
emerged. It retained, however, its theological character, the pirate a figure specifically 
of religious enmity. The idea of the pirate as a secular figure and hostis humani generis 
as a secular legal concept was yet to take shape. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The pirate in the New World 
Early on the afternoon of 1 March 1579, a cry came from the lookout at the masthead 
of the Golden Hind. John Drake, a younger cousin of the ship’s commander, Francis 
Drake, had caught sight of the Spanish treasure ship the Nuestra Señora de la 
Concepción. Under the command of Captain San Juan de Anton, it was bound for 
Panama, heavily laden with silver from the Potosí mines in Peru. Slowing his own 
vessel so as not to startle the Spanish, Drake had his crew trail ropes and cables behind 
the Hind. As it drew closer, there was little alarm amongst the Spanish. Depredation, 
while common in the Caribbean and Atlantic, was unheard of in Pacific waters. In 
fact, Spanish ships on the Pacific leg of the silver train were rarely armed. Yet, as the 
Hind slowly flanked the Spanish ship, a cry rang out: ‘Strike sail in the name of the 
Queen of England!’1 A volley of artillery fire brought down the Concepción’s mizen 
mast and before long Drake’s men had scrambled aboard the Spanish prey. The 
treasure found on the Spanish ship was greater than anything taken thus far on Drake’s 
voyage: ‘we found in her great riches, as jewels and precious stones, thirteen chests 
full of royals of plate [silver reales], fourscore pound weight [80 pounds] of gold, and 
six and twenty ton of silver’.2 So voluminous was the cargo that it took six days to 
transfer the cargo to the Hind, after which the Concepción was set free.3 
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If the Nuestra Señora de la Concepción was the richest prize taken by Drake 
on his circumnavigation of the globe, it was by no means the only. He had set out from 
Plymouth on 15 November 1577 aboard the Pelican, accompanied by a further four 
vessels. In January, a Portuguese merchant ship, the Santa Maria, was captured off 
the African coast near the Cape Verde islands. Crossing the Atlantic, the fleet made 
land in Brazil and followed the coast south to Patagonia. By September, Drake had 
passed through the Magellan Strait, continuing into the Pacific in the Pelican, now 
renamed the Golden Hind. Sailing north, he attacked Spanish ports and ships along 
the Chilean coast, sacking Valparaiso, the port of Santiago, on 5 December 1578. At 
Arica, the first port on the treasure route which took silver from Potosí to Panama, 
Nombre de Dios, and ultimately Spain, Drake took two further prizes.4 Continuing 
north, Drake raided Callao, the port of Lima, where he learned of the Nuestra Señora 
de la Concepción, heavily laden with silver and recently departed for Panama. Several 
weeks later, the younger Drake sighted the Spanish vessel off Cape San Francisco in 
what is now Colombia. After securing his prize, Drake continued north before setting 
west across the Pacific, returning to England by way of the Cape of Good Hope nearly 
three years after departing Plymouth.5 The booty carried back to England by Drake 
was significant—Elizabeth’s share alone was enough, John Maynard Keynes has 
observed, to pay off the entirety of her foreign debt.6 
Upon his triumphant return, Drake was met with enthusiasm and praise. The 
queen feasted aboard the Golden Hind, consecrating the ship ‘with great ceremonie, 
pompe, and magnificence, eternally to be remembered’, and, in 1581, knighting 
Drake.7 Unsurprisingly, the Spanish were unimpressed. Drake’s raids on Spanish 
vessels and ports outraged the Spanish king, Philip II: Drake was a pirate and, the 
king’s ambassador in London, Bernadino Mendoza, demanded, should be punished 
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accordingly. Wars, Mendoza warned the English queen, had started with less 
provocation.8  
This chapter uses Drake’s depredations as a starting point to consider the 
contrasting English and Spanish attitudes towards piracy in the late-16th century. It 
begins by considering contemporaneous Spanish accounts which present Drake as a 
pirate, a figure, the chapter shows, not only associated with illegitimate depredation, 
but, as with its counterpart in the Mediterranean, epitomising religious enmity and 
embodying the confrontation between two religio-political orders. As in Europe, the 
Spanish state cast its imperial ambitions in religious terms, as it did its geopolitical 
rivals—the Ottomans, but so too now newly emerging English and Dutch imperial 
formations. In the New World, these challengers sought to rival Spanish hegemony 
over the extraction of wealth, a challenge cast in ideological terms as a threat to the 
Iberians’ universal mission. The chapter then turns to contemporaneous English 
depictions of Drake, situating these within the context of emergent English mercantile 
imperialism and attendant outrage at England’s exclusion from profitable trade in the 
Americas. 
DRAKE IN THE SPANISH IMAGINATION 
Drake’s exploits were recorded in numerous contemporaneous cultural texts including 
several epic poems, the most important genre of Spanish American colonial literature. 
Maritime violence featured prominently in many poetic chronicles of Spanish 
colonisation. The first such account to feature Drake was by Juan de Castellanos, a 
Spanish priest who arrived in the New World around 1534. His Elegías de varones 
ilustres de Indias, first published in Madrid in 1589, totals some 113,609 verses and 
chronicles the early colonisation of the Caribbean and Spanish Main. In the third 
volume of the Elegías, Castellanos included five cantos on Drake—the Discurso de el 
Capitán Francisco Draque—which recount his various voyages of pillage against the 
Spanish. Written shortly after Drake’s sacking of Cartagena de Indias in 1586 and 
focusing primarily on that event, it nonetheless also includes details of his 
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circumnavigation.9 The poem opens by placing the threat of piracy to Spanish ports 
squarely at the centre of New World concerns: 
A hard, sad, and frightful case 
a furious assault and a deplorable calamity 
to some ports in this New World, 
I sing with hoarse and woeful voice 
to which my tongue sends forth 
from the depths of my constricted breast 
but who could sing if not to Spain’s dishonour?10 
Drake’s assaults are then given a specifically religious character by Castellanos who 
identifies the authors of this ‘calamity’ as Lutherans. 
and the destruction 
that with Lutheran troops at his command 
the English Captain Francis inflicted 
in this our new sacred sheepfold.11 
A short biographical sketch of Drake follows, before a description of Drake’s various 
incursions into the New World including the circumnavigation. While bemoaning the 
‘destruction . . . Captain Francis inflicted’, Castellano’s criticism is directed also at the 
administrative situation of the colonies. A recurring theme is thus the ease with which 
Drake is able to attack poorly defended Spanish ports and vessels. This can be seen 
specifically in the taking of the Nuestra Señora de la Concepción. Here, Castellano is 
at pains to stress the absence of weapons and soldiers to defend the Spanish treasure 
ship and the lack of precautions taken by Spanish authorities.12  
If the poem is in one sense an extended harangue against the Habsburg 
administration in the Indies, its central figure of enmity nonetheless remains Drake. 
He is described at various times as a pirate, a thief and a tyrant. Interestingly, though, 
the enmity attaching to Drake rests in large part on his religious identity, his 
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depredations placed squarely in the context of an inter-imperial confrontation between 
Catholic Spain and Protestant England. Already in the poem’s opening stanzas, quoted 
above, he is identified as Lutheran, as he is repeatedly throughout. Then, in attacking 
the Nuestra Señora de la Concepción, Castellano has Drake openly challenge Spain’s 
claim to sovereignty over the New World, a claim rooted in the papal bulls of donation 
issued by Pope Alexander VI in 1493: 
And as you are said to have such enlightened minds 
please free me from this doubt, 
did Adam leave a will and testament 
whereby he entrusted these lands to Spain alone? 
If so, show me the deed and the decree 
and I will renounce to all my claims 
because if the opposite is true, 
he who can takes all.13 
Drake’s heretical identity is increasingly emphasised as the poem progresses. He acts 
in the name of England: ‘Amayna, amayna, por Ingalaterra’—‘lower the sails, lower 
the sails, for England’.14 Drake’s, Castellanos stresses, is a ‘perfidious nation, blindly 
malignant, wretched enemy of the divine honor’.15 Both pirate and nation have been 
‘guided to the deep inferno / by a false and soulless beast: / that great chatterbox and 
fierce monster / who was Martin Luder or mean Luther’.16  
In his careful analysis of Castellanos’s poem, Martínez-Osorio has catalogued 
the various epithets used to depict Drake and his fellow heretics as demonic enemies. 
The list is extensive and includes such terms as ‘evil army’ (ejército maligno), 
‘ministers of hell’ (ministros del infierno), ‘cruel beasts’ (bestias fieras), ‘Lutherans 
from hell’ (luteranos infernales), and ‘allies of the devil’ (miembros del demonio).17 
Such language, on Martínez-Osorio’s analysis, lends ‘the ubiquitous conflict 
underlying Castellanos’s narrative’ the tone of ‘a religious war against a demonic 
enemy’, with the fundamental opposition between English and Spaniards resting on 
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‘their adherence [to] or disdain for the Catholic faith’.18 Nina Gerassi-Navarro 
similarly notes the moral opposition reiterated constantly between Spanish Catholics 
and English Protestants, a line running through the poem delineating ‘good and evil, 
religious and heretical’.19 The coincidence of monstrousness and heresy is affirmed 
when Drake sacks Santo Domingo in 1586: Castallano has him pillage churches and 
desecrate religious art and, in an episode of Christian martyrdom, brutally execute two 
Dominican friars. 
The religious enmity with which Drake’s piracy is identified can be found also 
in subsequent Spanish accounts. Martín del Barco Centenera’s poem La Argentina, 
published in Lisbon in 1602, describes Drake’s passage through the Strait of Magellan 
and his depredations along the Chilean and Peruvian coasts. As in Castellanos’s 
account, Drake’s moral failing lies in his Lutheran identity: ‘But what’s most 
important and most necessary / He lacks: the love of Jesus Christ’.20 Likewise in the 
Armas antárticas of Juan de Miramontes y Zuázola, published in 1921, where Drake 
is portrayed as a violent pirate and even Satan’s ally, juxtaposed with the faithful 
Catholics determined to defend their lands against heretics. Here, again, pirate and 
heretic are two sides of the same coin who, having ‘refused obedience to the Holy 
Father’ had become ‘hateful to the world and to God’.21  
ENEMIES IN THE NEW WORLD 
These accounts of Drake presented him as a demonic figure and heretical foe. In this 
aspect, he fit into a tradition of religious foes facing the Spanish in the New World. 
Iberian colonisation had long been understood through a religious lens.22 Columbus’s 
arrival in the Americas in 1492 coincided with the fall of the Nasrid kingdom of 
Granada, the culmination of the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula. There could be 
little doubt, in the Spanish imagination, that both were part of a divinely inspired 
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Christian expansion, a process, in Edmondo Lupieri’s words, ‘towards a Christian 
kingdom covering the entire globe’.23 But just as Christianity and Christendom were 
threatened by hostile (Islamic) forces in Europe, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
so too was it under threat from the devil in the New World, which had, Spanish 
colonists believed, long been under Satan’s control. The Spanish would have to 
continue the Reconquista here, too, to ‘recover the continent for God’.24 Indeed, 
Castellanos himself wrote, in his Elegías, of the ‘discovery’ of America pitting the 
forces of evil against the heroic Christian conquistador. 
Almost immediately the devil was encountered in the form of Amerindians. In 
later 16th-century debates amongst Spanish jurists over the ontological status of the 
indigenous population, Vitoria would posit a universal framework in which both 
European and Amerindian shared a universal humanity and reason. Yet, as Silvia 
Federici has noted, such debates were only conceivable against the background of an 
already successful ‘ideological campaign representing the latter as animals and 
demons’.25 
One of the earliest Iberian depictions of Amerindians is the Inferno (c. 1510-
1520) by an unknown Portuguese master. In that painting, we see the devil presiding 
over the torture of Europeans adorned with Amerindian headdress.26 The early 
conquistadores may have begun, in one colonist’s words, ‘the process of liberating 
the natives from Satan’s brutal, unrelenting tyrannical rule’,27 yet Satan was still very 
much a threat, ‘scorching, drying, and destroying the fruit of virtue growing in the 
hearts and souls of the Indians’.28 Colonists such as Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, 
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27 Cañizares-Esguerra (2006) 2. 
28 Quoted in Ibid 97. 
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governor of the Ozama fort on Santo Domingo in the early 16th century, wrote of the 
indigenous population as ‘bestial and evilly inclined’.29 Throughout the 16th century, 
Iberians would author numerous chronicles and epic poems pitting heroic Christian 
conquistadors confronting a tyrannical devil ruling over hordes of demonic 
Amerindian minions.30 Biblically sanctioned violence against these demonic enemies 
was common: the torture and execution of Amerindians under charges of diabolism 
and devil worship was widespread.31 Colonisation was, as Cañizares-Esguerra puts it, 
‘an ongoing epic struggle against a stubbornly resistant Satan’.32 
This epic struggle against the devil in the New World would continue, while 
the satanic enemy came to take on different forms. If Amerindians were initially 
viewed as Satan’s most powerful allies, they were soon joined—or even replaced, as 
the colonial regime in Mexico, Peru and elsewhere was firmly established—by new 
foes.33 Most prominent amongst these demonic agents, though, was the pirate. The 
pirate, more than any other figure, came to embody the religious alterity threatening 
the universalising Christian expansionism of the Habsburg empire. 
                                                        
29 Quoted in Anthony Pagden, European Encounters with the New World (Yale University Press, 1993) 
57. 
30 E.g., José de Anchieta’s De gestis Mendi de Saa (1563) and Gabriel Lobo Lasso de la Veja’s 
Mexicana (1594). 
31 See Claude F. Baudez & Sydney Picasso, Lost Cities of the Maya (Harry N. Abrams, 1992) 21. Of 
course, this was not just religious ideology, but rather a means of ‘establishing control over production 
and strengthening the grip of colonial rule’ through the destruction of indigenous ownership practices—
a ‘strategy of enclosure’, in Federici’s words. Alex Anievas & Kerem Nişancıoğlu, How the West Came 
to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism (Pluto Press, 2015) 132; Federici (2004) 220. 
32 Cañizares-Esguerra (2006) 5. The association of Amerindian with devil was not limited to the Spanish 
imagination. In 1557, the Huguenot pastor Jean de Léry, living among the Tupinamba in the Bay of Rio 
in Brazil, witnessed a religious assembly: ‘Not only did they howl, but also, leaping violently in the air, 
they made their breasts shake and they foamed at the mouth—in fact, some, like those who have the 
falling-sickness over here, fell in a dead faint; I can only believe that the devil entered their body and 
that they fell into a fit of madness’. Citing Bodin’s description of witches in Europe, Léry concluded 
that ‘they have the same master: that is, the Brazilian women and the witches over here were guided by 
the same spirit of Satan; neither the distance between the places nor the long passage over the sea keeps 
the father of lies from working both here and there on those who are handed over to him by the just 
judgment of God.’ Quoted in Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New 
World (University of Chicago Press, 1991) 14, 16. 
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las Casas’ Historia de las Indias (1552), the New World staged as a prelapsarian paradise attacked by 
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CHRISTENDOM UNDER SIEGE 
In the pre-1492 inter-polity order of medieval Europe, Wilhelm Grewe writes, the 
international legal community was ‘identical to the Christian community, united in the 
Roman Church.’34 Christianity formed a ‘close-knit occidental community’ in which 
the Pope determined the ‘common good’ for the societas Christiana and the Holy 
Roman Emperor served it with temporal power.35 As we saw in Chapter 4, when 
Charles V became Emperor, he took on the mantle of ‘the defender of Christendom 
against all its enemies, both external and internal’.36 Although this system had been 
collapsing already by the time Columbus arrived in the Americas, the Papacy and Holy 
Roman Empire remained important symbols—both insisted on an ‘overarching 
agency’, albeit a weakened one, with the Pope continuing to claim ‘a legislative power 
binding upon all Christian nations’.37 
In 1493, the papal bull Inter Caetera had called for a universal mission, setting 
out that ‘the Catholic faith and the Christian religion be exalted and be everywhere 
increased and spread, that the health of souls be cared for and that barbarous nations 
be overthrown and brought to the faith itself’.38 The Treaty of Alcaçovas between 
Portugal and Spain had already, in 1479, divided the Atlantic Ocean into two spheres 
of influence but now Pope Alexander VI set out a formal line of demarcation. 
Exhorting them to spread the faith, Alexander granted to the Crowns of Castile and 
Aragon all lands west and south of a pole-to-pole line drawn ‘one hundred leagues 
towards the west and south from any of the islands commonly known as the Azores 
and Cape Verde’.39 The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 affirmed the division between 
respective Spanish and Portuguese missionary zones.40 
The Spanish empire, then, was understood, at least in the imperial ideology, as 
not merely a matter of territorial aggrandisement but of a piece with the religious 
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39 Ibid 17. 
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mission of salvation and of enlarging the Christian commonwealth.41 While the 
Salamancan jurists would reject Rome’s authority as legitimate grounds for Spanish 
conquest, the Castilian crown nonetheless continued to rely on papal donation for 
legitimacy of Spanish claims to the Americas. The donation’s ‘continuing importance 
in the official historiography of the Spanish Empire’ served, Anthony Pagden writes, 
‘to keep the continuity between the Spanish monarchy and the ancient Christian 
Imperium romanum firmly on the agenda’.42 The ideological construction of a 
missionary impetus behind territorial expansion would continue in the service of 
Iberian colonialism until the late 17th century. Even then, the Spanish jurist Diego 
Andrés Rocha would insist that Spain’s claims to the New World derived from ‘God’s 
providential design to propagate the true faith through the agency of the Spanish’.43  
Yet already in the 16th century, the authority of the Pope could no longer 
guarantee an Iberian claim to imperium would be recognised by all European powers. 
Christendom was not the monolithic community it had once been; ecclesiastical 
discipline had dissolved, the Protestant Reformation creating a lasting schism in 
Christianity, not to mention over a century of wars of religion. The supremacy of Pope 
and Emperor had been undermined: so too the latter’s claimed monopoly on the New 
World. As Francis I of France declared—the bon mot placed in Drake’s mouth by 
Castellanos—‘The sun shines for me as for others. I should very much like to see the 
clause in Adam’s will that excludes me from a share of the world’.44 William Cecil, 
the Elizabethan statesman, likewise dismissed the Pope’s right ‘to give and take 
kingdoms to whomsoever he pleased’.45 The result, Carl Schmitt observed, was a 
world historical struggle ‘between Reformation and Counter-Reformation, between 
                                                        
41 See, generally, John H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-
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42 Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-
1800 (Yale University Press, 1995) 32. Pagden goes on to note that ‘the Bulls of Donation offered the 
Castilians an historical link with the empire as the second sword of Christendom which no argument 
from natural law could ever provide.’ Ibid 48-49. 
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the world Catholicism of the Spaniards and the world Protestantism of the Huguenots, 
the Dutch, and the English’.46 
It was against this background that the quickly growing penetration by 
Protestants—Elizabethans, Huguenots and Dutch—into Catholic missionary zones 
was interpreted by Spain. As Policante writes, mariners from these countries, in 
pursuing trade or, like Drake, preying on the Spanish colonies of the New World or 
simply plundering the Spanish galleons returning with gold and silver from the 
Americas, ‘refused to respect the orders imposed by papal authority’. In doing so, 
Policante suggests, they ‘endangered the welfare of the entire Christian community’.47 
It was, after all, as Vitoria argued, in the interest of all Christianity that the Pope had 
granted a monopoly on travel to the Americas. Although the Pope was not temporal 
lord, he nonetheless, insisted Vitoria, ‘has power in temporal things insofar as they 
concern spiritual things’. It is the Pope’s ‘special business to promote the Gospel 
throughout the world’ and, ‘if the princes of Spain are in the best position to see to the 
preaching of the Gospel in [the Americas], the pope may entrust the task to them, and 
deny it to all others’. In fact, Vitoria stressed, he may ‘restrict not only the right to 
preach, but also the right to trade’ if such restriction is ‘convenient for the spreading 
of the Christian religion’. And indeed, Vitoria believed, it was convenient, for if there 
were ‘an indiscriminate rush to the lands of these barbarians from other Christian 
countries, the Christians might very well get in each other’s way and start to quarrel’, 
frustrating the ‘business of the faith and the conversion of the barbarians’.48 
It was quite logical then, in Inter Caetera, for the Pope to have threatened 
anyone crossing the line of demarcation for ‘trade or any other reason’ with 
‘immediate excommunication’.49 But excommunication was no mere spiritual 
sanction. As Grewe explains, in the late medieval world, it meant ‘not only exclusion 
from all sacraments, from mass, from an ecclesiastical burial’, and so on, but also 
‘absolute exclusion from the community of the faithful, with the result that no one was 
permitted to communicate with the banned person and that temporal powers were 
                                                        
46 Carl Schmitt, Land and Sea, trans. Simona Draghici (Plutarch Press, 1997) [1954] 42. 
47 Policante (2015) 37 
48 Francisco de Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians (De Indis)’ [1539], in Political Writings, ed. Anthony 
Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 231, 284-85 (emphasis added). 
49 Pope Alexander VI (2000) 17. 
 145 
obliged to outlaw him’.50 For the Spanish, then—indeed for medieval Catholicism 
more generally—as Policante argues, drawing on Grewe, excommunication and 
outlawry were two sides of the same coin. To cross the line into the Spanish missionary 
zone was not only to incur ecclesiastical sanction but to step outside of, and to 
abandon, the res publica Christiana. In Policante’s words, ‘outlawry’ is ‘the 
secularization of the theological notion of excommunication’.51 
On the Spanish view, it followed, Protestants that crossed the papal lines of 
demarcation, be they merchants or depredators, were not merely contesting an Iberian 
monopoly on the New World, but challenging the very authority of the Pope, whose 
role it was to determine the common good of the universal Christian community—
threatening, that is, not only Spanish colonialism but the juridico-political structure of 
Christendom.  
PROTESTANT PIRATES 
Drake, if the most famous trespasser, was by no means the first. French Huguenot 
raiders based in the Protestant stronghold of La Rochelle had been active in the 
Atlantic Triangle since Columbus first arrived in the Americas. With Cortés’s 
conquest of Mexico from 1519-21, the volume of treasure flowing from America to 
Spain increased dramatically.52 In 1523, Jean Florin, a Norman raider, captured 
several Spanish ships off the southwest coast of Portugal returning with treasure. By 
1536, French predation had entered the Caribbean, with at least one French raid on a 
Spanish ship off the north coast of the Panamanian isthmus.53 The next year, reports 
of French depredation came from the ports of Tierra Firme, in particular Cartagena 
and Nombre de Diós, as well as nearby Havana and Santo Domingo. Paul Hoffman 
reports some 22 French raids on settlements in the Indies between 1535 and 1547, 
while 66 ships were lost in the same period, although of these more than half were 
attacked off the coast of Spain.54 
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If the French were the vanguard of Protestant attacks on Spain’s New World 
empire, they were soon joined by the English and, following revolt in the Low 
Countries from 1568, the Dutch. Their numbers would increase steadily so that by 
October 1595, the treasurer of Santo Domingo could report that pirates were ‘as 
numerous and assiduous as though these were ports of their own countries. They lie 
in wait on all the sailing routes to the Indies . . . . Not a ship coming up from the outside 
escapes them; nor does any which leaves the harbour get past them.’55 The Indies had 
become one more theatre in the European wars of religion which threatened the 
stability of the Spanish Christian empire. The Protestant interlopers in Catholic 
missionary zones were no mere annoyance but, like the devil’s agents amongst the 
indigenous populations of the Americas, or the Islamic pirates in the Mediterranean, a 
threat to the universal Christian commonwealth in which name Spanish imperialism 
operated. Indeed, depredation in the New World was easily assimilated to the 
overarching battle against Christianity’s Others—especially against Islam in the 
Mediterranean which remained, in Barbara Fuchs’s words, the ‘satanic other of 
Christian Europe’.56 The Protestant depredators, excommunicated from the societas 
Christiana, were thus also pirates—piratas luteranos or corsarios luteranos, the 
Spanish still using both terms interchangeably, rather than piratas islámicos or 
corsarios islámicos—and, like their Islamic counterparts, not mere public criminals 
but enemies of all Christian civilization, the refusal to recognise, let alone obey, papal 
dispositions endangering the entire Christian community, albeit a crumbling one.  
Fernão Oliveira’s 1555 treatise on methods of naval warfare, Arte da Guerra 
do Mar, was unexceptional in lumping English, French and Algerians together as 
dangerous piratical foe.57 These were joined, in Balthasar de Ayala’s De iure et officiis 
bellicis et disciplina militari (1582), as we saw in Chapter 4, by Protestant Dutch 
insurgents. Neither pirate nor rebel, the Judge Advocate General of the Habsburg army 
in the Low Countries insisted, enjoyed the rights of belligerents—both could 
legitimately be treated like earlier heretics and infidels of medieval holy wars.58 
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Christianity, at least as imagined by the Iberians, was now threatened on three fronts: 
the Ottomans in the Mediterranean, the Dutch in northern Europe, and various 
Protestant pirates in the Atlantic.  
The connection was only strengthened in the early 17th century when many 
English pirates began using the Barbary Coast as a base of operations and, especially, 
when the English state entertained the North African Moors as ‘a probable ally against 
Catholic Spain’.59 In at least one Spanish ballad from 1611, Englishmen, Turks, and 
Moors all sail together as pirates.60 Already in the 16th century, though, Spanish 
representations of Atlantic piracy incorporated these attacks into the ‘grand narrative’ 
of Spain’s imperial mission. In this narrative, Fuchs observes, English incursions into 
Spanish zones were ‘a heavenly scourge visited upon Spain, to be endured as were the 
attacks of Islam’.61 
Such representations are clear in various Spanish texts from the 16th century 
in which Protestant pirates take on a truly demonic form alongside and in tandem with 
the continuing threat of an encroaching Islam. One of the most famous epic poems 
from the period, published a decade after Castellanos’s Elegías, is Lope de Vega’s La 
Dragontea.62 Born in 1562, Lope was a Spanish playwright, poet and novelist, today 
held in Spain in much the same esteem as Cervantes. La Dragontea recounts Drake’s 
final raid on the Spanish Main, his attempt to capture Nombre de Dios, the port in 
Panama from which silver was sent back to Spain. The poem opens with a description 
of the Christian religion under attack: 
Look at my face, blind with tears, 
the Christian religion under siege 
Spain, Italy, and America disturbed 
with native and barbarian swords.63 
Spain is represented by the figure of the Christian religion, la religión cristiana, under 
                                                        
59 Fuchs (2004) 122. 
60 Ibid 151. 
61 Ibid 140. 
62 Lope de Vega, ‘La Dragontea’ [1598], in Collecion de las Obras sueltas, assi em prosa, como en 
verso, de D. Frey Lope Felix de Vega Carpio, del Habito de San Juan (Antonio de Sancha, 1751) 183. 
63 Ibid 186: Mira en mi rostro de mi llanto ciego / la religión cristiana perseguida, / a España, a Italia, 
a América turbadas / de propias, y de bárbaras espadas. Translation in Elizabeth R. Wright, Pilgrimage 
to Patronage: Lope de Vega and the Court of Philip III, 1598-1621 (Bucknell University Press, 2001) 
28. Note that Wright translates bárbaras as ‘foreign’, while I have rendered it instead as barbarian. 
 148 
attack in both Europe and America. Drake’s raid on Panama stands, then, as a 
metaphor for the larger siege of Catholicism, with Spain’s imperial struggle—
valiantly extending Christianity into the New World and fending off heretics and 
infidels—transposed into a biblical frame of reference. Drake is cast by Lope as a 
satanic dragon, the Beast of the Apocalypse, with the struggle against him, as Fuchs 
puts it, ‘a cosmological battle of good against evil’.64 
La religión cristiana, already under attack by Islamic pirates in the 
Mediterranean, begs God to spare her the Dragon’s attack.  
‘Is not Mohammed’s domination enough, 
which causes Italy and Spain so much anxiety? 
Do you also want to grow and spread 
the vile seed of infamous Luther?65 
Again the connection is made between Muslim attacks on Spain and Italy—in the 
latter, Spain controlled Sicily, Naples, Sardinia, and Milan—and piratical Lutheran 
attacks in the New World. If Drake is a creature of Satan, his actions mirror those of 
the Barbary pirates in Algiers and ‘Tripoli, Tunis and Bizerta’. These, Lope writes, 
with reference to the Barbary captivity discussed in Chapter 4, are responsible for the 
‘lost souls who cry for / sad Italy and miserable Spain / captives of the Barbarians who 
adore / the deplorable theft of bodies’.66 
Later, in describing Drake’s attack on Nombre de Dios, Lope draws on 
imagery from the fall of Gothic Spain to invading Moors—the destruction, for 
instance, of the town’s church and relics, a motif common to 16th-century chronicles 
recounting the Moorish invasion.67 Further connections are drawn when the Spaniard, 
Don Diego Suárez de Amaya, exhorts his troops to resist Drake.  
And beyond the fact that Heaven protects us, 
simply our being Spanish compels us 
not to turn the other cheek from the fierce Englishman, 
when with greatest might he seeks and follows us. 
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For per chance the arrow will return 
to the Arabic bow and hand of the enemy, 
and, should it not, we are born to die, 
and will live after death.68 
If they should not resist Drake and turn back the demonic dragon, they risk not only 
capitulation to the heretics in the New World, but also a new Muslim threat to Spain. 
The poem closes with Drake’s death, slain finally by Philip II, a scene depicted 
on the frontispiece of the work’s 1598 edition. Drake, here again cast as the Dragon 
of the Apocalypse, wrestles with an eagle, his slayer: Philip II as the archangel 
Michael.69 With Drake dead, Philip III—Lope authored the poem shortly after Philip 
II’s death—is free to turn back to the Mediterranean, to Christianity’s other enemies. 
La religión cristiana makes a final plea, singling out once more the Muslim pirate that 
he too may now be crushed: 
Oh Great Lord, who humiliates the giant, 
turn your eyes to the humble David, 
to the Moor turned arrogant pirate 
loaded with Catholic spoils: 
turn, eternal thunderous Jupiter, 
the rays of your strength and fury 
onto my enemies and those of Spain 
whose harm, Lord, afflicts and hurts me.70 
Lope’s poem was far from unique. La Dragontea, Cañizares-Esguerra suggests, was 
characteristic of efforts to cast ‘the battles against Satan in the New World as episodes 
in a global struggle’, one in which Muslim pirates in the Mediterranean and Protestant 
pirates in the Caribbean, each played a role.71 These and other similar narratives 
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enabled, to use Fuchs’s phrase, ‘the discursive consolidation of a Spanish identity 
eternally committed to the defense of the Faith’.72 
This religious identity attaching to the pirate overshadowed the legal 
distinctions developing elsewhere in Europe. Bartolus’s 1354 treatise on reprisals, 
discussed in Chapter 3, would only be printed for the first time in 1588 in Basel.73 Its 
influence, of course, was already widespread and, as we have seen, the legitimacy of 
maritime depredation turned for many legal thinkers on sovereign license. Some of 
the Protestant pirates making sail for the New World carried letters of marque or 
enjoyed official crown support, covert or open. Many more did not. The degree of 
crown support enjoyed by Drake—and the extent to which Elizabeth appreciated his 
voyage would be one of plunder—has been the subject of extensive debate. Yet such 
nuances were of minor importance in Spanish determinations. Certainly, Spanish 
victims of English piracy on occasion took their complaints to the English Admiralty 
Court seeking the return of booty or reprisal for spoiled goods.74 But for Spanish 
authorities, it mattered little whether a Protestant interloper held an official 
commission from a European prince. Whether Drake, say, was plundering in his own 
name or that of the queen was neither here nor there: in either case he was impeding 
Spain’s missionary activity and undermining the Catholic Church’s authority. 
The piratical identity attaching to Drake and others, and the enmity in which 
they were held, rested primarily on their heretical character and incorporation into a 
grand religious narrative. It is telling, as Policante observes, that one finds few 
references in historical records to a corsario inglés, francés or holandés. Those 
captured were defined not by their nationality but by their religious beliefs: corsarios 
luteranos.75 Moreover, they were tried not before regular colonial courts but by the 
Inquisition. By the time the Holy Office of the Inquisition arrived in Spanish America 
in the mid-16th century, Lutheranism had become a common charge, used to denounce 
various beliefs and non-orthodox practices.76 Indeed, the establishment of Inquisitorial 
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tribunals in the Americas was motivated, in the first place, by the threat of 
Protestantism within urban colonial communities—a threat posed by alumbrados, for 
instance, whose practice of silent prayer and direct communion with God looked 
suspiciously Lutheran, but also by contact with foreign heretics arriving in the Indies.77 
In 1570, 38 English sailors were tried for heresy by the Inquisition in Mexico. In 1578, 
the Lima tribunal confirmed that any English corsairs captured would be treated and 
tried as heretics.78 Two years later it found John Oxenham, one-time companion of 
Drake, guilty of heresy, for which he was hanged and, as legend has it, his body burned 
on the stake.79 The records of the Inquisition are replete with similar trials of 
luteranos—records in which the terms luteranos, corsarios, and piratas are used 
interchangeably.80 
ENGLISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEPREDATION AT SEA 
Drake’s depredations against the Spanish empire in the Americas were, we have seen, 
incorporated into a religious narrative of Spain’s imperial mission. This ideological 
frame reproduced the figure of the pirates once more as a demonic, heretical foe—an 
enemy of a universal Christendom now extended to the New World. Like all 
ideologies, however, it was rooted in the concrete conjuncture, one in which the 
Habsburg empire faced not only a religious but also a material threat from new 
imperial formations, most importantly a nascent English empire. 
In England, imperial interests also took on religious shape. Thomas Dekker’s 
play, The Whore of Babylon, offered an allegory of Elizabethan England at war with 
Rome, the latter cast, in keeping with a long anti-papal tradition, as the empress of 
Babylon, the ‘whore’ of the play’s title.81 John Foxe’s violently anti-Catholic Acts and 
Monuments,82 cited in Chapter 4, fuelled the view of English raiders as ‘seaborne 
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crusaders of the Protestant Reformation’.83 Thus for some, as John Appleby writes, 
‘the plunder of Spain was projected as a patriotic duty, as a means of defending the 
Protestant cause while weakening the “great whore of Babylon”’.84 Indeed, Foxe and 
Drake themselves were close friends, the former viewing Drake as a ‘true warrior of 
the faith’, while the latter is reported to have read extracts from Acts and Monuments 
to Spanish prisoners during his 1587 Caribbean expedition.85 Yet, while in both Spain 
and England imperial interests were given expression in religious discourses, attitudes 
towards the figure of the pirate differed. Whereas in Spanish legal thought, the pirate 
remained in the 16th century a figure of extreme religious enmity, the English position 
was more ambiguous.  
English maritime depredation in the early 1500s varied in pattern. In local 
waters around England, especially on the country’s southern coast, ‘petty plunder’ 
flourished and was indiscriminate and widespread. Small-scale, short-range venturing 
by poorly armed ships was common, often supported by coastal communities and 
protected by local officials.86 In some regions, such as south-west England, sea-raiding 
was a long-standing tradition, whereas elsewhere, such as in the north-east of the 
country, plunder was more opportunistic and occasional.87 
Efforts were taken to suppress such depredation. In 1443, Henry VI had 
ordered that restitution be made to Englishmen so accosted. Much like other early laws 
in the Mediterranean discussed in Chapter 3, this order was concerned entirely with 
the question of property rights, with no suggestion of criminal penalty attaching to 
those identified as a pirate (pirata).88 A 1490 Proclamation by Henry VII went 
somewhat further, complaining of ‘divers and moneyfold spoliations and robberies’ 
committed by ‘enemyes as by other pirattis and robbers’.89 The term pirates (or 
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pirattis) is left undefined, and no distinction is made between these and the other 
enemies and robbers referenced. Nor is the immediate concern the acts of depredation 
themselves, but rather that the condemned ‘daily resorte into divers portes and places 
of this his realme of England’ where the parties in question ‘sell their prises, spoiles, 
and pillages’.90 The Proclamation thus commands that no one in the king’s realm shall 
comfort, take or receive ‘any of the said mysdoers, ne any merchandisez or goodes by 
them spoiled or takyn’.91 Punishment for the ‘enemyes’, ‘pirattis’ and ‘robbers’ is not 
mentioned, only for the receivers of their goods in England. Indeed, no legal 
consequences attach to the pirates at all. 
In short, acts of theft at sea attracted no exceptional treatment under English 
law at this time. Indeed, repression of maritime plunder in English waters was largely 
left to local interests. As early as 1486 Henry VII reached an agreement with the 
northern port of Hull under which the mayor and aldermen would take sureties from 
English ships against piratical activity.92 Suppression of robbery, both on sea and land, 
depended on the power of local gentry. These, however, were often the very same 
people responsible for the depredation of which they were tasked with stamping out.93 
The first suggestion of criminality attaching to ‘pirates’ is found in a 1535 
statute, complaining in its preamble of ‘pirates, thieves, robbers and murders upon the 
sea’ who ‘many times escape unpunished’.94 Yet reference to pirates is dropped in the 
substantive text of the statute. A nearly identical statute the following year again 
dropped reference to pirates in its substantive text, the invocation in both preambles 
apparently used as a general pejorative rather than in any technical legal sense.95 The 
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statute sought to extend common law punishment of robbery, murder, etc. to those 
acts committed on the sea (i.e., outside the common law courts’ jurisdiction). It did 
not create any new common law offense or felony, but rather gave a means of trying, 
before Admiralty commissions, robbery, murder, etc. at sea by the common law, with 
attendant criminal penalties, as if they had been ‘done upon the land’.96 There is no 
suggestion that the statutes enjoyed any extraterritorial reach beyond the jurisdiction 
already enjoyed by the Admiral, which included vessels flying English colours outside 
the realm, but not foreign vessels. 
As the 16th century progressed, English depredation grew more varied. Small-
scale, opportunistic spoil in English waters continued, but was joined by more 
systematic plunder of trade routes further afield. Two factors were central to this 
development. First, the aggressive foreign policy of Henry VIII, from the 1520s to the 
1540s, saw the state encourage depredations against French shipping in and beyond 
the Channel.97 Reprisals, by now firmly rooted in international relations as a legitimate 
means for merchants to recover losses from the subjects of foreign states, were 
dispensed indiscriminately in times of war, any concern for the careful rationalizations 
of Bartolus’s concilia long forgotten. This private, commercial depredation, deployed 
for strategic purposes in the absence of large-scale professional navies, became known 
as ‘privateering’. Of course, the line between legitimate privateering and illegitimate 
plunder was fluid, the spoils of war no less attractive when unsanctioned in peacetime. 
Second, for a growing London bourgeoisie with aggressive commercial 
ambitions, organised large-scale plunder promised exciting opportunities for profit. 
Localised plunder thus gave way to more ambitious depredation reaching ever further 
into the Atlantic, epitomised by the voyages of trade-cum-plunder by individuals such 
as John Hawkins.98 In October 1562, a fleet under Hawkins’s command set out from 
Plymouth, financed by investments from London, including from the royal court. 
Stopping in Tenerife, the fleet sailed on to Cape Verde and continued down the Guinea 
coast. There, Hawkins filled his ships with slaves, ‘stealing some from Portuguese 
traders, capturing others on his own, and finally taking a Portuguese vessel to carry 
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the slaves that could not be crammed into his own holds’.99 The Triangular trade took 
Hawkins on to the West Indies and South America where his human cargo was sold 
to Spanish colonists, happy for the English slavers to undercut the Iberian monopoly. 
Throughout the 1560s, English depredations swelled with Spanish shipping 
increasingly its target. As early as 1560, the Spanish ambassador complained that 80 
subjects, primarily from the Low Countries, had been victims of English pirates.100 
The renewal of Anglo-French hostilities in 1562 saw a new wave of privateering 
commissions, under the cover of which English depredators intensified their 
entrepreneurial plunder also of Iberian shipping. Spanish ports—peninsular and in the 
Canary Islands—were increasingly their target. Returning from a slaving voyage to 
London in 1564, Hawkins found strenuous protests by the Portuguese and Spanish 
ambassadors to his intrusions into the Indies, on the Iberian view, as we have seen, the 
exclusive preserve of Catholic merchants.101 Elizabeth and her counsellors were happy 
to earn a generous return on their investments in Hawkins’ voyages but could not 
openly support depredation. Hawkins was called upon to post a £500 bond and 
promise to not travel again to the Indies that year.102  
Tensions between England and the Iberian monarchies increased throughout 
the 1560s, centred initially around English penetration of the Guinea trade, its 
opportunities for both commerce and pillage attractive to promoters in London. For 
the Spanish and Portuguese, as we have seen, interlopers were pirates. The English 
court, though, defended its merchants’ freedom to trade in West Africa. A pattern 
emerged wherein tacit approval of depredation from the English crown went hand in 
hand with public proclamations condemning plunder of Spanish shipping. In 
November 1564, with Philip II’s remonstrations ever louder, Elizabeth reported to the 
Spanish ambassador that ‘she had ordered her subjects not to go to places where the 
[Spanish] King held sway, and if they contravened these orders she would have them 
punished’.103 And in 1569, she denounced ‘all pyrats and rovers upon the seas’, 
pronouncing them ‘to be out of her protection, and lawfully to be by any person taken, 
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punished, and suppressed with extremity’.104 Meanwhile, though, members of her 
court were increasingly active in the Guinea trade: the Queen loaned ships to Guinea 
traders and her councillors were members of the trading syndicates sponsoring their 
voyages.105 
The Guinea trade, and the attendant efforts of Hawkins and others to break into 
the transatlantic slave trade, promoted an ambiguous intermingling of aggressive 
commercial trade and outright depredation. Hawkins’ voyages to the Caribbean had 
highlighted Iberian intransigence to peaceful commercial relations in the New World, 
while also flagging the vulnerability of colonial settlements to pillage. The 1570s saw 
what Appleby describes as an ‘outburst of marauding in the Caribbean by the English’, 
of which Drake was at the forefront.106 In 1569 and again in 1571 and 1572, Drake set 
out on raiding voyages to the Caribbean. Working with Huguenot rovers and assisted 
by cimarrons—escaped African slaves—he plundered the Panama isthmus, returning 
to England with sizeable booty.  
Needless to say, Drake’s depredations lacked any legitimacy, legal or 
otherwise, in Spanish eyes. Although he presented his voyages as exercises in 
reprisal—the Battle of San Juan de Ulúa (1568), during which five English ships were 
lost to the Spanish, was regularly cited—Drake in fact possessed no commission. Nor, 
despite growing animosity, were Spain and England at war. On the by now 
longstanding rules of reprisal, the Spanish were quite justified in seeing Drake’s acts 
of plunder as clearly illegitimate (in addition to the illegitimacy they attached to him 
as a Lutheran interloper). But so too did Drake’s actions appear illegitimate under the 
approach taken by the English admiralty towards robbery and plunder in English 
waters. Was this not robbery as extended to the sea by the 1535 and 1536 statutes? 
Schmitt has argued that in the 16th century, starting with the lines of amity 
agreed at Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, the New World was conceptually and juridically 
set off from Europe. A new frontier delineated the ‘open spaces’ of the New World 
and the free seas: 
At this ‘line’, Europe ended and the ‘New World’ began. At any rate, 
European law, i.e., ‘European public law’, ended here. Consequently, 
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so, too, did the bracketing of war achieved by traditional European 
international law, meaning that here the struggle for land-appropriation 
knew no bounds. Beyond the line was an ‘overseas’ zone in which, for 
want of any legal limits to war, only the law of the stronger applied.107 
In the anomic space beyond the line, ‘force could be used freely and ruthlessly’ in the 
appropriation of new land by Europeans.108 But this division also, Schmitt observed, 
gave ‘free rein’ for looting, piratical plunder and pillage outside the jus publicum 
Europaeum.109 
Without citing Schmitt, Eliga Gould describes a remarkably similar conception 
of a division of planetary space, one with a hold specifically on English thinkers. 
Starting in the 16th century, they ‘accepted an image of Britain’s Atlantic periphery 
as a region “beyond the line,” a zone of conflicting laws where Britons were free to 
engage in forms of violence and exploitation that were unacceptable whether in Britain 
proper or in Europe’s law-bound state system’.110  
Acts of violence and plunder in the New World, like those of Drake, were most 
certainly ‘beyond the line’. For the English, such violence directed at the Spanish was 
not only legitimate, then, but even increasingly necessary in light of their growing 
imperial ambitions. 
PLUNDER IN THE SERVICE OF EMPIRE 
Until the middle of the 16th century, London had been largely peripheral to the nascent 
world economy. The great majority of England’s overseas trade was carried by foreign 
merchants, the country’s connection to Mediterranean markets dependent on Florence, 
Genoa and Venice. A single merchant organisation, the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers, sold the country’s only significant export, cloth, primarily through 
Antwerp. In the second half of the century, however, as Ottoman power weakened the 
                                                        
107 Carl Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. 
G.L. Ulmen (Telos, 2006) [1950] 93-94. 
108 Ibid 94. 
109 ‘The fact that the thoroughly Catholic King of France aligned himself with dangerous heretics and 
wild pirates . . . against the Catholic King of Spain and, together with such allies, pillaged Spanish cities 
in the Americas, can be explained only by the fact that these pirate raids were undertakings “beyond 
the line”.’ Ibid 93. 
110 Eliga H. Gould, ‘Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, 
circa 1772’ 60 The William and Mary Quarterly (2003) 471, 474. 
 158 
Italian grip on Mediterranean trade, English merchants became increasingly active. 
The 1570s, in particular, saw a dramatic expansion of English merchant capital as new 
overseas links were forged. New forms of collective investment, systems of credit and 
join-stock companies such as the Levant Company allowed the London merchant 
community to open up long-distance commerce and cement England’s role in an 
expanding global system of trade.111  
While trade with the Levant market, in particular, flourished, Habsburg 
hegemony in the New World closed off potentially valuable markets for English 
exports, especially English cloth. In his 1580 pamphlet ‘A Discourse of the 
Commodity of the Taking of the Straight of Magellanus’, Hakluyt warned of the 
dangers of the Spanish monopoly: ‘whenever the rule and government of the East & 
West Indies, and there several isles and territories shalbe in one Prince, they neither 
will receive English cloth nor yet care for anie vente of their commodities to us, having 
then so manie places of their owne to make vente and enterchange of ther 
commodities’.112 The need to secure new markets for textiles, Claire Jowitt notes, was 
especially acute following the loss of access to the overseas Antwerp trade routes. 
English support for the Dutch in their rebellion against Spanish rule had seen them 
barred and the Americas offered ‘potentially illimitable’ new markets.113  
The 1570s and 80s saw a surge of propaganda in support of, on the one hand, 
English expansion and, on the other hand, violent efforts to undermine the Spanish 
monopoly. In his Discourse Concerning Western Planting (1584), Hakluyt opined on 
the benefits of colonial settlement in the New World, lauding Walter Raleigh’s efforts 
to establish a colony at Roanoke.114 Westward expansion that challenged the Spanish 
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monopoly on the West Indies, Hakluyt argued, might ‘bringe King Phillippe from his 
highe throne’ and ‘make him equall to the princes his neighboures’.115 The limits of 
Spanish dominion in the West Indies, he insisted, was ‘nothinge so large as is generally 
ymagined and surmized’.116 Here was an explicit rejection of the papal donations and 
an insistence that Elizabeth’s own title to the West Indies was ‘more lawfull and righte 
than the Spaniardes’.117 
Already in 1562 Elizabeth had insisted on English access to the Americas. 
‘[N]othing will bring these people to their senses’, wrote Philip’s ambassador when 
informed of the queen’s refusal to accept Spanish claims to monopoly backed by papal 
award.118 Seven years later, Antonio de Guaras, a Spanish agent in London, wrote to 
the Duke of Alba to report Elizabeth’s continued insistence ‘that Englishmen abroad 
shall enjoy their liberties . . . that they shall be free to go with merchandise to the 
Indies, and that neither in Flanders nor Spain, shall they be molested in person or 
property for their heresies’.119 Unsurprisingly, de Guaras dismissed the queen’s 
demands as ‘absurd pretensions’.120 For colonial promoters like Hakluyt, violent 
conflict with Spain, in the face of their intransigence, was an inevitable corollary of 
English attempts to access new markets and fashion a maritime empire.  
Still, Elizabeth was not willing to countenance a direct assault on Spanish 
possessions in the New World, preferring covert support for plunder by English 
depredators. As Ludwig Dehio puts it, ‘Elizabeth, manoeuvring cautiously, disavowed 
them as need arose, while silently furthering their ends’.121 Drake’s 1977 voyage, 
famous for his circumnavigation of the globe, epitomised this stance. Elizabeth and 
her ministers’ support for Drake remained secret; publicly, this was to be a voyage of 
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trade to Alexandria and Constantinople.122 In reality, the plunder of Spanish wealth in 
the New World was Drake’s chief concern.123 
The earliest English accounts of Drake’s voyage were notably sparse, likely 
constrained by fears of Spanish retaliation. The first published commemoration of his 
circumnavigation was Nicholas Breton’s brief encomium, A discourse in 
commendation of the valiant gentleman, maister Frauncis Drake, with a reioysing of 
his happy adventures (1581).124 A poem of 18 lines followed by a short eulogy, the 
work celebrated Drake finding ‘the Land where Treasure lyes, the way to come by it 
and honor by the getting of it’ but was otherwise short on details .125 After the outbreak 
of war between England and Spain in 1585, such concerns were no longer pressing. A 
lengthier account, already quoted at the start of this chapter, followed in Hakluyt’s The 
Principall Navigations (1589), celebrating Drake’s voyage and depredations.126 
In her close reading of Hakluyt’s account, Jowitt shows how the ideologue for 
English empire placed Drake’s voyage within a broader narrative construction of 
English imperial aspirations. Hakluyt championed an English ‘mercantile 
nationalism’, seeing in commercial expansion the means both to future economic 
prosperity—through the export of English cloth to new markets—and to challenge 
Iberian dominance.127 In this context, Drake’s violence against an imperial rival, 
especially one intent on excluding England from potentially profitable new markets, 
was presented ‘not as criminal activity, but as a standard aspect of early modern 
mercantile behaviour in disputed colonial regions’.128 Violent depredation, at least 
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when pursued ‘beyond the line’, was, in Hakluyt’s construction, simply a ‘form of 
business practise . . . designed to ensure a share of profitable markets overseas’.129 For 
the English, it was Iberian monopoly that was illegitimate, Drake’s ‘piracy’ 
understood, and celebrated, as an anti-monopolistic practice, a ‘type of patriotic trade’ 
central to the country’s new imperial and commercial project.130 
A NEW IMPERIAL FORMATION 
That project, premised, in Hakluyt’s vision on violent depredation, represented the 
rising influence of merchant capital in the English state. ‘Commercial capital’, Marx 
would write, ‘when it holds a dominant position, is thus in all cases a system of 
plunder’, its development ‘directly bound up with violent plunder [and] piracy’.131 
With the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish war in 1585, depredations increased further—
some 200 ships dispatched each year to ‘hunt and rob the Spaniards in the West indies 
and on the high seas’.132 By 1588, Elizabeth I was ‘mistress of the most powerful navy 
Europe had ever seen’,133 largely thanks to the long rehearsal of seaborne violence by 
depredators like Drake. Depredation, in short, laid the foundations for English 
maritime power. 
Yet the nascent English commercial expansion spurred by merchant capital 
would fundamentally transform the nature of English economic power.134 By early in 
the 17th century, the country had developed ‘a complex network of trade, involving 
products of many lands’ and exchanged its ‘passive, dependent role in Europe’s 
trading system for an active, independent role in the world’.135 Increasingly, piratical 
raiding appeared anachronistic to English imperialism. As Robin Blackburn puts it, 
Drake and his fellow depredators belonged ‘to the prehistory of English colonialism’, 
                                                        
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid 58, 66. 
131 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach (Penguin Books, 
1981) [1867] 448-49. 
132 Quinn (1984) 24.  
133 Garrett Mattingly quoted in Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (New Left Books, 
1974) 134. 
134 See Rabb (1967) 2-3. 
135 Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the 
British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge University Press, 1984) 8-9. 
 162 
their ‘gold lust and preference for booty . . . inimical to regular commerce’.136 Piracy, 
even ‘beyond the line’, came to be viewed as at odds with trade and England’s self-
perception as a merchant nation. Maritime depredation, once handmaiden to English 
imperialism, was now a threat. This new attitude would soon find formal expression 
in the work of a young Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, to whom the next chapter now 
turns. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The pirate as universal enemy of commerce 
Early on 25 February 1603, three Dutch ships under the command of Jacob van 
Heemskerck sighted a Portuguese carrack anchored in the mouth of the Johor River 
estuary to the east of the island of Singapore. The carrack, the Santa Catarina, was 
large by the standards of the time, about 1400 tons. Van Heemskerck’s trading voyage 
had thus far been disappointing and, after almost two years at sea, his cargo holds 
remained empty. The Portuguese ship would likely be heavily laden with goods from 
China and its capture would turn his fortunes. A decision was made: the Dutch would 
seize the ship and its cargo. A battle ensued for much of the day until, as night was 
falling, the Portuguese captain surrendered. The crew’s lives were spared, but the ship 
and its cargo were forfeited and returned with van Heemskerck to Amsterdam where 
they were auctioned for some 3.5 million Dutch guilders, approximately three hundred 
thousand pounds sterling.1 
In Amsterdam, van Heemskerck’s attack was greeted with some consternation. 
As the young jurist Hugo Grotius would soon write, many ‘hesitate to approve of the 
prize, apparently regarding it as something wrongfully acquired and illegitimate’.2 
Although trade and plunder still often went hand in hand, Van Heemskerck’s voyage 
to the East Indies was understood by many to have been foremost a trading venture; 
his commission from Prince Maurice, the Lord High Admiral of Holland, did not 
authorize him to engage in offensive warfare. Nor did his instructions from his 
employers, the United Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
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Compagnie; VOC). He was to use force only in self-defence or to obtain reparations 
for injuries.3 There was nothing in his commission to justify the seizure of the Santa 
Catarina when he had been neither attacked nor harmed by the Portuguese. Was this 
not then a clear case of illegitimate depredation? Indeed, as Martine van Ittersum 
shows in her careful study of the Dutch captain’s extant correspondence, van 
Heemskerck himself recognised that it would be considered such, were he not to 
present it otherwise.4  
Either the seizure was a legitimate prize in which van Heemskerck and the 
VOC held a legal right, or the attack was an ignoble act of piracy and the ship and 
cargo should be returned to its owners. In September 1604, the Amsterdam Admiralty 
Court validated the Santa Catarina and its wares as legitimate prize.5 Shortly before 
the Court’s decision was handed down, the VOC commissioned the precocious jurist 
Hugo Grotius, or Huig de Groot, to author an apologia for the seizure. 
The Admiralty Court’s verdict, while settling the legal status of the prize, was 
an unfortunate tangle of ‘loosely related arguments’—self-defence, just war doctrine, 
natural law and the law of nations were all invoked, albeit not always coherently.6 The 
VOC directors looked to Grotius to put some order into the legal justification for the 
seizure, not so much for reasons of legal pedantry but, more importantly, to garner 
‘widespread political support for their cause, both domestically and internationally’.7 
The diplomatic support of France and England, for instance, was essential in the young 
Dutch Republic’s rebellion against Habsburg Spain (and Portugal, united as it was 
with Spain under one crown from 1580 until 1640), as well as in the VOC’s 
increasingly forceful penetration of the East Indies.  
The VOC thus sought an advertisement of Portuguese iniquity, an account of 
‘perfidy, tyranny and hostility’ that justified the seizure. Yet Grotius had other designs: 
what was initially intended to be a brief and quickly published pamphlet became, in 
                                                        
3 van Ittersum, Profit and Principle (2006) 10, 22. 
4 Ibid 53. 
5 The court’s decision is reproduced in Grotius (2006) 510-14 As in England, captains were to bring 
any seized goods back to their home port where it would be inventoried and a determination made 
whether the captain’s commission was legal and thus whether any plunder was legal prize. 
6 Martine Julia van Ittersum, ‘Hugo Grotius in Context: Van Heemskerck’s Capture of the Santa 
Catarina and its Justification in De Jure Praedae (1604-1606)’ 31 Asian Journal of Social Science 
(2003) 511, 521; van Ittersum, Profit and Principle (2006) 53. 
7 van Ittersum, Profit and Principle (2006) 25. 
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Grotius’s hands, an extended study of the ‘universal laws of war’ which would 
ultimately ‘revolutionis[e] natural law and natural rights theories’.8 The resulting 
treatise is commonly known as De iure praedae commentarius or Commentary on the 
Law of Prize and Booty and remained unpublished in Grotius’s lifetime.9 
If paling in comparison to the attention paid to Grotius’s other major texts, De 
iure praedae has in recent years been subjected to a number of close readings.10 
Although it remained unpublished during his own lifetime, a single chapter was 
published anonymously in 1609 as De mare liberum (The Free Sea) sparking heated 
debate with leading legal contemporaries—John Selden, William Welwood, Seraphim 
de Freitas—disputing Grotius’s thesis on the freedom of the seas.11 No less 
significantly, De iure praedae already set out the framework for Grotius’s major 
contribution to international law in De iure belli ac Pacis, first published in Paris in 
1625. 
More importantly, however, for present purposes, is the role piracy plays in De 
iure praedae. Grotius’s foremost concern in this work, this chapter argues, is to 
establish the legitimacy of Dutch commercial expansion into the East Indies and the 
violence attendant on, and implicit in, that expansion. Grotius’s thinking clearly 
                                                        
8 van Ittersum, ‘Introduction’ (2006) xvii; see also Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: 
Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford University Press, 1999) 
78-108. 
9 Grotius’s manuscript itself bore no title; De iure praedae commentarius was the title given the text by 
its first editor. Grotius himself referred to the text in his correspondence as De rebus Indicis (On Indian 
Matters). The work consists of 15 chapters. Grotius began, in chapters one and two, with an elaboration 
of a theory of justice. This led in the following eight chapters to an analysis of just war. Chapter 11 is 
concerned with setting out the historical background leading to the seizure of the Santa Catarina. 
Grotius then applies the law of war, developed in the earlier chapters, to the facts of the seizure. Chapter 
12 explains the seizure as a case of just private war, while the following chapter considers the taking as 
a case of just public war. The work concludes with two chapters justifying the seizure as not only 
legitimate, but also honourable and beneficial.  
10 The leading study is van Ittersum, Profit and Principle (2006). Other important works include 
Borschberg (2011), Tuck (1999); Ileana M. Porras, ‘Constructing International Law in the East Indian 
Seas: Property, Sovereignty, Commerce and War in Hugo Grotius’ De Iure Praedae—The Law of Prize 
and Booty, or “On How to Distinguish Merchants from Pirates”’ 31 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 741 (2006) 741; Eric Wilson, Savage Republic: De Indis of Hugo Grotius, Republicanism and 
Dutch Hegemony within the Early Modern World-System (c. 1600-1619) (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). 
11 Mare liberum is in essence a revision of chapter 12 of De iure praedae. Its publication in 1609, at 
the urging of the VOC, came in the context of Spanish-Dutch truce negotiations. While the larger tract 
focused on a specific case of maritime plunder (as discussed below), Mare liberum instead was 
concerned with the broader issue of the Dutch’s claim to a sweeping right of access to the seas. See 
Martine Julia van Ittersum, ‘The long goodbye: Hugo Grotius’ justification of Dutch expansion 
overseas, 1615-1645 36(4) History of European Ideas (2010) 386, 388; Porras (2007) 747. On Grotius’s 
contribution to the freedom of the seas doctrine, see W.E. Butler, ‘Grotius and the Law of the Sea’, in 
Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations 
(Clarendon, 1992) 212. 
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emerged in a particular conjuncture. Martine van Ittersum’s Profit and Principle 
reconstructs the origins of Grotius’s manuscript against the background of Dutch 
commercial penetration of the East Indies, identifying him as an ardent advocate of 
Dutch imperialism. But Dutch commercial expansion was itself connected with a 
broader phenomenon, namely the consolidation of merchant capitalism in western 
Europe and the emergence of a capitalist world economy. As Martti Koskenniemi has 
noted, Grotius ‘gave legal articulation’ to a particular world, one marked by the 
‘emergence of new types of economic relationship’.12 Koskenniemi traces Grotius’s 
contribution to the legal forms undergirding ‘the expansion over the whole world of 
that system of productive and mercantile relations that we are used to calling 
“capitalism”’.13 
The novelty of Grotius’s argument, this chapter suggests, lay in his claiming 
for a private commercial company certain rights—for instance, the right to undertake 
armed aggression on the high seas—usually associated with state sovereignty. 
Grotius’s task was to establish the legitimacy of an act of violent acquisition that was 
otherwise not just legally, but also morally, dubious. In doing so, he set out a doctrine 
of natural rights legitimising mercantile violence with far-reaching implications for 
world-historical processes of accumulation. But legitimacy and illegitimacy are two 
sides of the same coin: the legitimacy of certain practices was necessarily structured 
by a corresponding notion of illegitimacy, represented in Grotius’s treatise by the 
figure of the pirate. In grounding the legitimacy of commercial violence in a theory of 
natural rights, Grotius did more than simply reproduce the pirate as illegitimate 
depredator. Rather, the pirate was invested, as the chapter argues, with new 
opprobrium, the transgressor of natural law and the ‘other’ to the legitimate violence 
of mercantile capitalism.  
A NEW KIND OF STATE 
The rise of Dutch commercial power in the late 16th and early 17th century was a 
defining moment in the emergence of capitalism in western Europe that would 
                                                        
12 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and the Emergence of Mercantile Capitalism: Grotius to 
Smith’, in Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Vincent Chetail (eds), The Roots of International Law / Les 
fondements du droit international: Liber Amicorum Peter Haggenmacher (Brill, 2013) 1, 26. 
13 Ibid 11-12. 
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eventually see the ascendance of a ‘new bourgeois society that gradually came to 
dominate all spheres of human activity’.14 The emergence of capitalism was a gradual 
and uneven process, a ‘series of stages and transitions’, in Braudel’s words.15 Many 
of the features we associate with capitalist society existed in the pre-capitalist world, 
as did basic legal forms such as property and contract.16 Markets and commodity 
exchange had existed under feudalism—‘[f]eudal production relations, like those of 
the tributary mode, are consistent with extensive commodity exchanges’17—and small 
centres of merchant capitalism had crystallised, as we saw in Chapter 3, in urban 
centres in Northern and Central Italy even before the 15th century, as well as in the 
Netherlands, England, and parts of France, Germany, Bohemia and Catalonia. But 
these were sporadic moments and did not represent ‘the subsumption of significant 
numbers of economic actors under capitalist relations’.18 
The ‘most decisive moment’ in the emergence of capitalism as a world-
historical force, then, was not the mere ‘proliferation of elements of capitalist 
enterprise across Europe’—as Giovanni Arrighi observes, ‘[e]lements of this kind had 
occurred throughout the Eurasian trading system’.19 Unique, though, to Europe in the 
16th century, was the coalescence of these elements of capitalism ‘into the powerful 
mix that propelled European states towards the territorial conquest of the world and 
the formation of an all-powerful and truly global capitalist world-economy’.20 An 
essential element in this process—perhaps even the most important, as Arrighi has 
it—was the transition from ‘scattered to concentrated capitalist power’ leading to ‘the 
unique fusion of state and capital, which was realized nowhere more favorably for 
capitalism than in Europe.’21 
If it was in the city-states of northern Italy where state and capital first fused—
in Venice, Genoa and Florence, in particular—it was in the United Provinces where 
                                                        
14 Ernest Mandel, The Place of Marxism in History (Humanity Books, 1996) 1. 
15 Fernand Braudel, The Perspective of the World (Harper & Row, 1984) 92. 
16 Tor Krever, ‘The rule of law and the rise of capitalism’, in Christopher May & Adam Winchester 
(eds), Handbook on the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming). 
17 Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and the Global Political Economy (Wiley, 2013) 127. 
18 Ibid 127. 
19 Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times, 2nd 
ed. (Verso, 2010) 11. 
20 Ibid 12. 
21 Ibid. 
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this alliance reached its early apogee. The Netherlands had long been home to major 
trading centres in the European economy. Antwerp, in particular, was a centre for trade 
in spices, textiles, sugar and metals, while Amsterdam, further north, was by the late 
15th century becoming a major trading port. From the mid-1500s, the largely 
Protestant Provinces of the Netherlands struggled against the rule of Catholic Philip 
II, who acceded to the Spanish throne in 1556. Although the northern Provinces 
declared independence in 1581—the southern Provinces, initially joining the revolt, 
submitted to Spain—an end to the war, and de jure Dutch independence, came only in 
1648. 
With de facto freedom from absolutist Habsburg Spain, a new form of state 
emerged in the nascent Dutch Republic, ‘a confederation of provinces that maintained 
their autonomy and were governed largely by civic administrations in the cities’.22 
This novel juridico-political form of state had important implications for the economic 
development of the United Provinces and their eventual dominance, along with 
England, of the world economy. As Christopher Hill has observed, ‘[a]n absolute 
monarch with a standing army and a permanent bureaucracy may intermittently favour 
trade and industry for its own military purposes; but it can control them. The looser, 
freer Dutch and English states allowed capitalist interest to dominate permanently.’23 
Or in Braudel’s words, in the United Provinces, the state ‘governed for the benefit and 
even according to the directives of the businessmen, merchants, and money-lenders’.24 
The Dutch state was, in short, ‘a federation of urban mercantile elites’.25 Here, 
with the alienation of the state to a merchant capitalist oligarchy, was the quintessential 
embodiment of Marx and Engels’ description of the capitalist state, ‘but a committee 
for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’.26 ‘In no other society’, 
Ellen Wood writes, ‘not even the Italian city-states, was public authority so intricately 
                                                        
22 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Liberty & Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought from 
Renaissance to Enlightenment (Verso, 2012) 111. 
23 Christopher Hill, ‘Braudel and the State’, in Collected Essays, vol. 3 (Harvester Press, 1986) 132, 
140. 
24 Braudel (1977) 64-65. Like Hill, Braudel sees the same phenomenon, if later in England: ‘Likewise, 
in England the Glorious Revolution of 1688 marked the accession of business similar to that in 
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predominated’: David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford University Press, 2005) 91-92. 
25 Callinicos (2013) 130. 
26 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Verso, 2012) [1848] 37. 
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bound up with commercial dominance.’ Ruled by commercial interests, ‘who 
identified the public interest with commercial profit’, there was at best a ‘hazy line’ 
between the state and commercial enterprise.27 
The emergence of the United Provinces as one of the first capitalist states was 
not solely the result of intra-European developments. The latter, as Alex Callinicos 
observes, were themselves closely entwined with ‘geopolitical conflict and mercantile 
ambitions’ pushing ‘European states and private adventurers to seek wealth in the rest 
of the world’.28 The ‘reorganization of [national] political space in the interest of 
capital accumulation’29 allowed the Dutch state to pursue overseas commerce. The 
United Provinces’ development of capitalism, and their prosperity, rested, in the final 
analysis, on commercial expansion into the extra-European world. By the mid-17th 
century, Amsterdam would become the centre of world trade: ‘Except for Britain after 
around 1780’, writes Jonathan Israel, ‘no one power in history ever achieved so great 
a preponderance over the processes of world trade as did the Dutch, for a century and 
a half, from the end of the sixteenth century down to the early eighteenth century.’30 
Trade abroad, in turn, generated industrial production at home—in fine 
textiles, for example, the skilled producers of which had migrated north en masse from 
the southern provinces early in the Dutch Revolt, and in shipbuilding.31 But the 
relationship between trade and economic development was not unidirectional: the 
Dutch dominance of global mercantile trade itself rested on the development in the 
United Provinces of a capitalist economy with a dynamic of rising productivity.32 
                                                        
27 Wood (2012) 129. Koskenniemi, too, observes that ‘public interest in the United Provinces was 
intertwined with the interests of the merchant classes and the growth of commerce’. Koskenniemi 
(2013) 19. 
28 Callinicos (2013) 127. 
29 Arrighi (2010) 45. 
30 Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Clarendon Press, 1989) 12. 
31 Wood (2012) 113-14. Note, though that Wood herself does not understand such production to have 
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Wood, The Origins of Capitalism: A Longer View (Verso, 2002) 94. 
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Success, failure and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge University Press, 
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Countries in the Transition to Capitalism’ 1 Journal of Agrarian Change (2001) 169, 231. Interestingly, 
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If the United Provinces represented the early emergence of a new kind of 
capitalist state, the Dutch mercantile empire represented a new kind of imperial logic, 
a ‘genuinely capitalist version of extra-European expansion’.33 While Spain and 
Portugal had long dominated the seas and trade, Dutch accumulation was different in 
scale and character than that of the Iberian empires. Portuguese extra-European 
penetration, for instance, was initially motivated by crusading ambitions against the 
Muslim states of north Africa and a desire for west African gold, leading eventually 
eastwards to control of seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean. But like the Spaniards in 
their conquest of the Americas, the Portuguese were driven by a territorial logic of 
imperialism, concerned with the extent of their domain; capital was merely a means 
to territorial expansion. The Dutch, by way of contrast, with a nascent capitalist 
economy and bourgeois control of the state at home, were driven by an entirely new 
capitalist logic. The merchants-cum-rulers of the United Provinces understood power 
in terms of their command over resources; territorial acquisitions was merely a means 
for the accumulation of capital.34 In short, as Arrighi observes, Iberian imperialism 
‘was missing . . . an obsession with profit and “economizing,” rather than with crusade; 
a systematic avoidance of military involvements and territorial acquisition that had no 
direct or indirect justification in the “maximization of profit”’.35 The result of the new 
capitalist logic of the Dutch, ‘a fully fledged world entrepôt, not just linking, but 
dominating, the markets of all continents, was something totally outside human 
experience. The fact is that never before—or perhaps since—has the world witnessed 
such prodigious concentration of economic power at a single point.’36  
                                                        
the capitalist nature of the United Provinces is one of the few subjects where Wood’s analysis departs 
markedly from that of Brenner. 
33 Callinicos (2013) 128. 
34 Arrighi (2010) 35. 
35 Ibid 155. Callinicos has also written of the rise of the United Provinces (and England) as marking a 
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accumulation—of territorial and dynastic rivalries among state-building magnates driven into 
expansion by the late mediaeval crisis of feudalism—is drastically changed by the emergence of a new 
kind of actor, the first capitalist states in Holland and England’. Callinicos (2013) 133-34. 
36 Israel (1989) 13. 
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DUTCH COMMERCIAL EXPANSION 
The full extent of Dutch commercial power would take time to emerge, a process 
dependent in no small part on Dutch control of the ‘rich trades’ from the East Indies. 
The growth of the early modern European economy created demand for such luxuries 
as spices and silks, creating an opportunity for European traders with access to the 
entrepôts of Southeast Asia to secure significant profits. The incentive was great for 
the Dutch capitalist oligarchy to carve its own share of this trade out of the Iberian 
seaborne empires. Already a main trading force in northern Europe by the late 16th 
century, Dutch merchants in fin de siècle Europe turned in search of further profits to 
the promise of new commercial ventures in the East Indies.  
The immediate catalyst for Dutch ventures in the East Indies was Jan Huygen 
van Linschoten’s publication, in 1595, of his Reysgheschrift. Having spent time in the 
service of the Archbishop of Goa in Ásia portuguesa and the Azores, van Linschoten 
had amassed an encyclopaedic knowledge of Iberian trade and the roteiros, or 
navigational instructions, employed by Portuguese pilots. His publication of these 
materials, Benjamin Schmidt observes, ‘vastly expanded the world of Dutch readers, 
sailors, and merchants alike’. Van Linschoten, Schmidt suggests, ‘revealed the 
wonders of the world while also charting the ways to reach them’.37 The first major 
Dutch expedition to the Indian Ocean, led by Cornelis de Houtman in 1595, carried 
the newly printed Reysgheschrift, as did subsequent expeditions such as that, in 1598, 
of Jacob Cornel van Neck, of whom Grotius would write in De iure praedae.38  
In all, between 1595 and 1602, the trading companies of the United Provinces 
commissioned some 65 merchant vessels to sail to the East Indies.39 When Van 
Heemskerck set sail for the East Indies, his was merely the latest such venture. He had 
been commissioned by the United Amsterdam Company (Gede Amsterdamse 
Oostindische Compagnie; UAC) to buy spices in the East Indies. But in 1602, while 
van Heemskerck was at sea, the UAC merged with other regional trading companies 
of Holland and Zeeland and was subsumed under a new United Dutch East India 
Company, the VOC. 
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38 Ibid. 
39 Porras (2006) 745 note 9. 
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The United Provinces’ supreme legislative body, the Estates General, had 
granted a monopoly on trade with extra-European regions to the newly formed VOC. 
This commercial organisation was entirely novel: it was ‘a chartered, joint-stock 
monopoly’, financed with private capital and in search of commercial profit, but at the 
same time strongly backed by the state.40 Under its charter, the company enjoyed not 
only a monopoly on trade but also sweeping powers usually associated with the 
sovereign state. It could ‘maintain troops and garrisons, fit out warships, impose 
governors upon Asian populations, and conduct diplomacy with Eastern potentates, as 
well as sign treaties and make alliances’.41 
The creation of the VOC had marked not only the merger of rival trading firms, 
but also a shift in Dutch imperial ambitions. It would be the vehicle for the United 
Provinces’ empire of commerce. Van Heemskerck’s seizure of a Portuguese carrack 
presaged a new wave of aggressive policies on the part of the VOC’s merchant 
sailors—an ‘irrevocable shift’, writes Eric Wilson, ‘from orthodox—and legitimate—
self-defence to more legally and morally ambivalent forms of armed aggression’.42 
The Estates General, in turn, expected to share in prize goods and would benefit further 
from the VOC’s disruption of Iberian commerce in the East Indies, thus aiding the 
Dutch war effort in Europe.43  
Perhaps encouraged by van Heemskerck’s profitable attack, the Estates 
General passed a resolution on 1 November 1603 instructing deputies of the VOC to 
‘damage the enemies and inflict harm on their persons, ships and goods by all means 
possible, so that they may with reputation not only continue their trade, but also 
expand it and make it grow’.44 In 1605, four Portuguese merchant vessels were seized 
                                                        
40 On the VOC, see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806 
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43 van Ittersum, Profit and Principle (2006) lii-liii. 
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in and around the Singapore Straits alone,45 while Victor Enthoven has estimated that 
some 200 craft were captured by the VOC in Asian waters in first two decades of the 
17th century.46 Grotius’s task was thus not simply to justify van Heemskerck’s seizure, 
but also this broader campaign. The taking of the Santa Catarina, Grotius explained 
in his prolegomena to De iure praedae, was merely the ‘most widely celebrated’ of 
such acts of plunder and would thus be treated as ‘the episode representative of all 
such captures’.47 
A CLASH OF IMPERIALISMS 
Dutch policy quickly brought the VOC’s fleets into conflict with the Portuguese and 
challenged their claims to dominium over the East Indies. The Portuguese established 
themselves in the East Indies in the early 16th century, with the conquest of the trading 
hub of Malacca in 1511. Fortified trading posts were built on the surrounding islands 
and, soon thereafter, the trade in spices was declared a Portuguese monopoly: the 
Estado da Índia was to be the sole trading partner for local producers with local 
merchants prohibited from taking part.48 
Unsurprisingly, the Portuguese encountered resistance; those indigenous 
opponents who tried to trade outside Portuguese control were labelled ‘pirates’ and 
‘corsairs’.49 This mirrored the pattern in other parts of the Estado da Índia. On the 
Malabar coast of India, for instance, in the 16th century, the Kunjalis were the main 
adversaries of the Portuguese and were considered cossarios.50 So too, further north: 
contemporary accounts record a Portuguese siege of Bhatkal, the queen of which had 
failed to pay tributes to the Portuguese and was accused of harbouring ‘pirates’ in her 
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port.51 The ‘pirates’, Hannah Wojciehowski suggests, were likely simply ‘rival traders 
. . . whose trade threatened the attempted Portuguese monopolies’.52 
Like the Spanish in the New World, the Portuguese understood pirates to 
include all who rejected their monopoly, rooted in papal donation, on intercourse, 
religious or otherwise, in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese merchants who had 
opened the sea routes to the East Indies claimed continued ownership; all non-
Portuguese merchants who sought to trade in the area was by definition a pirate—
including the indigenous mariners who had been active in the region long before the 
arrival of any Europeans. 
As far as the Portuguese were concerned, the interloping Dutch, when they 
arrived, were further cossarios. But their piratical identity overlapped easily with other 
political and religious identities. Contemporary Spanish and Portuguese sources 
tended to characterize Dutch merchants as ‘piratas’ and ‘cossarios’, but also ‘rebels’ 
and ‘men without a king’, as well as ‘enemies of the Faith’, ‘faithless scoundrels’, and 
a ‘locust plague of heretics’.53 Philip III considered the citizens of the United 
Provinces as simply rebellious subjects. His father, Philip II had died in 1598 and had 
never recognised the Estates General as enjoying any authority to depose him.54 
Fighting in Europe had cooled following Philip II’s death—the Spanish crown 
endured something of a financial crisis—but the new monarch had no intention of 
renouncing the Habsburg claim to sovereignty over all of the Low Countries.55 
There was certainly some hyperbole in Portuguese attempts to tarnish the 
reputation of the Dutch, as Grotius would complain in De iure praedae. But when 
King Philip III of Spain (and II of Portugal) wrote to the King of Cananor in 1606 of 
pirates and rebels, these were, from his standpoint, the appropriate labels. 
‘I was informed by means of a letter from my viceroy that some rebels 
from the states of Flanders, who are subjects of my Crown, have been 
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going about robbing in those lands, and when they went to the port in 
your lands, offering you their friendship and seeking your favour and 
help in order to be able to load their carracks, not only did you not 
consent but you also helped my fortress with additional men, which is 
all in keeping with your noble nature and loyalty; nor would it be 
convenient for pirates and rebels [piratas e aleuantados] who do not 
obey their King and natural Lord to enter [that is take over] this 
fortress.56 
As far as the Iberians were concerned, van Heemskerck and his fellow Dutch 
merchants were indeed rebels and, as such, necessarily pirates when committing 
violence against Portuguese trade. If they were resentful of competition for trade in 
the region—as when Bishop Ribeiro Gaio wrote that these interlopers were ‘spoiling 
the market for the Portuguese and Luso-Asian traders’57—it was resentment premised 
on a specific juridico-political understanding of their alleged dominium over the East 
Indies. 
JUSTIFYING PLUNDER 
This was the background against which Grotius wrote De iure praedae. The dramatic 
emergence of Dutch maritime power and merchant capitalism, culminating in an 
aggressive VOC campaign to seize control of trade in the East Indies, had its 
counterpart in coeval changes in international legal thought: if the juncture was 
characterized by a new type of European commercial expansion, Grotius provided the 
juridical and ideological justification for that expansion. In De iure praedae, he sought 
to set out a legal framework that not only justified van Heemskerck’s seizure of the 
Santa Catarina, but also gave legal authority to Dutch merchants to seek wealth 
wherever they could, including by violent means. 
To do so, Grotius turned to the familiar doctrine of just war, casting the 
Portuguese and Dutch as public enemies. As set out by Aquinas and his later 
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commentators, including, as we saw in Chapter 3, Bartolus, the doctrine of bellum 
iustum held that the existence of a just war rested on certain conditions, in particular 
a superior’s authority and a just cause. Legally acceptable causes included self-
defence, restitution of rights and recovery of stolen property, and the punishment of 
an enemy for injuries. As for authorisation, it could come only from a prince or other 
sovereign. 58 
Van Heemskerck, Grotius argued, was an agent of the Dutch Estates General 
and, as such, of the Dutch state. As we have seen, at least since Bartolus, it was 
accepted that sovereigns could grant commissions, with just cause, to private 
individuals in the form of a letter of reprisal or marque. With commission in hand, the 
individual could then pursue their just cause—the recovery of stolen goods, for 
instance, or, in times of war, the seizure of an enemy’s property or punishment of 
enemy subjects. Putting aside for the moment the justness of the Dutch cause, much 
turned first on the legal identity of the commissioning entity: was van Heemskerck’s 
superior in fact a sovereign? It was not sufficient that he be recognised as an agent of 
the Dutch Estates General—the question remained whether the Estates General itself 
represented a legitimate sovereign. 
The United Provinces were, de jure, still subject to Habsburg sovereignty. The 
nascent Dutch Republic was engaged in a civil war with the Spanish and Portuguese 
crown and would only achieve formal independence in 1648. As far as the Iberians 
were concerned, certainly, van Heemskerck and other Dutch subjects, along with the 
Estates General itself, were mere rebels. Indeed, Dutch sovereignty was not formally 
recognised even by the Republic’s most influential diplomatic backers, the French and 
English monarchs. Following Elizabeth’s death in 1603, James I of England had 
quickly made peace with the King of Spain and Portugal with the Treaty of London.59 
Neither he nor his Bourbon counterpart were willing to undermine a fragile peace with 
formal recognition of Dutch independence. The Dutch might be free, Henry IV of 
France declared in 1609, but they were not sovereign.60 
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Grotius’s solution was to enunciate a novel theory of sovereignty. In early 
modern Europe, sovereignty, as enunciated most famously by Bodin, emphasised 
territoriality. Closely tied to medieval feudal arrangements in which land was granted 
in return for armed support and loyalty to a monarch, sovereignty was understood as 
indivisible, a single whole ‘preferably vested in the person of the monarch, and in only 
very exceptional cases within a collective body comprising multiple members’.61 
Grotius departed from this view, instead arguing for an approach to sovereignty that 
allowed for the division of sovereign rights amongst various parties within a polity.62  
Princes, Grotius argued, ‘are invested with no just power that has not been 
derived from the power of the state through election either of individual rulers or of 
dynasties’.63 The sovereign right to wage war ‘pertains to the prince only in the sense 
that he is acting for the state and has received a mandate from it’.64 That right resides 
foremost in the state itself. It is clear, Grotius insisted, that the Dutch state, ‘even if it 
was subject to a prince’ still retained the sovereign power to declare a public war 
‘independently of that ruler’.65 And just as sovereignty, and the right of just war, can 
be mandated to a prince, so too can it be mandated to ‘inferior magistrates’.66 As van 
Ittersum explains, on Grotius’s approach, ‘All magistrates, including heads of states, 
were simply bearers of the marks of sovereignty (judiciary, taxation, defense and so 
forth)’.67  
On this view, as ruler of the Low Countries, Philip had never been an absolute 
sovereign, but merely exercised a number of powers that were ultimately derived from 
the Dutch commonwealth and, more specifically, from each and every Dutch citizen. 
Now, in violently putting down the Dutch rebellion, Philip, in his role as prince, was 
no only failing to defend his citizens, but in fact ‘contributes toward their oppression 
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his counsels, money fleets, and army.’68 Any allegiance the Dutch owed him, Grotius 
insisted, could justifiably be renounced. Sovereignty, stemming in the first place from 
the state and not the prince, remained with the Dutch, now to be exercised by the 
Estates General. The members of the Estates General, Grotius went on, ‘in their 
capacity of supreme magistrates, were charged with the function of watching over the 
rights of both state and citizenry’.69 It was their duty to defend the state and protect its 
citizens. ‘Philip strove to regain through war the sovereign status from which he had 
fallen’ and even to punish the Dutch: in such circumstances the Dutch were provided 
with ‘an exceedingly just motive for war, namely, the defence of their lives, property, 
and lawful liberty.’70 
The Dutch thus enjoyed both the right to wage a public war and a just cause. 
‘The Dutch are justified’, Grotius concluded, ‘in regarding Philip and the Spaniards 
and the Portuguese as enemies, one and all, in view of the injuries inflicted upon our 
people by those three parties.’71 Van Heemskerck, it followed, could act as an agent 
of the sovereign Dutch state which could lawfully authorise attacks on Iberian 
shipping as part of its public war against Philip III. There remained a question of 
whether van Heemskerck in fact held a commission from the Estates General, an issue 
Grotius insisted was in fact ‘superfluous’: ‘the question of whether or not an order was 
given is plainly a matter which in nowise concerns the foe’. For the Portuguese, it 
should suffice that a just cause for the attack existed. ‘Since the Portuguese occupy 
the status of a foe in their relation to the Dutch’, Grotius explained, ‘and since they 
were indeed liable to despoliation, the problem of whether they were despoiled by 
command or independently of any command is no concern of theirs’.72 
PRIVATE JUST WAR: COMMERCE AS A NATURAL RIGHT 
Grotius did not stop with a justification of Dutch plunder in terms of just public war. 
Van Heemskerck, he insisted, had been justified in seizing the ship both as an agent 
of a sovereign power engaged in a just public war and as a private person engaged in 
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a just private war. The latter was a strikingly original proposition. Just war had, since 
at least Aquinas, been the preserve of princes and other sovereigns. ‘[I]t is not the 
business of a private individual to declare war’, Aquinas had insisted ‘because he can 
seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior’.73 He could not take up 
arms himself; ‘because it takes place between private persons, being declared not by 
public authority, but rather by an inordinate will’, private war was always a sin.74 A 
limited exception was admitted for self-defence. In Vitoria’s formulation, ‘a private 
person is entitled . . . to defend himself and what belongs to him, but has no right to 
avenge a wrong done to him, nay, not even to recapture property that has been seized 
from him if time has been allowed to go by since the seizure.’ This right to self-defence 
is thus quite narrow and ‘can only be resorted to at the very moment of the danger, or, 
as the jurists say, in continenti, and so when the necessity of defense has passed there 
is an end to the lawfulness of [private] war’.75 Gentili, too, in a passage quoted in part 
in Chapter 4, had insisted that ‘private individuals, subject peoples, and petty 
sovereigns are never confronted with the necessity of resorting to the arbitrament of 
Mars, since they can obtain their legal rights before their superiors’ tribunal’.76 
Against these authorities, Grotius now sought to argue that private individuals 
could in fact engage in a just war. Even if van Heemskerck’s status as a public agent 
of a sovereign Dutch Republic was ambiguous, he nonetheless enjoyed a right to the 
freedom of trade which, in the absence of an independent judge, he could enforce 
himself. Vitoria had understood there to be ‘a single and only just cause for 
commencing a war, namely, a wrong received’.77 Grotius went further: ‘The defence 
of recovery of possessions, and the exaction of a debt or of penalties due, all constitute 
just causes of war. Under the head of “possessions”, even rights should be included’.78 
Such rights, Grotius explained, included not only that ‘due us in our capacity as private 
individuals’ but also that which is ‘due by the law of human fellowship’.79 What rights 
                                                        
73 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 3 (Cosimo Classics, 2007) 1353. 
74 Ibid 1357. 
75 Francisco de Vitoria, De iure belli [1557], extracted in John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the 
Law of Nations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1935) 99, 100. 
76 Alberico Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres, trans. John Carew Rolfe (Clarendon Press, 1933) [1588] 
20. 
77 Vitoria (1935) 101. 
78 Grotius (2006) 363. 
79 Ibid 363-64. 
 180 
might stem from human fellowship? Here Grotius had in mind specifically ‘the use of 
whatever is common’, specifically ‘the sea and commercial opportunities’. If anyone 
has ‘quasi-possession’ of such a right of use, it is proper, Grotius concluded ‘to defend 
that claim.’80 
In Grotius’s hands, then, the enjoyment of ‘commercial opportunities’ had 
become, in and of itself, a right, one rooted in humanity’s natural propensity to trade. 
Needless to say, this was a move which placed Dutch commercial interests at the heart 
of his juridical schema. On Grotius’s telling, the United Provinces were a community 
of merchants.81 Bounded by water, the Dutch were compelled by nature herself to a 
maritime destiny, with commerce their vocation.82 It was only natural that the Dutch, 
with the ‘eagerness for honorable gain’, should seek to expand their trading horizons. 
In fact, the state’s very survival, Grotius argued, rested on commerce and, in particular, 
commercial expansion into the East Indies: 
[W]ho is so ignorant of the affairs of the Dutch as to be unaware of the 
fact that the sole source of support, renown, and protection for those 
affairs lies in navigation and trade? Among all of the Dutch enterprises 
in the field of trade, moreover, our business in the East Indies easily 
occupies first place in worth, extent, and resultant benefits.83 
Not only does Grotius insist on the coincidence of state and merchant interests: 
the pursuit of those interests, and concomitant commercial expansion into the East 
Indies, is invested with a theological significance, what Ileana Porras has called ‘the 
providential function of commerce’.84 As Grotius explains in De iure praedae, ‘God 
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has not willed that nature shall supply every region with all the necessities of life’ but 
rather ‘has granted pre-eminence in different arts to different nations’. That one nation 
should supply the needs of another is ‘in accordance with the design of Divine Justice’ 
and, it follows, ‘whatever has been produced in any region is regarded as a product 
native to all regions’.85 Trade, then, not only sustains the wealth of the United 
Provinces, but bears the stamp of Divine Providence. Nature, Grotius explains, 
‘distributes the sum of her gifts throughout various regions in such a way as to make 
reciprocal commerce a necessity of the members of the human race’.86  
Having located the United Provinces’ national identity in seaborne commerce 
and imbued their pursuit of profit with a ‘providential function’, Grotius goes on to 
identify the pursuit of commerce as a natural right. Here he draws on the Spanish 
Scholastics and, in particular, Francisco de Vitoria. While writing De iure praedae, 
Grotius had received a 1557 edition of Vitoria’s Releciones Theologicae XII (Twelve 
Theological Reflections) from Jan ten Grootenhuys.87 The Dominican had identified a 
universal ius comunicationis or right of free communication, the denial of which was 
grounds for a just public war.88 But where Vitoria had emphasised the right of the 
Spanish, under the ius comunicationis, to travel and, especially to evangelise 
unimpeded by the indigenous peoples of the New World, Grotius expanded upon 
Vitoria and identified a natural right to engage specifically in trade. 
Trade was not entirely absent from Vitoria’s Releciones: he had accepted that, 
much like impeding Spanish efforts to preach the Gospel, the refusal of Amerindians 
to allow the Spanish to engage in trade was a basis for just war. But any such right to 
trade was subsumed within a broader right of communication or hospitality. As Porras 
observes, it is far from clear that Vitoria had ‘intended to assert an autonomous and 
distinctive “right to engage in trade,” as Grotius proceeded to do.’89 Vitoria’s concern 
had been justification of the Spanish conquest of the Americas. He concluded that the 
Spanish enjoyed a right to ‘travel and dwell in those countries, so long as they do no 
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harm to the barbarians, and cannot be prevented by them from doing so’.90 But the 
emphasis here was on the duty of hospitality (by the Amerindians) owed to (the 
Spanish) strangers. It was derivative of this duty, and the Spaniards’ concomitant right 
to travel and sojourn, that the Iberians might ‘lawfully trade among the barbarians, so 
long as they do no harm to their homeland’.91 
Grotius, writing at a distinct conjuncture, faced a quite different set of 
concerns. He was not concerned with justifying the appropriation of native lands in 
the East Indies or the rights of settlers to claim dominium, but rather an attack on 
another European nation and, more generally, access of Dutch traders to the ‘fruits of 
commerce’: in short, the extension of Dutch commercial activities, through violent 
means. It is hardly surprising, then, that it is commerce, not a more general right of 
hospitality, at the centre of his analysis. No ‘state or prince’, Grotius opined, ‘has the 
power to issue a general prohibition forbidding others to enjoy access to or trade with 
the subjects of that state or prince. This doctrine is the source of the sacrosanct law of 
hospitality’.92 As Porras puts it, ‘[h]ospitality, the right to travel or reside, the right to 
share in the common ownership—all these are for Grotius merely expressions of the 
practice of commerce.’93 Inverting Vitoria, Grotius could write that ‘if the Spaniards 
should be prohibited by the American Indians from traveling or residing among the 
latter, or if they should be prevented from sharing in those things which are common 
property under the law of nations or by custom—if, in short, they should be debarred 
from the practice of commerce—these causes might serve them as just grounds for 
war against the Indians’.94 
The reversal had important consequences when turning back to the East Indies. 
The Portuguese, in seeking a monopoly on trade with the East Indies, were committing 
no offense against hospitality as Vitoria had understood it. But they were interfering 
with the right of the Dutch to trade with locals parties. Under Grotius’s analysis, where 
trade and commerce had taken on the status of natural right, such offence struck at the 
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heart of the natural order. As Grotius explained, anyone who interferes with ‘the 
system of exchange’, interferes also with ‘the highly prized fellowship in which 
humanity is united. He destroys the opportunities for mutual benefactions. In short, he 
does violence to nature herself.’95 Commerce is a condition of survival, grounded in 
natural law, and so fundamental that neither the Portuguese, nor any other people, 
European or otherwise, may be allowed to impede it: to do so is a cause for a just war. 
DUTCH INJURIES 
How then had the Portuguese committed an injury against the right of free trade and 
commerce? In seeking to maintain a monopoly on trade in the eastern hemisphere, the 
Portuguese claimed dominium over the pelagic spaces of the East Indies and Indian 
Ocean. The Portuguese nominally controlled the maritime highways necessary for 
transoceanic trade by issuing cartazes (free conduct passes) and by restricting licenses 
to trade to European-born Portuguese subjects.96 But in claiming dominium, Grotius 
maintained, the Portuguese had sought to appropriate that which could not be 
appropriated. ‘the sea is included among those things which . . . cannot become part 
of anyone’s private domain’.97 Certainly the Portuguese could not claim to occupy the 
sea simply because they sailed over it first. Like the air, fluid and vast, the sea is 
infinite and ‘bounded only by the heavens’, impossible to occupy or exhaust.98 
Moreover, Grotius opined, nature wills that some sites remain common to all: ‘those 
things which have been so constituted by nature that, even when used by a specific 
individual, they nevertheless suffice for general use by other persons without 
discrimination, retain to-day and should retain for all time that status which 
characterized them when first they sprang from nature.’99 
If Portuguese claims to dominium were not tenable theoretically, they still held 
concrete consequences for Dutch mercantile interests. For the Dutch to enjoy their 
right of commerce, they required unimpeded access to trading entrepôts of the East. 
But in practice, at least from the view of Grotius and his Dutch merchant sponsors, the 
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Portuguese were harassing Dutch shipping and thus impeding that right. In Chapter 
11 of De iure praedae, Grotius sets out the historical events leading up to van 
Heemskerck’s attack on the Santa Catarina—events that, Grotius argues, established 
the Portuguese as ‘men of bad faith, assassins, poisoners, and betrayers’.100 One 
example will suffice. 
In 1602, the earlier expedition of van Neck, mentioned above, had landed off 
the Canton coast seeking to trade. The fleet had been driven close to the shore by 
winds and so, as Grotius recounts, ‘[v]an Neck decided that men should be sent to 
investigate the lay of the land and to give an explanation of the arrival of the Dutch, 
while procuring fresh provisions’.101 Upon reaching shore, the men presented 
themselves to the local mandarins, explaining that ‘the visitors were Dutch merchants 
and that they came to engage in trade’.102 However, the Portuguese present in the area 
interceded, Grotius explains, and the Dutch were ‘dragged off together’ and ‘placed 
under guard and bound with the heaviest of fetters’.103 When six of the men were 
brought before the chief magistrate of Canton and ‘plied with numerous questions 
through an interpreter who spoke in Portuguese, they lay like men without tongues, 
owing to their ignorance of that language and perhaps also to fear’.104  
The Portuguese, Grotius reports, accused van Neck’s men of ‘piratical 
savagery’ (piraticae feritatis).105 When the latter failed to respond, ‘the Portuguese 
insisted that their silence should be regarded as a confession’. 
Thus it came to pass that six men of Holland—O fatherland! O justice 
and law, and liberty vainly defended at home!—were subjected to the 
cruellest and most hideous punishment, suited to robbers and pirates, 
by Portuguese sojourners in that Kingdom of China which the 
Hollanders had sought amid so many hardships and perils, and where 
their presence was in turn desired.’106 
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Lest the reader not already grasp from Grotius’s hyperbolic cries of anguish the wrong 
inflicted on the Dutch, he continues: ‘The Chinese looked on pityingly at this spectacle 
and afterwards prayed, with averted faces, that these men might not be left unavenged, 
whatsoever race and whatsoever region of the earth had sent them as guests to Chinese 
waters and shores, if they worshipped any divinity or had any native land.’107 Already, 
in this one example, Grotius has made sure to spell out all the elements justifying 
Dutch retaliation. Here were Van Neck and his crew enjoying their natural right to 
trade in a land where ‘their presence was in turn desired’. There could hardly be a 
more blatant interference with this right, one that, there could be no doubt—even the 
Chinese desired it—the Dutch were justified in avenging. 
Charged and executed for piracy and robbery by the Portuguese, van Neck’s 
men were but one of the many examples offered by Grotius of Portuguese treachery 
against the Dutch in the East Indies. If hyperbolic to the modern reader, and blatantly 
self-serving, Grotius’s account rang true for many in the United Provinces. Bartolomé 
de las Casas’s Brevísima Relación, first published in Dutch in 1578, had popularised 
the evils of the Spanish treatment of Amerindians in the New World.108 The anti-
Spanish rhetoric of the Dutch rebels transposed the conquistadores to the Low 
Countries, with Philip II intent on subjecting the Dutch to ‘the most abject slavery, 
akin to Spanish tyranny in the Americas’.109 Such rhetoric was imported by Grotius, 
too, in his account of the Portuguese. Drawing on the Spanish ‘Black Legend’, he 
presented Portuguese attempts to obstruct Dutch trade in the East Indies as an 
extension—or ‘the mirror image’, in van Ittersum’s words110—of Spanish tyranny in 
the New World and northern Europe. Writing of the Portuguese arrival on the island 
of Ambon in 1602, Grotius draws a direct comparison between Iberian savagery in the 
Low Countries and the East Indies: 
[T]he inhabitants were subjected to the same savage treatment that the 
people of the Low Countries had often suffered at the hands of the 
Spaniards. Slaughter was practiced without distinction of age or sex; 
little children and women were slain indiscriminately. Nor were they 
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merely slain; for some of the Portuguese cut off the limbs of young 
children before the very eyes of the parents, and others searched with 
their swords both the wombs of pregnant women and bodies that were 
unquestionably innocent.111 
As van Ittersum shows in her study of De iure praedae, the imagery was borrowed 
almost directly from Brevísima Relación.112 Never one to not labour a point, Grotius 
make sure to contrast such horrors with the Dutch who ‘are by nature gentle and 
compassionate’.113 
In Grotius’s philippic, Portuguese offences do not stop with discrete acts of 
violence against Dutch merchants (or indigenous populations). Not only were the 
Portuguese harassing Dutch shipping but they also incited indigenous rulers to block 
Dutch access to local emporia. The charge against van Neck’s men of piracy was, 
according to Grotius, part of a far-reaching conspiracy by the Iberians to malign Dutch 
merchants and bring them into disrepute amongst the region’s indigenous populations: 
the Portuguese ‘made a practice of declaring that pirates had come [venisse piratas], 
whose home was the sea, whose trade was robbery, and who had no peaceful dwelling-
place’.114 
PORTUGUESE PIRATES AND DUTCH AVENGERS 
By placing commerce at the centre of his juridical universe, Grotius elevated 
Portuguese offences to ‘a crime against nature, an affront to God’s design’.115 
Portugal’s forceful exclusion of the Dutch from East Indian trade is not merely an 
injury to the United Provinces: if trade is a universal right, its obstruction is ‘an affront 
to all of humanity’.116 For this, Grotius argues, the Iberians deserved universal 
opprobrium, for ‘there is no stronger reason underlying our abhorrence of robbers and 
pirates than the fact that they besiege and render unsafe the thoroughfares of human 
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intercourse’.117 It is not, as the Portuguese claimed, van Heemskerck who is a pirate, 
nor van Neck’s men, condemned as such by the Iberians. Rather, it is the Portuguese 
themselves who deserve the epithet: ‘We shall plainly perceive that the Portuguese, 
though they assume the guise of merchants, are not very different from pirates.’118 The 
name ‘pirate’, Grotius repeats, is ‘appropriately bestowed upon men who blockade the 
seas and impede the progress of international commerce’, a description apposite for 
the Iberians who ‘forcibly bar all European nations (even nations that have given them 
no cause for war) from the ocean and from access to India’.119 
Like the Spanish, Grotius saw in the pirate a universal enemy. His, though, 
was not an enemy of a universal Christendom but rather of a universal commercial 
society: humankind defined not with reference to salvation but commerce. As such, 
the pirate, Grotius wrote, was ‘harmful to all mankind’ and thus worthy of ‘universal 
hatred’.120  
If the Portuguese were injuring the fundamental right of commerce, it was not 
only monarchs but also private merchants who could punish transgressors of natural 
law. For states, Grotius held, have only those powers which individuals already 
possess in nature. Indeed, on Grotius’s view, the natural rights of states derive in the 
first place from those of private individuals and their natural propensity for sociability; 
the state cannot have any right that did not first belong to individuals including the 
right to punish or wage just war.  
[J]ust as every right of the magistrate comes to him from the state, so 
has the same right come to the state from private individuals; and 
similarly, the power of the state is the result of collective agreement . . 
. . Therefore, since no one is able to transfer a thing that he never 
possessed, it is evident that the right of chastisement was held by 
private persons before it was held by the state.121 
This was not an entirely open-ended license. Where individuals enter into civil society, 
the state exists to arbitrate disputes. But on the sea, or in extra-European lands, where 
there is no (recognised) civil society, individuals return, in essence, to a pre-civil state 
                                                        
117 Grotius (2006) 305. 
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of nature where, ‘[i]n the natural order . . . every individual is charged with the 
execution of his own rights.’122 Having transgressed the natural law mandating 
freedom of commerce and rendered themselves pirates, the Portuguese were liable to 
punishment. And in the absence of independent judges in the East Indies, that 
punishment could be administered by private individuals such as van Heemskerck who 
themselves became judges in their own cause.123  
The Portuguese certainly, Grotius complained, could not be trusted to take 
steps to punish their own transgressions. Their officials could hardly operate as 
independent magistrates: ‘The Portuguese State and its ruler were the very parties who 
took the first step, not only in the public infliction of injury upon the Dutch, but also 
in initiating the war. This fact clearly deprived them of the power to serve as 
judges’.124 The courts of the United Provinces, across the ocean, could be of no help 
either and the indigenous rulers of the East Indies had little interest in mediating. The 
answer, in van Ittersum’s words, was ‘as predictable as it was opportune: van 
Heemskerck had no choice but to take action himself and attack a Portuguese 
merchantman in revenge’.125 It followed, then, as Grotius wrote, that ‘it cannot be 
dishonourable for merchants to take well-deserved vengeance upon the violators of a 
public right, with the purpose of ensuring greater security for themselves in the 
enjoyment of that right’.126  
In short, Grotius concluded, van Heemskerck’s violence, an act of ‘vengeance’ 
against pirates, undertaken ‘for the purpose of obtaining one’s rightful due’, was not 
only justified, it was ‘honourable’.127 Moreover, in doing so, van Heemskerck was not 
defending only his own right. For the Portuguese blockade of the sea prevented all 
other nations, too, from partaking in that commerce beneficial to all nations. In 
                                                        
122 Ibid 92. 
123 van Ittersum, Profit and Principle (2006) 53-54.  
124 Grotius (2006) 380. Van Ittersum suggests that Grotius exaggerates the absence of judicial recourse 
and that his account elided certain inconvenient facts. It was apparent from van Heemskerck’s 
correspondence with Portuguese authorities in Malacca, which was in Grotius’s possession when 
writing De jure Praedae, that ‘the Estado da India was not devoid of upstanding magistrates who 
sought to administer justice impartially’. Van Ittersum concludes that, in reality, ‘the Portuguese 
authorities in Asia did not leave the Dutch without legal remedy’: van Ittersum, Profit and Principle 
(2006) 45. But then this was hardly the only detail Grotius exaggerated. 
125 van Ittersum, Profit and Principle (2006) 45. 
126 Grotius (2006) 450. 
127 Ibid 452. 
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attacking the Portuguese, van Heemskerck was, in fact, acting on behalf of all 
humanity. He was, to use Grotius’s phrase, acting as a ‘private avenger’. The private 
avenger, he who upholds the right to trade, ‘has in view the good of the whole human 
race, just as he was when he slays a serpent’.128 
Van Heemskerck’s seizure was not an act of piracy, as the Portuguese claimed 
and some Dutch feared. Rather, it was the Portuguese, themselves, who should be 
understood as pirates. Whereas the Iberians had condemned Protestant pirates in terms 
of the universality of a Christian commonwealth, in Grotius’s new rendering of the 
pirate figure, they were now themselves condemned in terms of a universal natural 
right. This secularised figure of the pirate is one that acts against nature’s designs and 
natural law. And in doing so, they are not merely an enemy to the Dutch, but to all of 
humanity, for it is for the benefit of all that commerce should rein free.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has traced the historical origins of the pirate as a paradigmatic figure of 
enmity in international legal thought. It began by mapping reactions, cultural and 
legal, to the rise of Somali maritime depredation at the end of the first decade of the 
present century. It showed how these discourses reproduce the pirate as a figure of 
extreme enmity—the enemy of all mankind, of civilization, and of humanity itself—
demanding elimination and legitimating great violence to that end. The illegitimate 
violence of the pirate calls forth the legitimate violence of anti-pirate operations, two 
sides of the same coin. Stepping back from Somalia specifically, the chapter showed 
how this figure, and the discourses about it, are rooted in a tradition of international 
legal thought that regularly draws on, and reproduces, the pirate as an archetypal figure 
of enmity, the model for the treatment of other proscribed forms of violence: the slave 
trader, torturer, war criminal, terrorist, and so on. 
As the thesis demonstrated in its introduction, much contemporary 
international legal writing, in reproducing the pirate as a figure of abstract enmity, 
implicitly, and often explicitly, presents him as transhistorical and timeless. Chapter 2 
therefore turned to the world of antiquity, tracing the etymological origins of the term 
‘pirate’ and interrogating the identity of those individuals and groups labelled 
‘pirates’. The epithet’s Greek and Roman cognates, the chapter showed, did not 
convey the same concept, let alone the same legal consequences, as in modern legal 
thought: against the variety of phenomena and actors of the ancient world associated 
with the term, the modern pirate appears quite distinct. Considering specifically the 
example of the Cilicians, the group most commonly associated with piracy in Rome, 
the chapter suggested that the term, while already conveying hostility, described 
autonomous political communities engaged by the Roman navy as legitimate 
combatants, their enmity, far from universal, directed specifically at Rome, and born 
out of the context of war. 
By the late middle ages, Chapter 3 showed, piracy and pirate remained 
fundamentally ambiguous terms. In the medieval Mediterranean, plunder and trade 
were intimately related, piratical acts of depredation a common, even accepted, feature 
of maritime life. Yet, it is here that we find the start of a distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate maritime violence that would come to define the pirate’s modern 
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identity. This distinction, the chapter argued, was rooted in the growing competition 
over Mediterranean trade amongst a newly emergent plurality of autonomous 
mercantile centres in the 14th century. Against that background of inter-mercantile 
rivalry, a generalised law of reprisals took shape building on theories of just war and 
lawful belligerency. This early law of reprisals drew a fundamental distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate depredation rooted in sovereign authorisation, 
while the pirate would slowly begin to be identified with the absence of such 
endorsement. 
If the association of pirate with unauthorised, and thereby illegitimate, 
violence had its roots in the medieval Mediterranean, the argument here has been that 
it was only in the long-16th century that the modern figure of universal enmity began 
to take shape. Chapter 4 traced the emergence in international legal thought of a new 
conception of the pirate not as an individual lacking sovereign authority, but as a 
universal enemy, hostis humani generis. This enmity had its roots, the chapter argued, 
not in legal debates around jurisdiction, but in Christian theological traditions. Long 
associated with the devil as a universal enemy of Christianity, the hostis humani 
generis came to be associated with pirates in the context of the threat posed to 
Christian Europe by an expanding Ottoman empire. The universal enemy of medieval 
Christian theology, the chapter showed, came to be embodied in the Christian 
European imagination by the Ottoman empire and its western Mediterranean 
vanguard, the pirates of the Barbary coast. At once figures of religious enmity and 
piratical plunder, the Muslim pirates of northern Africa were assimilated to other 
demonic foes of Christendom, an ideological association encouraged by a Habsburg 
state eager to rally the faithful against the heretical threat to the east.  
In the fifth chapter, the thesis turned to the extension of this religious discourse 
to the Atlantic and the New World. Analysis here focused on the inter-imperial rivalry 
between the Habsburg empire, with its claimed monopoly on the Americas rooted in 
papal donation, and a nascent English imperial formation seeking to challenge 
Habsburg power and establish a maritime empire. Within this context, the chapter 
showed, the pirate became a highly contested figure, refracted distinctively in the 
competing ideological prisms through which the conflict was viewed. For the Spanish, 
the colonisation of the New World, and the spiritual salvation of its native population, 
had been entrusted by Rome to the Iberian empires. Conceived in theological terms, 
this was a mission in the service of a universal Christendom. Yet by the mid-16th 
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century, Christendom was in crisis, faced not only by external threats from the 
Ottoman empire, but also internal confessional schism. Habsburg pre-eminence was 
increasingly challenged by Protestant powers: rebellion and civil war at home in the 
Low Countries, and endemic plunder in the Atlantic.  
These threats, internal and external, were easily assimilated in the Spanish 
imperial imagination: all—Ottomans in the Mediterranean, Dutch at home, and 
English in the New World—were heretical foes who interfered with Spain’s 
Providential mission. On this view, Protestant depredators such as Drake raiding the 
Spanish Main were little different than the Islamic pirates haranguing European 
waters, both adversaries of a universal Christendom and, concomitantly, epitomising 
a religiously-rooted universal enmity. This view contrasted markedly from that of 
British publicists, for whom Drake was not pirate but hero. If the British Empire was 
not yet synonymous with oceanic commerce, Elizabethan England, the chapter further 
showed, was already in the early grip of a new commercial disposition, with British 
merchants eager to extend English maritime power. National perceptions of Drake’s 
depredations were shaped by outrage at England’s exclusion from profitable trade in 
the Americas: his violence was perceived as a legitimate response. 
This understanding, Chapter 6 argued, was formalised in the work of Hugo 
Grotius and his attempts to justify Dutch maritime violence in the face of an Iberian 
monopoly on trade with the East Indies. By the start of the 17th century, the chapter 
showed, the Dutch United Provinces, if still fighting for independence from Habsburg 
Spain, had emerged as one of the world’s first capitalist states, with commercial 
expansion and the accumulation of capital its foremost concern. The chapter offered a 
reading of Grotius’s De iure praedae against this background, tracing the basis for his 
novel grounding of the legitimacy of Dutch commercial violence in a theory of natural 
rights including, specifically, a right to commerce. On Grotius’s telling, the chapter 
showed, it was not the Dutch who, in attacking Portuguese shipping, should be 
considered pirates. Rather, reversing the equation, Grotius insisted it was the Iberians 
who, in restricting access to the Indies, did violence to Dutch rights. Grotius rendered 
the Portuguese as pirates, secularising the figure’s illegitimacy and redefining the 
pirate as the enemy of trade, now elevated in Grotius’s schema to a universal good. 
The figure of the pirate with which Grotius leaves us, the chapter concluded, was the 
universal enemy of commerce and capital accumulation, to be extirpated no longer in 
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the name of a universal Christian commonwealth, but now on behalf of the universal 
commercial society of humanity. 
BEYOND THE LONG 16TH CENTURY 
With the further crystallisation of a capitalist world economy, this figure would 
become a cynosure of legal thought. In the century following Grotius’s defence of van 
Heemskerk, imperial rivalry and capitalist development continued apace, with 
religious war giving way to trade war. The Atlantic maritime states of northwest 
Europe continued to challenge Iberian power, all competing fiercely with one another 
for control of the seas, the key to commercial expansion, new markets, and economic 
growth. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought a semblance of peace to the Atlantic 
and the hope of stable long-distance trade. As commercial cities and manufacturing 
trades developed in Europe and national economies were reorganised for exchange in 
the world market, trade became paramount, undergirding the rise of commercial 
powers. The increasing importance of oceanic routes at the start of the 18th century is 
stressed by Marcus Rediker, who describes how they ‘unified distant parts of the 
globe, different markets, and distinct modes of production’, organising ‘the flow of 
commodities and the movements of labor’. These ‘pulsing routes’, he writes, 
‘stretching from one port city to the next, were the most elementary material structures 
of empire, indeed of the whole world economy’.1  
With the mass expropriations that accompanied capitalist development and the 
move to a system of capital accumulation based on the exploitation of slave and waged 
labour—enclosures in Europe; colonial dispossession in the extra-European world—
a new proletariat took to the seas. ‘Poor people’, writes Rediker, especially highly 
skilled, unemployed, and desperate sailors, thronged almost every port city.’2 In the 
late 17th and early 18th centuries, especially following the end of the War of Spanish 
Succession, great numbers turned to piracy. Yet pirates, by definition now 
impediments to the smooth flow of commerce, were out of place in a world of global 
circulation. Pirates, Rediker tells us, ‘wreaked havoc in the Atlantic system . . . 
[disrupting] trade in strategic zones of capital accumulation—the West Indies, North 
                                                        
1 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-
American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge University Press, 1987) 21. 
2 Marcus Rediker, Villains of all Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Verso, 2004) 28. 
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America, and West Africa—at a time when the recently stabilized and expanding 
Atlantic economy was the source of enormous profits and renewed imperial power’.3 
Unsurprisingly, then, the 17th and 18th centuries saw not only the growing 
importance of long-distance trade in popular consciousness, but also, coeval with that 
development, the consolidation and generalisation of the Grotian image of the pirate 
in law and legal thought. ‘Suffer pirates, and the commerce of the world must cease’, 
warned the Admiralty judge Sir Charles Hedges in 1696.4 Pirates, Captain Charles 
Johnson wrote in his oft-quoted General History of the Pirates, published in 1724, 
were ‘destructive to the Navigation of the Trading World’.5 As Governor Spotswood 
of Virginia had already warned in July 1716, ‘the whole Trade of the Continent may 
be endangered if timely measures be not taken to suppress this growing evil’.6 Two 
years later, as mentioned in the thesis’s introduction, the Bahamas would choose its 
new motto: explusis piratis, restituta commercia—pirates expelled, commerce 
restored. 
No longer a figure of religious enmity, the pirate was associated squarely with 
a threat to commerce. And it was that threat, as Grotius had first adumbrated, that 
made him hostis humani generis. Addressing a group of pirates about to be executed 
in 1717, Nicholas Trott, judge of the Vice-Admiralty and Chief Justice of the Province 
of South Carolina, explained that ‘the evil and wickedness’ of their crime ‘is evident 
to the reason of all men’. Pirates are ‘so destructive of all trade and commerce between 
nation and nation’, he intoned, that they ‘are called enemies to mankind’.7 Hedges 
simply called them ‘Enemies of Merchants and Mankind’.8 Yet, this figure was not 
entirely divorced from its antecedents. Like a palimpsest, its older theological meaning 
lurked beneath the new. Pirates, Rediker observes of the 18th century, were still held 
up ‘as the antithesis of the Christian way of life’.9 They were agents of Satan, 
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4 Rex v. Dawson (1696) 13 Howell’s State Trials 451, 453. 
5 Captain Charles Johnson, A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the Most Notorious 
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preachers and publicists warned: The Reverend John Barnard likened them to ‘a Herd 
of Wild Beasts’ no better than ‘Devils Incarnate’.10  
The description of pirates as enemies of humanity, on both theological and 
commercial rationales, invited, in Mikkel Thorup’s words, a ‘total war with 
exterminatory intent’.11 ‘All Nations agree to treat your Tribe, as the Common Enemies 
of Mankind, and extirpate them out of the World’, intoned the Puritan minister Cotton 
Mather to a group of pirates on the gallows in Boston in November 1717.12 No longer 
were pirates the subject primarily of proceedings concerning postliminy; the English 
Admiralty courts, at the urging of a rising merchant class, began to sentence to death 
pirates with increasing frequency. The hanged bodies of pirates lined the Thames at 
Wapping—but also elsewhere: in 1721, the English Parliament extended English anti-
piracy jurisdiction ‘to all his Majesty’s Dominions in Asia, Africa, and America’.13 An 
international ‘campaign of terror’ in the name of eradicating piracy followed. London, 
Edinburgh, the Azores, Cape Coast Castle, Salvador, Curaçao, Antigua, Saint Kitts, 
Martinique, Kingston, Port Royal, the Bahama Islands, Bermuda, Charleston, South 
Carolina, Williamsburg, New York, Providence, Boston: all saw executions of pirates, 
the gallows used as a public performance of imperial power.14 Here was the start of an 
outline of universal jurisdiction, or at least universal British jurisdiction (soon 
cemented under British naval dominance in the 19th century) driven by the imperative, 
as Alfred Rubin puts it, to protect ‘private property crossing national boundaries’.15  
IMPLICATIONS 
The expansion and eventual hegemony of the Grotian figure of the pirate, then, might 
best be understood as part of the juridification of the oceans in the service of capital. 
To put it slightly differently, the origins of the modern figure of the pirate in Grotius, 
and its further development in subsequent centuries, are inseparable from the early 
development of a capitalist world market. 
                                                        
10 Quoted in ibid. 
11 Mikkel Thorup, An Intellectual History of Terror: War, Violence and the State (Routledge, 2010) 
165. 
12 Quoted in Rediker (2004) 127. 
13 Piracy Act, 8 Geo. I, c. 24 (1721). 
14 Rediker (2004) 10. 
15 Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (University Press of the Pacific, 2006) [1988] 32. 
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This is not the first study to suggest such a link. Rediker’s history of early-
18th-century piracy implies as much, while Policante, discussed at some length in the 
thesis’s introduction, suggests an intimate link between the suppression of piracy and 
18th- and 19th-century British sea-power’s role in consolidating global commerce.16 
Michel Foucault, too, hinted as much, if only in passing, in a lecture at the Collège de 
France in January 1979. The history of piracy’s treatment in the 18th-century, Foucault 
suggested, reflects ‘an attempt to think of the world, or at least the sea, as a space of 
free competition, of free maritime circulation, and consequently as one of the 
necessary conditions for the organization of a world market’.17 In other words, the 
construction and suppression of the pirate as hostis humani generis, according to 
Foucault, was concomitant with the juridical constitution of the world market and 
securitisation of the sea as a space safe for commercial circulation. 
Yet neither Rediker, Policante, or Foucault explore how this relates to 
international law specifically or what it means for how we understand the pirate as 
epitome of enmity as an international legal idea. Policante does engage with 
international legal thought briefly, but any historical specificity in his analysis gives 
way ultimately to the pirate as a transhistorical figure, the Other to empire from 
antiquity to the present day. My own contribution therefore differs from earlier 
accounts in taking the pirate specifically as an international legal idea and, through a 
detailed historical analysis of the origins and evolution of the figure, undermines its 
construction in international legal thought as a timeless enemy of humankind 
stretching backwards through all of human history. Instead, it emphasises the 
contingency of the figure’s emergence, tracing its origins to a concrete conjuncture of 
inter-imperial rivalry and merchant capitalist interests. Moreover, without denying the 
ideological importance of the pirate identified by Rediker et al. in the crystallisation 
of a capitalist world economy in the 18th and 19th centuries, my own contribution 
traces the figure’s origins to an earlier period. The thesis shows how the roots of the 
pirate’s universal enmity emerged specifically in the long 16th century in the service 
of imperial interests—first in the religious ideology of a Catholic-Habsburg 
imperialism and, later, in the secular ideology of a nascent commercial imperialism. 
                                                        
16 Amedeo Policante, The Pirate Myth: Genealogies of an Imperial Concept (Routledge, 2015). 
17 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79, ed. Michel 
Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 56. 
 197 
This history casts new light on modern invocations of the pirate as a 
paradigmatic figure in international law. Once established in the juridico-political 
imagination, the figure of the pirate as universal enemy was invoked to target not just 
any adversary, but specifically other perceived enemies of commercial society. The 
pirate was a familiar trope for English colonists on the American continent. Indigenous 
peoples, classified as ‘savages’, were regularly compared to the pirate, both 
impediments to progress and the security of commerce requiring ‘conceptual and 
physical displacement’, to borrow Christopher Tomlins’s phrase.18 Various charters 
for settlement from the 17th century identified the Amerindians as barbarians, pairing 
them with ‘other Enemies, Pirats and Robbers’ and, on that basis, allowing the 
colonists to ‘make warre . . . and by God’s assistance to vanquish and take them and 
being taken to putt them to death’.19 Pirate and ‘savage’: both, as William Morris put 
it, were to be ‘slain in wicked resistance to the benevolence of British commerce’.20 
Such analogies drew not only on the pirate’s new secular identity but also 
earlier theological meanings. In once more joining barbarian and pirate, colonists 
recalled the image of the Islamic pirates as a dangerous Other to Christian Europe. If 
this racialised dimension of the pirate first emerged in its association with the North 
African Moors, it could also be found in Atlantic discourses in the 16th century. When 
English ‘pirates’ like Hawkins and Drake were found to have formed strategic 
alliances with indigenous populations and Cimarron communities in the Americas, 
they were further decried by the Spanish as ‘traitors to their own race’21 who were 
‘infected’ with the ‘inherent barbarism of the natives’.22  
In the 19th century, in particular, the pirate was regularly mobilised to racialize 
and denounce non-European groups and rival trading networks resistant to imperial 
subsumption. In the Persian Gulf, the Malay archipelago, and elsewhere, the British 
branded communities pirates, placing them outside humanity and the commercial 
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society of civilized states.23 So too in the Mediterranean, where the states of North 
Africa were once more racialised as uncivilised barbarians. Deemed pirates, they were 
systematically denied statehood, their status as hostes humani generis once more 
legitimation for imperial violence, now US and British bombardment and French 
colonisation. Such invocations reproduced an already common racialised trope of 
international law, with non-Europeans constituted as legitimate targets for violence 
through their casting as ‘savage’ or ‘uncivilised’—or, increasingly, as ‘pirates’.24  
Today, this rhetoric resurfaces in relation to Somali piracy, the racialised 
essentialism of Somalis in general, and Somali pirates in particular, reproduced, as 
described in Chapter 1, by popular and legal discourses alike. So too is the pirate’s 
relationship to commerce visible in the reactions to Somali depredation. The 
heinousness of the Somali pirates suggested in Paul Greengrass’s Captain Phillips lay 
in the fact that they impeded the smooth flow of commerce across the world’s pelagic 
highways—that they, as Alexandra Ganser puts it, ‘immobilize[d] the US protagonist 
and his business ventures, a professional in the mobile world of late capitalism’.25 
Somali pirates, like the Portuguese of Grotius’s treatise, threaten the flow of 
commodities and commerce. Yet if this is the pirate’s original sin, the seed of animus 
that pitches him against mankind, it has remained hidden in much international legal 
thought, lost from sight as the pirate is discursively produced and reproduced as an 
abstract figure of illegitimacy and enmity.  
This thesis places the relationship between the pirate and commerce squarely 
back into the frame of analysis, inviting us to reconsider this paradigmatic figure of 
international legal thought. If the pirate is the enemy of humanity, how is it that 
humanity became synonymous with trade and commerce? In the constant rehearsal of 
the pirate’s perennial enmity, the history of that relationship—rooted in the emergence 
of commercial imperialism as celebrated by Grotius—is rendered invisible. Imperial 
interests are recast as universal concerns, imperial violence naturalised as necessary 
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policing actions in defence of humanity. Today, the violence of the Somali pirate 
directed against transnational corporate trade is criminalised and cast as inimical to 
civilisation. The everyday violence produced by that trade, meanwhile, is naturalised, 
the figure of the pirate, and the international legal thought that reifies its exceptional 
status, contributing to an ideological closure. And what then of the pirate’s other 
avatars: the torturer, the génocidaire, the terrorist—but also the native, the savage, the 
barbarian. What is lost when we uncritically accept and reproduce their identification 
as hostes humani generis? 
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